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Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and

Association: Who Should Get
What and Why
(The Impact of Adoptions, Adult Adoptions,
and Equitable Adoptions on Intestate
Succession and Class Gifts)
Jan Ellen Rein*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Within the past fifty years formal adoption has evolved from a
relative rarity to become a truly popular means of ushering newcomers into a family. An estimated 150,000 children are adopted
annually.1 A recent United States Senate committee report indicates that adoptees constitute approximately five percent of our
citizenry and that the relationships created affect up to a third of
* Associate Professor of Law, Gonzaga University School of Law. Member, New York
State Bar and Washington State Bar. B.A. 1962, Wellesley College; LL.B. 1965, Georgetown
University Law Center.
The author wishes to acknowledge the research assistance of John C. Wilson, Gonzaga
University School of Law, Class of 1983, and Benjamin R. Simpson, Gonzaga University
School of Law, Class of 1984. Special thanks go to Josefa E. O'Malley, Gonzaga University
School of Law, Class of 1984, and Charles E. Maduell, Gonzaga University School of Law,
Class of 1985, for their research assistance and unstinting work on the technical aspects of
this manuscript.
Throughout this Article male pronouns will be used whereever the use of phrases like
"his or her" would be textually awkward.
An abbreviated version of this Article will appear in W. McGOVERN & J. REIN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE ImN
STS, to be published by West Publishing Co.
1. Adoption in America, 1981: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aging, Family and
Human Services of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 6 (1981) (statement of Sen. Jepson) [hereinafter cited as Adoption in America]. Although the Children's Bureau stopped keeping adoption statistics after 1975, statistics
based on incomplete reports from only 42 of the 50 states listed approximately 104,000

adoptions for 1975. U.S. Dm"'T OF

HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, ADOPTIONS IN

1975, 1, 7

PUn. No. (SRS) 77-03259 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ADOPTIONS IN 1975]. Between 1965 and
1971 over one million children were adopted. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITD STATES:

1976, at 321 (97th ed. 1976).
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the United States population.2
While adoption today is a commonplace and socially acceptable means of begetting children, our succession laws have not
kept up with this modern day fact of life. Adoption, like biological
begetting, creates a network of family relationships that extends
far beyond the nuclear family. In order to give the relationships
that adoption creates full recognition in accordance with the attitudes of today's society, we must reform our succession laws to accommodate this newly popular institution. Although the courts
and legislatures have made some progress in this direction, even
the most progressive states have not fully addressed the multifarious ramifications of adoptive relationships on succession. The less
progressive states still treat the adoptee in matters of succession
like a second class family member within his adoptive family and,
conversely, give him largely unusable and unwarranted rights of
succession within his biological family. Even the most well-meaning legislative attempts to integrate adoptive relationships into our
succession laws have been piecemeal and disorganized. Judicial efforts have been understandably hampered by the restraints of separation of powers.
This Article explores the questions that courts and legislatures
must address in order to integrate the social phenomenon of adoption into our succession laws, monitors the progress that has and
has not been made in dealing with these questions, and proposes a
comprehensive approach to the treatment of adoptees in matters
of succession. Specifically, part I1 introduces the traditional approach to relationship by adoption, while part HI compares the
past and present goals of adoption. Part IV discusses the legal status of adoptees in the context of intestate succession. This discussion explores past and present trends and examines the special
policy considerations that apply to in-family adoptions. Part V discusses the treatment of adopted-in and adopted-out children
under class gifts and also addresses the retroactivity issue which
has sharply divided our courts. Part VI deals with adult adoptions
and the special problems they pose in succession cases, both testate and intestate. Part VII explores the uncharted terrain of equitable (informal) adoption. It explains the theoretical bases for equitable adoption, discusses the consequences of equitable adoption,
and suggests more realistic criteria for judging equitable adoption
claims. Part VII concludes by discussing the special policy consid2. Adoption in America, supra note 1, at 114, 119.
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erations that should guide the courts in deciding how far to extend
the equitable adoption doctrine.
II. RELATIONSHIP BY ADOPTION: THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
The popularity of adoption today necessitates the full integration of this new institution and the relationships it creates into our
succession laws. Progress in this direction has been slow because of
the common-law reverence for blood as the basis of succession.
Following the maxim "Solus Deus facit haerdem, non homo" (God
alone makes the heir, not man),s our succession law started with
the assumption that inheritance rights are based on consanguinity
and that any deviation from this principle requires express authorization either by legislation or by a private dispositive instrument.4
This assumption underlies society's traditional reluctance to cut
off an adoptee's inheritance rights from biological relatives or to
recognize inheritance rights of an adoptee vis-a'-vis the kin of his
adoptors absent a compelling statutory mandate. 5 The results produced by this traditional attitude work at cross-purposes with the
modern goal of adoption-to promote the adoptee's welfare by giving him a "fresh start" as a full-fledged member of his adoptive

family.'
The traditional preoccupation with blood ties is now on the
wane. Nevertheless, progress toward accommodating our succession laws to the phenomenon of relationship by adoption remains
halting. Adoption statutes have tended to focus on the qualifications for adoption and the procedures for perfecting it. Until re3. See Note, Adopted Children:InheritanceThrough Intestate Succession, Wills and
Similar Instruments, 42 B.U.L. REv 210, 210 (1962) (quoting Co. Litt. 191a § 6, n.3.).
4. See Binavince, Adoption and the Law of Descent and Distribution:A Comparative
Study and a Proposal for Model Legislation, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 152, 154-58 (1966); Comment, The Adopted Child's Inheritance from Intestate Natural Parents,55 IOWA L. REv.
739, 739-41 (1970). The court in Dodson v. Ward, 31 N.M. 54, 60, 240 P. 991, 993 (1925),
emphatically expressed this view.
5. For some illustrative cases, see Hawkins v. Hawkins, 218 Ark. 423, 236 S.W.2d 733
(1951); Estate of Kruse, 120 Cal. App. 2d 254, 260 P.2d 969 (1953); In re Tilliski's Estate,
390 Ill. 273, 61 N.E. 2d 24 (1945); Estate of Ballentine, 81 N.W.2d 259 (N.D. 1957). The
terms "biological" and "natural" will be used interchangeably in this Article to denote blood
relatives.
6. The Washington Supreme Court clearly enunciated this view of the goal of modem
adoption in In re Estates of Donnelly, 81 Wash. 2d 430, 436-38, 502 P.2d 1163, 1166-68
(1972); see also CmILDREN's BUREAU, U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, LEGISLATIV

GUIDES FOR THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE ADOP-

28-29 (1961) [hereinafter cited as TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS];
Comment, Intestate Succession, Sociology, and the Adopted Child, 11 VILu. L. REV. 392,
400 (1966); authorities cited infra notes 33-36.
TION OF CHILDREN
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cently state legislatures did not concern themselves with the impact this new institution might have on our laws of either testate
or intestate succession. Even recent attempts to deal with the
ramifications of adoption on succession have been piecemeal, the
statutes often providing no guidance for situations that arise. The
resulting picture is one of uneven progress and great diversity
among the states.'
Considering the impact of adoption on succession, two major
areas of inquiry exist. First, what rules should determine intestate
succession by, from, and through an adopted person? Second, what
rules of construction should determine whether class designations
like "children," "issue," or "heirs" used in private dispostive instuments include persons who allege membership in the class by virtue of adoption? Related questions that cut across both areas of
inquiry concern whether a person adopted as an adult should receive the same treatment as one adopted as a child, and what status a court should accord the "equitably adopted" child who is not
adopted with statutory formalities, but may nevertheless be able to
maintain a claim in equity to part of his putative adoptor's estate.
III.

THE GoALs OF ADOPTION: PAST AND PRESENT

No judgment ought be made about how our succession laws
should treat adoptees without a historical perspective on the purposes of adoption, past and present.' In early Rome and in other
ancient cultures, adoption served a primarily religious function associated with ensuring a legitimate male heir to carry out sacred
obligations.9 Even after the religious overtones vanished, civil law
countries viewed adoption principally as a vehicle for perpetuating
the adoptor's name and property rather than as a means of benefiting the adoptee. The English common law did not recognize
adoption at all; England finally legalized it by statute in 1926.10
Although Americans have always farmed out children in some
fashion, adoption as known today did not fully emerge until the
7. For a detailed discussion of this development in the various states with extensive
references to statutes and case authority as well as commentary on the subject, see 7 R.
PoWELL, THm LAw OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 1004-1007 (R. Rohan rev. ed. 1982).
8. For a brief introduction to the history of adoption, see Binavince, supra note 4, at
154-58; Kuhlman, Intestate Succession By and from the Adopted Child, 28 WASH. U.L.Q.
221, 222-24 (1943). For more extensive historical treatments, see Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REv. 743 (1956); Presser, The HistoricalBackground
of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAm. L. 443 (1971).
9. Presser, supra note 8, at 445-48.
10. Adoption of Children Act, 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, ch. 29.
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mid-nineteenth century when general adoption legislation was introduced on a wave of social welfare reform.11 Before then child
placement in this country was an informal affair, involving almost
no governmental regulation. An English practice called "puttingout" came with the Puritans to the American colonies. The practice, followed by rich and poor alike, was to send one's offspring to
another family for more objective discipline and training than a
fond parent could provide. 12 In short, society viewed the "puttingout" period as a phase of the child's education and preparation for
13
a useful role in society.
Although the colonial system initially served purposes other
than the placement of orphans, it was conveniently available to fill
the breech in those cases as well. Upon the death of one or both
parents, a child was simply "put-out" for a suitable blood relative,
usually designated in the decedent's will, to raise. Orphaned or
abandoned children without family connection were less fortunate.
Waifs too young for apprenticeship went to public almshouses
where they were sustained and given a rudimentary education until they were useful enough to be either "bound-out" (indentured
or apprenticed) or sent to uninvestigated homes. 4 Although some
attention went to the child's well-being, this placement served
mainly to relieve the public of a ward while providing economic
benefit to the master or mistress who received the child. Some orphans may have been lucky enough to get a real family situation
out of this arrangement. The public almshouses, however, made
little organized effort to place children in an amiable environment
or to protect them from exploitation.1 5 In a parallel development,
wealthy eighteenth century patriarchs began incorporating orphans
and the children of less fortunate relatives into their households.1 6
Families wishing to formalize the arrangement obtained private
legislation, the effect of which varied, depending on the jurisdiction, from merely changing the child's surname to conferring lim11. See, e.g., 1855 Me. Acts ch. 189; 1851 Mass. Acts ch. 324.
12. See Presser, supra note 8, at 456-58; 1 A. CALHOUN, A SocIAL HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN FAMILy 172, 203 (1917).
13. Recall that the public school system we take for granted was then nonexistent.
14. See 1 A. CALHOUN, supra note 12, at 124-27; H. WrrmR, E. HERzOG, E. WEINSTmIN
& M. SULLIVAN, INDEPENDENT ADOPTIONS 33-34 (1963).
15. Although laws eventually were passed that sought to protect apprentices and indentured servants from exploitation, no evidence suggests that these statutes were invoked
regularly. See 1 A. CALHOUN, supra note 12, at 307-10.
16. See 1 A. CALHOUN, supra note 12, at 232; 2 A. CALHOUN, supranote 12, at 23, 144;
Presser, supra note 8, at 459-61.
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ited heirship rights in the event of the adoptor's intestacy.1 7
By the nineteenth century changing economic and social conditions combined to make these once reasonably workable child
placement systems completely unworkable.1 8 The industrial revolution brought as its byproduct the blight of widespread urban poverty. This development, combined with the tidal wave of immigrants that hit American shores, caused already inadequate
almshouses and orphanages to overflow with destitute, dependent
children. The traditional child placement and welfare practices
were simply unable to cope with this growing tide of unfortunate
children. While some agencies tried to ensure that apprenticiable
youths were "bound-out" to suitable masters, the sheer numbers
requiring placement probably made careful scrutiny impossible in
most cases.19 The cutthroat economic atmosphere of the times
made it tempting for masters and mistresses to use their charges as
unpaid labor and to dispense with the child rearing side of the arrangement. Thus, children who failed to die of disease or neglect in
overcrowded orphanages were left increasingly defenseless against
economic exploitation in an American version of Oliver Twist.
Around this time a revival of Christian philanthropy swept the
nation. The plight of America's homeless children naturally invited
the attention of Christian reformers who, through religiously affiliated private agencies, began to shift the focus of their efforts toward the placement of infants and young children in homes where
they would be treated more like family members than servants."°
The advent of public education facilitated these early placement
efforts by sparing recipient families the cost of educating the
placed child. The prototype of adoption as we know it today
emerged from this kind of placement. As the families that took in
these young adoptees sought to formalize the arrangement through
private statutes, the state legislatures felt increasingly pressured to
enact general adoption legislation.2
17. See Presser, supra note 8, 461-64.
18. For a detailed chronicle of this development, see Presser, supra note 8, at 470-89.
19. "[T]here is little evidence of any adequate inquiry into the circumstances of the
persons receiving children, or of any system of subsequent oversight. The children, after
leaving the doors of the institution, were in too large measure lost sight of." H. FOLKS, THE

CARE op

DEsTrruTE, NEGLECTED, AND

DELINQUENT

CHILDREN

64-65 (1902).

20. See Presser, supra note 8, at 482-88.
21. Id. at 477. Although legislatures enacted general statutes designed to facilitate
adoptions and make a public record thereof before this time, the Massachusetts legislature
passed the first comprehensive adoption act providing for the welfare of adopted children in
1851. 1851 Mass. Acts ch. 324. Examples of the earlier statutes generally requiring merely

19841

IMPACT OF ADOPTIONS

717

The official legislative histories of these first adoption laws
give no clue as to the motives of the legislators who drafted them.
But one may surmise that these statutes were a response to the
prevailing socioeconomic conditions, and that the statutes reflected
a glacial shift in public attitudes from the notions of apprenticeship and service to the notion that child placement should primarily serve the welfare of the dependent child.22
Modern adoption statutes are replete with statements that
make it clear that the primary focus of today's adoption laws is the
well-being of the adopted child.23 The requirement of many modern adoption statutes that prospective adoptors pass a rigorous
screening process before the adoption is finalized illustrates this
concern.2 4 In the case of the out-of-wedlock infant given to strangers for adoption, society generally deems it in the adoptee's best
interests to make him a full-fledged member of his adoptive family. This assimilation can occur only if the adopting family treats
the adoptee in all respects, including matters of succession, as
though he had been born into his adoptive family. Furthermore, it
is apparent that an adoptee's retention of ties with his biological
family can undermine the psychological aspect of this assimilation.
Thus, the Washington Supreme Court has described the broad objective of Washington's "overlapping adoption and inheritance
statutes"25 as "giving the adopted child a 'fresh start' by treating
him as the natural child of the adoptive parent, and severing all
ties with the past." 26 Similarly, the North Carolina Supreme Court
in a 1981 decision discerned a "legislative intent that the legal effect of a final order of adoption ... be substitution of the adoptive

in place of the natural family and severance of legal ties with the
child's natural family .... 7
the filing of a deed of adoption appear in 1846 Miss. Laws ch. 60; 1850 Tex.Gen. Laws p. 36,
ch. 39.
22. Presser, supra note 8, at 470-71, 515-16.
23. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 227 (West 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1525 (SmithHurd 1980); N.Y. DoM. RIn. LAW § 114 (McKinney 1977); Tax. FAm. CODE ANN. § 16.08
(Vernon 1975); VA. CODE § 63.1-230 (1981-82).
24. See, e.g., CAL. Civ CODE § 226 (West 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1508 (SmithHurd 1980); N.Y. DoM. RFL. LAW §§ 113-116. (McKinney 1977); Tax. FAm. CODE ANN.
§ 16.03 (Vernon 1975); VA. CODE § 63.1-223 (1981-82).
25. In re Estates of Donnelly, 81 Wash. 2d 430, 438, 502 P.2d 1163, 1167 (1972).
26. Id. at 436, 502 P.2d at 1166. Four justices dissented regarding the narrow holding
of the Donnelly majority. Donnelly, however, concerned what will be described as an infamily adoption, an adoption in which the same considerations may not apply. See infra
notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
27. Crumpton v. Mitchell, 303 N.C. 657, 664, 281 S.E.2d 1, 6 (1981).
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By, FROM, AND THROUGH ADOPTED
PERSONS

A.

The Ramifications of Adoption on Intestate Succession

Although adoption as we know it has existed for over a hundred years, our succession laws have only recently begun to focus
on adoptive relationships.
In dealing with the impact of adoption on intestate succession,
a well considered statute should resolve the following questions: (1)
Can the adoptee and the adoptor inherit from each other? (2) Can
the adoptee inherit through the adoptor from the the adoptor's
kindred? (3) Can the adoptor's kindred inherit from and through
the adoptee? (4) Should the adoptee's former ability to inherit
from his biological parents and their kindred be retained or abolished? (5) Should the former ability of the biological parents and
their kindred to inherit from the adoptee be retained or abolished?
(6) Should any of these questions be answered differently in relative adoption cases when the adoptor is either a stepparent or a
blood relative of the adoptee? (7) How should these questions be
answered with respect to inheritance by, from, and through the descendants of an adoptee? (8) Should these questions be answered
differently with respect to inheritance by, from, and through a person who is adopted as an adult? (9) Assuming some inheritance
rights are preserved between an adoptee and his biological kindred, should an individual adopted by a blood relative-for example, a natural grandparent-be allowed to inherit from and
through the adoptor in two capacities, once as an adoptive and
once as a natural relative? (10) In the case of successive adoptions,
should mutual inheritance rights be recognized between the adoptive child and both sets of adoptive relatives? 8
Unfortunately, the statutes of too many states are silent or
vague on many of these points, leaving much to be filled in by case
law. The Kansas2 e and South Dakota 0 statutes, for example, while
creating a parent-child relationship between the adoptor and the
adoptee (and in Kansas terminating the biological parents' rights
of inheritance from the adoptee) are completely silent about
whether the adoptee may still inherit from his biological parents
and kindred and are also completely silent about possible inheri28. Similar formulations of some of these questions appear in 7 R. POWELL, supra note
7, § 1004, and M. RHEINSTEIN & M. GLENDON, THE LAW OF DECEDENT'S ESTATES' 43 (1971).
29. KAN. STAT. ANN §§ 59-501, -507, -2103 (1983).
30. S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN §§ 25-6-12, -16, -17 (1976).
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tance rights between the adoptee and his other relatives by adoption. The Oklahoma Statute establishes full reciprocal rights of inheritance between the adoptee and his adoptive family and denies
the biological parents and kindred inheritance from the adopted
child, but does not say whether the adoptee has rights of inheritance from his biological parents and relatives in addition to his
inheritance rights within the adoptive family.3 1 Illinois restricts inheritance by biological parents and kin from the adoptee to
properties that the adoptee acquired from them by gift, will, or
inheritance, but is silent concerning the adoptee's ability to inherit
from his biological parents and relatives.3 2 Most statutes make no
distinction between adult adoptees and persons adopted during
minority. Similarly, most statutes fail to mention the adoptee's
own descendants, although it seems that when the adoptee has full
status within his adoptive family this status should establish complete rights of inheritance by, from, and through the adoptee's descendants within that family.
B.

The Modern Trend-Complete Transplantation

We must assess the adequacy of state provisions for succession
by, from, and through an adopted person against the goals of modern adoption. As indicated, the primary focus today is on the
adopted child's welfare. The goal in nonrelative adoption cases is
to achieve a complete severence of the child from his biological

family and a total transplantation of the child into his adoptive
family.3 The Uniform Probate Code (UPC) intestacy provision,
31. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.16 (West Supp. 1983). Case law has filled in this
omission by allowing an adopted child to inherit from both adoptive and natural parents.
See, e.g., Meadow Gold Dairies v. Oliver, 535 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1975); In re Estate of Marriot,
515 P.2d 571 (Okla. 1973).
32. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1 , § 2-4 (Smith-Hurd 1978).
33. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. In In re Estates of Donnelly, 81
Wash. 2d 430, 502 P.2d 1163 (1972), the Washington Supreme Court looked at the statutory
provisions requiring (1) that all adoption files "be sealed and not open to inspection," WASH.
RIv. CODE ANN. § 26.32.150 (1961), (2) that "the records of the registrar be kept secret," id.
§ 26.32.120, and (3) that the adopted child's new birth certificate "bear the new name of the
child and the names of the adoptive parents ... but ... make no reference to the adoption
of the child," id. § 70.58.210. From its review of these and similar provisions, the court
concluded that a "legislative policy of providing a 'clean slate' to the adopted child permeates our scheme of adoption." Further, the majority found that "the only conclusion consistent with the spirit of our overlapping adoption and inheritance statutes is that RCW
11.04.085 [a statute tersely stating that an adopted child is not an heir of his natural parents] was intended to transfer all rights of inheritance out of the natural family upon adoption and place them entirely within the adopted family." 81 Wash. 2d at 437-38, 502 P.2d at
1167; see also UNiF. ADo rON ACT § 14, Commissioner's note, 9 U.L.A. 45 (1971); SECOND
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enacted in fourteen states, reflects that goal in matters of inheritance through its definition of "child," which provides that "[i]f,
for purposes of intestate succession, a relationship of parent and
child must be established to determine succession by, through, or
from a person,

. . .

an adopted person is the child of an adopting

parent and not of the natural parents... ."s' The Uniform Adoption Act, enacted in six states, also seeks total substitution of the
3
adoptive family for the biological family in the typical situation. 5
In spite of these two uniform acts, the movement to transplant the
adoptee into his adoptive family for all purposes 6 has been sadly
disorganized, and some states continue to lag behind.
C. States Restricting Inheritance Within the Adoptive Family
While most jurisdictions now recognize reciprocal inheritance
rights between the adoptee and the relatives of the adoptive parents, several states still deny or limit such reciprocal rights. The
Vermont statute, for example, expressly prohibits inheritance between the adopted child and his adoptive ancestral and collateral
relatives. 7 The Alabama statute, in granting the adopted child the
limited right to inherit "from his adopting parents and through
REPORT OF THE TEP:ORARY STATE COMM'N ON THE MODERNIZATION, REVISION AND SIMPLIPICATION OF THE LAW OF ESTATES TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No.
19 app. E at 146[204] (1963) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 19]. For a discussion
of "in-family" or "relative" adoptions, see infra notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
34. UNIF. PROBATE CODE (UPC) § 2-109, 8 U.L.A. 66 (1982); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 13.06.005-.36.100 (1972); ARIZ. RaV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-1101 to -7307 (1975); CoLo. REV.
STAT. §§ 15-10-101 to -17-101 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 731.006-735.302 (West 1976); HAWAH REV. STAT. §§ 560:1-101 to :8-102 (1976); IDAo CODE §§ 15-1-101 to -7-307 (1979); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 1-101 to 8-401 (1981); MICH. Compu. LAws ANN. §§ 700.1-.993
(West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 524.1-101 to .8-103 (1975); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-1-101
to -5-502 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-2201 to -2902 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-1-101
to -7-401 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-01-01 to -35-01 (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-1101 to -8-101 (1978).
35. UNIF. ADOPTION AcT § 14, 9 U.L.A. 44-45 (1971); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-101 to -125
(Supp. 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-8-101 to -202 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN §§ 40-7-1 to -728 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-15-01 to -15-23 (1981); Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3107.01.19. (Page 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 60.1-.23 (West 1981).
36. For examples of state statutes that adopt the modern view without adopting the
specific provisions of either the UPC or the Revised Uniform Adoption Act, see CAL. PRon.
CODE § 257 (West 1956); GA. CODE ANN § 74-413 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 170-B:20,
:22 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-50 (West Supp. 1981). A recent student work lists 25 states
that achieve a total substitution of the adoptive for the biological family, but the statutes
are so rife with gaps and exceptions that this listing is not totally accurate. See Case Comment, Adoption-Intestate Succession-The Denial of a Stepparent Adoptee's Right to
Inherit from an Intestate Natural Grandparent:In re Estate of Holt, 13 N.M.L. REV. 221,
229 n.50 (1983).
37. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 448(9) (1974).

1984]

IMPACT OF ADOPTIONS

721

them from their natural and adopted children," suggests by omission that the adoptee cannot inherit through his adoptive parents
from their ancestral and collateral kindred." Some courts interpreting similarly incomplete statutes have given them a liberal
construction to further the primary goal of adoption.39 But in
South Dakota where the statute is silent on this question,40 the
supreme court held that an adopted child could not inherit
through his predeceased adoptive father from his adoptive paternal grandfather. 41 The court reasoned that the clause of the statute
providing that "[a]fter adoption the two... shall sustain towards
each other the legal relation of parent and child" restricted the
effects of adoption to the relationship between the adopted child
and the adoptive parent. According to this narrow view, adoption
makes the adoptee the child of his adoptor, but does not make him
the grandchild or issue of his adoptor's parents. The court offered
several traditional arguments to support its narrow interpretation.
First, the court argued that adoption is a contractual arrangement,
binding only the adoptor, the adoptee, and his natural parents. As
a companion argument, the court urged that while the adopting
parents have the right to adopt a person as their heir, they have no
right to foist an heir on their relatives, "who are not parties to the
contract of adoption.

' 42

These arguments ignore the fact that a

child's birth always imposes a potential heir on the relatives of his
biological parents, yet no one would suggest that the child should
not inherit from his blood relatives because they had not consented to his conception. In the typical case of the child adopted as
an infant, adoption effects the equivalent of a natural birth into
the new family. Indeed, it has been called a "social birth. '4 Thus,
upon entering his adoptive family the adopted child, like his biological counterpart, acquires not only new parents but also new
38.

ALA. CODE § 26-10-5 (1975). Oddly enough, however, the same statute gives all of

the adopting parents' natural and adopted kindred rights of inheritance from the adopted
child and his descendants.
39. See In re Estate of Taylor, 136 Neb. 227, 285 N.W. 538 (1939); In re Masterson's
Estate, 108 Wash. 307, 183 P. 93 (1919); In re Caldwell's Estate, 26 Wyo. 412, 186 P. 499
(1920). The Nebraska and Washington legislatures have since modernized the statutes to
make them more complete. See NE. REv. STAT. § 30-2309 (1980); WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 11.02.005(4), 26.32.140 (1974).
40. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 25-6-16 to -17 (1976).
41. In re Eddin's Estate, 66 S.D. 109, 279 N.W. 244 (1938).
42. Id. at 110-11, 279 N.W. at 245. (quoting R.C. 1919 § 209, amended by S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 25-6-16 (1976)) (emphasis added).
43. See Note, Intestate Succession and Adoption in Utah: A Need for Legislation,
1969 UTAH L. REv. 56, 60.
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siblings, grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins. The 4 South Dakota court's narrow view, which it recently reaffirmed,

4

is out of

harmony with today's concept of adoption as a socially sanctioned
means of creating true family ties.
The South Dakota Supreme Court's final justification for its
restrictive reading of the statute was that explicit or inexorable
statutory mandate must authorize any deviation from the principle
that inheritance follows blood. 46 This attitude runs directly against
the principle that courts should construe remedial legislation liberally to further the policy of the statute. In adoption cases that policy is to promote the well-being of the adoptee by making him a
full-fledged member of his new family.47 The discrimination

against the adoptee that occurs in Vermont, Alabama, and South
Dakota is bound to retard achievement of this goal by making the
adopted child feel like a second-class family member. As a justice
of the Utah Supreme Court remarked in discussing this exclusion
from full inheritance rights, "He is a member of the family, yet he
is not, and the realization of this fact by him and other members of
the family leaves an area of rejection which is, in many instances,
more important psychologically than is concern over material
values.

'48

In the converse situation the South Dakota Supreme Court
has ruled that an adoptee's adoptive relatives cannot inherit
through the predeceased adoptive parents from the intestate
adoptee.4 9 This rule is bound to create resentment and disharmony
within the adoptive family, especially when the intestate estate in44. See In re Estate of Edwards, 273 N.W.2d 118 (S.D. 1978).
45. As Justice Loevinger of the Minnesota Supreme Court stated:
We have come to realize that it is not the biological act of begetting offspring-which is
done even by animals without any family ties-but the emotional and spiritual experience of living together that creates a family. The family relationship is created far more
by love, understanding, and mutual recognition of reciprocal duties and bonds, than by
physical genesis.
In re Trust Created by Will of Patrick, 259 Minn. 193, 196, 106 N.W.2d 888, 890 (1960)
(footnote omitted).

46. This is a variation of the old saw that statutes in derogation of the common law
must be strictly construed.
47. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
48. In re Smith's Estate, 7 Utah 2d 405, 409, 326 P.2d 400, 403 (1958) (dissenting
opinion). The Utah Supreme Court, using arguments identical to those just discussed, adhered to the same view as the South Dakota Supreme Court until the Utah legislature rescued adopted children from the court by enacting UPC § 2-109 in UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-1101 to -8-101 (1978). For an excellent discussion and critique of the Utah cases, see Note,
supra note 43.
49. In re Estate of Edwards, 273 N.W.2d 118 (S.D. 1978).

1984]

IMPACT OF ADOPTIONS

herited by the adoptee's biological kin to the exclusion of his adoptive kin consists entirely of property derived from the adoptive
family.
D. States Continuing Inheritance Ties with the Adoptee's
Biological Family
Several states have bucked the modern legislative trend toward a complete transplant by statutorily continuing to allow the
adopted-away child to inherit from his biological parents or kindred.50 Furthermore, in some states with statutes silent on this
question, case law has recognized the adoptee's right to inherit
from his natural family.5 1 For example, in a 1976 case a court allowed the intestate's adopted-away illegitimate daughter, who did
not learn of intestate's identity as her biological mother until she
was eighteen, to inherit from the intestate to the exclusion of the
intestate's adoptive sister.2 In another case, a court permitted the
intestate's natural son whom she had relinquished for adoption at
the age of three months to inherit from her to the exclusion of the
intestate's brother. 53 The courts taking this position expand on the
consanguinity argument-that express statutory mandate is necessary to break the right of inheritance created by blood-by arguing
that the adoptee, unlike his natural and adoptive parents, has had
no oportunity to consent to his adoption and, therefore, should not
50. The Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, Vermont, and Wyoming statutes expressly preserve the right of the adoptee to inherit from his natural parents and kindred. See ALA.
CODE § 26-10-5 (1975); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 214 (West Supp. 1982); TEx. FPA. CODE ANN
§ 15.07 (Vernon 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 448(9) (1974); Wyo. STAT. § 2-4-107 (1977).
51. See In re Tilliski's Estate, 390 Il1. 273, 61 N.E.2d 24 (1945); Meadow Gold Dairies
v. Oliver, 535 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1975); Harrell v. McDonald, 90 S.D. 482, 242 N.W.2d 148
(1976); Sorenson v. Churchill, 51 S.D. 113, 212 N.W. 488 (1927). The natural parents and
kin are usually denied a reciprocal right of inheritance from the adopted-away child. Thus,
Alabama and Vermont expressly exclude the adoptee's natural parents and kindred from
such inheritance while Illinois restricts the natural parents and kindred to properties the
adoptee acquired from them by gift, will, or inheritance. Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110
1h, § 2-4 (1978) with ALA. CODE § 26-10-5 (1975) and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 448(9) (1974).
The Wyoming statute is not clear, but by giving the adoptive parents and kindred the right
to inherit from the adoptee, seems to exclude the natural parents and kin. Wyo. STAT. § 2-4107 (1977). Although South Dakota case law permits the relatives of the natural parents to
inherit from the adopted-away child, see In re Estate of Edwards, 273 N.W.2d 118 (S.D.
1978), it does not permit the natural parents themselves to do so. The theory behind this
distinction seems to be that the natural parents, unlike the relatives, were privy to the
adoption contract and, by consenting to the adoption, agreed to give up any right to inherit
from the adopted-away child. All of these states make an exception permitting the natural
parent to inherit when the adopting parent is a spouse of the natural parent.
52. Harrell v. McDonald, 90 S.D. 482, 242 N.W.2d 148 (1976).
53. Sorenson v. Churchill, 51 S.D. 113, 212 N.W. 488 (1927).
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lose his birthright by virtue of an adoption to which he did not
agree."
Although exceptional cases always will arise, recognition of
continuing ties of inheritance between the adoptee and his biological family seems undesirable in the typical case from the standpoint of practicality and public policy. The majority of adoptees
are relinquished for adoption at infancy.5 5 The adoption file is almost invariably sealed to ensure that the identity of the biological
and adoptive parents will remain confidential. Hence, as a practical matter, it is usually difficult if not impossible for the adoptee or
his blood relatives to find each other.8 6 Even if these practical difficulties were overcome, association of the natural relatives with the
adopted child, whether through intestacy proceedings or otherwise,
may often disturb a young adoptee by dividing his loyalties between the natural and adoptive relatives and by prematurely forcing him to face the rejection of his relinquishment for adoption.
The very purpose of state regulations requiring sealed adoption
records is to protect the adoptive family from post adoption disruption, thereby strengthening the new family unit and promoting
the adoptee's assimilation into it. Recognition of continuing ties of
inheritance with the adoptee's natural family runs at cross-pur54. See Harrell v. McDonald, 90 S.D. 482, 484, 242 N.W.2d 148, 149 (1976), (quoting
with approval Sorenson v. Churchill, 51 S.D. 113, 212 N.W. 488 (1927)). But cf. Estate of
Carriger, 4 Kan. App. 2d 590, 609 P.2d 685 (1980) (adopted-away child not eligible for family allowance out of father's estate). Questions concerning the status of an adopted-away
child vis-a-vis his natural parents and kindred also can arise in a class gift setting. See infra
notes 125-50 and accompanying text.
55. Due to the relative scarcity of "healthy white infants" available for adoption,
placement of older children is on the rise. See W. MnZAN, ADiN. FOR CHELDREN, YOUTH
AND FAmmS U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUmAN SERIWCES, PUB. No. (OHDS) 80-30288,
ADOPTION SERVCES INTHE STATES 1 (1980). Nevertheless, the great majority of placements
to unrelated adoptors still involve infants. The percentage distribution by age of children at
the time of placement in 1975 was as follows:
Under 1 year ............................................................
63%
1 year to 6 years .........................................................
25%
O ver 6 years .............................................................
12%
Id. at 2 (citing ADOPTIONS IN 1975, supra note 1).
56. W. MnszAN, supra note 55, at 33. The Washington State Supreme Court made this
point in In re Estates of Donnelly, 81 Wash. 2d 430, 437-38, 502 P.2d 1163, 1167 (1972).
Moreover, a law that recognizes an adoptee's right to inherit from his natural relatives creates uncertainty in titles because usually only the adoptive parents and the adoption agency
know the identity and whereabouts of the adoptee. See N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 19, supra note
33, at 111; Note, supra note 43, at 68 n.72. For a discussion of the jurisdictional and administiative mishaps that failure to achieve total severance from biological relatives can create,
see In re Estate of Best, 116 Misc. 2d 365, 455 N.Y.S.2d 487 (Sur. Ct. 1982). See Morris v.
Ulbright, 558 S.W.2d 660 (Mo. 1977), discussed infra note 150, for an example of a nightmarish title dispute.
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poses with this policy. 57 This position is not necessarily antithetical
to the view that it may under certain circumstances be desirable to
authorize the opening of the adoption file when the adoptee
reaches majority. Once the adoptee reaches adulthood, post adoption disruption is no longer a concern and the adoptee is sufficiently mature to deal with the revelation of his roots. In any
event, an adoptee can fulfill the psychological need to know the
identity of his biological parents without having a right to inherit
from his natural relatives.5
The courts that permit an adoptee to inherit from his blood
relatives are actually assuming that natural filiation must survive
adoption. 9 The upshot of this assumption is that the adoptee is
given dual sources of inheritance. This right to inherit from two
sets of relatives, natural and adoptive, affords the adoptee an advantage denied biological children.
In addition to these policy objections, the recognition of such
dual filiation can lead to bizarre and inequitable results in a fairly
common fact pattern. The adoption of an orphan by a grandparent, aunt, or other blood relative is not uncommon. If the adoptor
or some other natural relative on the same side of the family
should die intestate, the question may arise whether the adoptee
can take a double share by inheriting from the decedent in two
capacities-once as a relative by adoption and once as a biological
relative. Cases in Utah and Kansas have held that a grandchild
57. As a Washington appellate court recently put it. "One important objective of the
relinquishment and adoption statutes is to protect the adopting parents, the child, and the
new family relationship from subsequent disturbance by the natural parents." In re Santore,
28 Wash. App. 319, 327, 623 P.2d 702, 707 (1981); see also In re Estates of Donnelly, 81
Wash. 2d 430, 502 P.2d 1163 (1972); UNti. ADOMON ACr § 14 Commissioner's note (1971);
N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 19, supra note 56, at 111; Binavince, supra note 4, at 183-84. Professor

Binavince spells out the policy considerations in greater detaih
The need for a psychological environment that assures successful adoption dictates the
complete removal of the child from his natural family. Maintaining the child's connec-

tion with his natural family casts serious obstacles in the path of achieving mutual
affection and responsibility within the adoptive family. It leaves the child uncertain as
to whom he should treat as "parents." Besides, prospective adoptive parents obviously

desire, and are entitled to, a protected privacy and free use of the discretion approximating that of a natural filial relationship. The fact that children are adopted at an
early age hopefully assures full assimilation into the adoptive family before the child
reaches the age of discretion. It is extremely doubtful that the child will find it to his
advantage, even at an advanced age, to be continuously exposed to the unfortunate

events that led to his adoption.
Binavince, supra note 4, at 183-84.
58. For a judicial discussion and recognition of this need, see Mills v. Atlantic City
Vital Statistics Dep't, 148 N.J. Super, 302, 372 A.2d 646 (Ch. Div. 1977).
59. Binavince, supra note 4, at 166.
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adopted by his grandparent can inherit twice from the same decedent, once in his status of adopted child and again by representation as a natural grandchild.60 While this result may at first blush
appear advantageous to the child, the resentment it creates is
likely to damage his standing within the family.' A 1975 Illinois
case carried this incongruity one step further by holding that an
orphan adopted by a sister of the intestate could inherit a double
share from the intestate by taking once as the intestate's adoptive
niece and again as a representive of her natural parent, who was
another sibling of the intestate.62 Courts that sanction this kind of
inequity rely on the traditional line that adoption creates additional rights but does not divest the child of existing rights absent
express statutory divestiture.63 These anomalous results are a direct outgrowth of the misconception that natural filiation must
survive adoption. In jurisdictions which follow the modern rule
that inheritance rights between the adoptee and his biological kindred cease upon adoption, the phenomenon of an adoptee taking
twice from the same decedent should not occur. Thus, in New
Jersey, which follows the modern view, a chancery court had no
difficulty in holding that when the decedent's parents adopted the
daughters of the decedent's sisters, the daughters could inherit
from the decedent only as sisters and, by being adopted, lost any
right of inheritance they formerly had as the decedent's nieces."
60. In re Bartram's Estate, 109 Kan. 87, 198 P. 192 (1921); In re Benner's Estate, 109
Utah 172, 166 P.2d 257 (1946) (subsequently overruled by the Utah legislature through
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-109 (1978)). Contra Billings v. Head, 184 Ind. 361, Ill N.E. 177
(1916); Delano v. Bruerton, 148 Mass. 619, 20 N.E. 308 (1889). The legislatures in Indiana
and Massachusetts have since amended the statutes to prohibit inheritance by the adoptee
from natural kindred. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-9 (Burns 1972); MAss. ANN. LAW ch. 210, § 7
(Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983-84).
61. As Justice Turner of the Utah Supreme Court explained:
After the relationship of a parent of adoption and child is created, can there by anything of greater moment for a child's happiness and general welfare than the love and
respect of brothers and sisters of adoption and the love and respect of the boys and
girls born of his own natural parents? If we are concerned primarily with the welfare of
the child we must be concerned with the preservation of these relationships. They cannot exist when the adopted child gives evidence of such a covetous nature that he
would take a dual inheritance at the expense of these.
In re Benner's Estate, 109 Utah 172, 179, 166 P.2d 257, 260 (1946) (dissenting opinion).
62. See In re Estate of Cregar, 30 Ill. App. 3d 798, 333 N.E. 2d 540 (1975). The facts
have been streamlined in the interest of readability. The court held inapplicable to the facts
of this case a statute preventing the adoptee from inheriting in two capacities from the
estate of his adoptor.
63. See id. at 804-05, 333 N.E. 2d at 545; In re Bartram's Estate, 109 Kan. 87, 90-91,
198 P. 192, 194 (1921)(quoting with approval from Wagner v. Varner, 50 Iowa 532 (1879)).
64. Crego v. Monfileto, 104 N.J. Super. 416, 250 A.2d 161 (1969).
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Some courts have carried the traditional assumption that
natural filiation survives adoption still another step to the extreme
of holding that a twice adopted child can inherit from both sets of
adoptive parents. These courts reason that when a child is adopted
he becomes the equivalent of a biological child to his adoptors. The
courts conclude that the legal parent-child relationship, once established, like its natural counterpart, cannot be severed by a subsequent adoption unless a statute expressly so provides."5 The
analogy of the first adoptor to a natural parent can achieve the
opposite and more desirable result in a jurisdiction that abolishes
the child's inheritance ties with his natural family upon adoption.
Thus, in a 1980 case, In re Estate of Luckey,66 the Nebraska Supreme Court reasoned that the Nebraska statute terminating the
relationship between an adopted child and his natural parents
mandated that the analogous relationship between the first
adoptors and the child be likewise terminated by a later adoption
to which the first adoptors consented. Chief Justice Krivosha
commented:
It makes little or no sense to suggest that the law intended that if one were a
natural parent and an adoption occurred, all relationship, including the right
to inherit by intestacy, would terminate, but if one were an adoptive parent
who later consented to a subsequent adoption, the relationship would not terminate and the right to inherit would continue. Once the second adoption
occurs, there is no longer any legal relationship between the relinquishing
7
parent and the child. Any other reading of § 30-2309 would be absurd.

Using this logic a court in a UPC state or any other state that
follows the modern policy of complete transplantation should have
no difficulty in reaching the preferable result of Luckey. Nevertheless, because it is desirable for the legislatures to make this explicit, the drafters of the UPC should consider enactment of a proviso to make it clear that in the event of successive adoptions the
child shall be deemed the natural child of his most recent adoptors
65. See Hawkins v. Hawkins, 218 Ark. 423, 236 S.W.2d 733 (1951); Holmes v. Curl, 189
Iowa 246, 178 N.W. 406 (1920); Dreyer v. Schrick, 105 Kan. 495, 185 P. 30 (1919); In re
Egley's Estate, 16 Wash. 2d 681, 134 P.2d 943 (1943). But see Quintrall v. Goldsmith, 134
Colo. 410, 306 P.2d 246 (1957); In re Estate of Leichtenberg, 7 IlM. 2d 545, 131 N.E.2d 487
(1956); In re Carpenter's Estate, 327 Mich. 195, 41 N.W.2d 349 (1950) (reasoning that the
adoptee cannot simultaneously be the adopted child of multiple sets of adoptive parents
and, thus, that the most recent adoption abolishes all rights and duties created by the prior
adoption). For the present state of Washington law, see In re Estates of Donnelly, 81 Wash.
2d 430, 502 P.2d 763 (1972); WASH. Rav. CODE ANN. §§ 11.04.085, 26.32.140 (1979).
66. 206 Neb. 53, 291 N.W.2d 235 (1980).
67. Id. at 57, 291 N.W.2d at 238.
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and shall not be deemed a child of his prior adoptors."
E. In-Family Adoptions
While cutting off inheritance ties between the adoptee and his
natural family is usually best, arguably these ties should remain in
the case of some in-family adoptions. In-family adoptions, also
called relative adoptions, typically occur as follows: (1) An orphaned child is adopted by a blood relative, usually a grandparent;
(2) a young unwed mother lets her parents adopt and raise her
illegitimate child; (3) one biological parent dies while still married
to the other, and the surviving biological parent eventually marries
a new spouse who adopts the child; or (4) following divorce of the
biological parents the custodial parent remarries and the stepparent adopts the child with the consent of, or after the death of, the
noncustodial parent.
The policy considerations differ depending on whether the
adoption is in-family or to strangers. Yet, in dealing with the impact of adoption on succession, many states do not differentiate
between the two types of adoption. The number of in-family adoptions is certainly significant enough to warrant separate consideration by our legislatures. Of the completed adoptions officially recorded in 1975, sixty-three percent were relative adoptions.69 Not
surprisingly, considering the rising divorce rates, stepparent adoptions accounted for eighty-five percent of those relative
adoptions.70
Let us examine the outcome of some typical relative adoption
cases in a jurisdiction which follows the modern rule that inheritance rights between the adoptee and his natural kindred cease
upon adoption. Jack and Jill, the parents of Junior, are killed in an
accident. Jill's parents, Junior's maternal grandparents, adopt Junior. Junior will inherit from his parents because they died prior to
the adoption. Upon adoption, Junior will gain the right to inherit
from and through his adoptive parents, his natural maternal
grandparents, but will lose the right to inherit from and through
68. See O'Connell & Effland, Intestate Succession and Wills: A ComparativeAnalysis
of the Law of Arizona and the Uniform Probate Code, 14 ARiz. L. REv. 206, 219 (1972). A
few states have enacted such a proviso. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-9 (Bums 1972);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN § 170-B:22 (1977); see also CoLO. Rzv. STAT. § 15-11-109 (1973) (case
law has supplied the proviso in Quintrall v. Goldsmith, 134 Colo. 410, 306 P.2d 246 (1957)).
69. W. MEzzAN, supra note 55, at 52.
70. Id. at 50-51.
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his pateral kindred unless some exception is made.7 1 This result
obtains despite the likelihood that Junior will continue to have a
family relationship with his paternal grandparents and other paternal relatives. An even more common scenario is the following.
Jack dies, either while still married to or after divorcing Jill. Jill
eventually remarries and consents that her new husband adopt
Junior. Upon adoption, Junior will gain the right to inherit from
and through his adoptive father.7 2 His inheritance rights from and
through Jill, his biological mother, will remain.7 3 But unless some
exception is made, Junior will lose the right to inherit from and
through his paternal relatives even though the natural associations
and ties of affection with his father's family will likely continue. 4
When strangers adopt a child, many good reasons support cutting off all ties with the adopted child's biological relatives. The

child's bonding with his adoptive family is disturbed if the child's
biological relatives interfere with the new family. To prevent this

kind of harassment authorities seal the child's orignial birth certificate and all records of the adoption, making it almost impossible
for the adoptee and his blood relatives to find each other. This
confidentiality also shields the biological parents from public exposure and spares them the mental anguish of knowing where the
child is; confidentiality thus allows the emotional wound of relinquishment to heal. Finally, if legal ties with the biological family
71. See Reeves v. Bailey, 53 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 126 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1975) (dictum);
Thornberry v. Timmons, 406 S.W.2d 151 (Ky. 1966).
72. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
73. Many states have statutory provisos expressly preserving the relationship between
the child and the natural parent whose spouse adopts the child. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN § 170-B:20 (1977) ("[B]ut, when a child is adopted by a stepparent, his relationship to
his natural parent who is married to the stepparent shall in no way be altered by reason of
the adoption."); N.J. STAT. ANN § 9:3-50 (1981); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-107(a)(i) (1977); see
also U.P.C. § 2-109, 8 U.L.A. 66 (1982) ("except that adoption of a child by the spouse of a
natural parent has no effect on the relationship between the child and either natural parent"). Even without such a proviso, that a court would deny mutual rights of inheritance
between the child and the custodial natural parent under these circumstances seems almost
inconceivable since such parent's rights would not ordinarily be terminated by his or her
spouse's adoption of the child.
74. This was the holding on almost identical facts in In re Estate of Holt, 95 N.M. 412,
622 P.2d 1032 (1981) (child adopted by stepfather after noncustodial father's death denied
heirship in paternal grandmother's estate); In re Estates of Donnelly, 81 Wash. 2d 430, 502
P.2d 1163 (1972) (child adopted by widowed mother's new spouse denied heirship in paternal grandfather's estate); In re Estate of Topel, 32 Wis. 2d 223, 145 N.W.2d 162 (1966)
(child adopted by stepfather after noncustodial father's death denied heirship in paternal
grandfather's estate). The Wisconsin legislature later overruled Topel by statute. See Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 851.51(2)(b) (West 1971). For a critique of the Holt decision, see Case Comment, supra note 36.
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remain, the necessity of searching for adopted-away children com75
plicates the settlement of decedents' estates.
The foregoing considerations do not usually apply when the
adoption occurs within the child's original family. Members of the
original family usually know about the adoption and continue their
associations with the child.78 In cases in which natural associations
and emotional bonds remain, continuing ties of inheritance may
make sense. Certainly the matter warrants legislative consideration. Of course, any jurisdiction making an exception to the modern rule terminating biological inheritance for in-family adoptions
should also enact a proviso to avoid the phenomenon of an adoptee
77
taking in two capacities from the very same decedent.
The UPC makes a limited exception to the modern rule of total severance from natural relatives by providing that if the spouse
of one biological parent adopts the child, the adoption does not
affect the child's relationship with either natural parent.7 8 This exception is both too broad and too narrow. It is too broad because it
applies when the other parent is still alive, but has surrendered the
child for adoption by the ex-spouse's new husband or wife. Except
in the case of illegitimate children, a stepparent cannot adopt his
spouse's child while the other parent is alive unless the other parent has failed to support the child, abandoned the child, consented
to the adoption, or had his parental status terminated for cause.7 '
The preservation of the child's relationship with a parent who has
voluntarily relinquished the child for adoption or abandoned him
in some manner seems wrong. The approach of the Revised Uniform Adoption Act is preferable because it preserves the relation75. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text; see also Case Comment, supra note
36, at 228, 230.

76. Two recent opinions from New York's judiciary have remarked on the differences
between "relative" adoptions and adoptions to strangers. See ex rel. Sibley v. Sheppard, 54
N.Y.2d 320, 429 N.E.2d 1049, 445 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1981); In re Estate of Best, 116 Misc. 2d

365, 455 N.Y.S.2d 487 (Sur. Ct. 1982). In Sibley, the issue was grandparent visitation.
77. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see supra notes 60-64 and accompanying
text. For example, the UPC preserves the relationship between the child and both natural
parents in the stepparent adoption situation, see U.P.C. § 2-109(1), 8 U.L.A. 66 (1982), and
provides that "[a] person who is related to the decedent through 2 lines of relationship is
entitled to only a single share based on the relationship which would entitle him to the
larger share," see U.P.C. § 2-114,8 U.L.A. 72 (1982). Because the UPC only makes an exception in the stepparent adoption situation, the only case that might produce the dual inheritance phenomenon in a UPC state is that in which the adopting stepparent is a relative
(e.g., a sibling) of the dead natural parent.
78. U.P.C. § 2-109(1), 8 U.L.A. 66 (1982).
79. See generally Comment, A Survey of State Law Authorizing Stepparent Adoptions Without the Noncustodial Parent'sConsent, 15 AKRON L. Rav. 567 (1982).

IMPACT OF ADOPTIONS

1984]

ship between the child and the other natural parent only if that
parent has died "without the relationship of parent and child having been previously terminated."80 Both the UPC and the Uniform
Adoption Act exceptions are too narrow because they do not cover
the case of a child adopted by a blood relative-for example, a parent-of his biological mother or father. Unless some exception is
made, this classic in-family adoption will terminate all inheritance
rights between the child and the nonadopting side of his natural
family. Because of the likelihood that a family relationship between the child and the nonadopting side of his family will continue, the retention of inheritance ties between the adoptee and
that side of his family seems reasonable.
V.

THE STATUS OF ADOPTEES UNDER CLASS GiwTs

If a donor executes a will, trust, or other private instrument
making a class gift to someone's "children," "grandchildren,"
"nieces and nephews," "issue," "heirs,"81 or "descendants," can
one who claims membership in the designated class by dint of
adoption share in the gift? Two illustrations suffice. Suppose T devises property to A for life, remainder to A's "children." A has one
biological child, X, and later adopts another child, Y. Should Y,
who was adopted into the status of A's child, share in the devise
the same as X, who was born into that status? Suppose now that T
devises property to A for life, remainder to A's "nieces and nephews." A's brother, B, adopts a boy named Z. In designating A's
nephews did T intend that Z, who was adopted into the status of
A's nephew take the remainder the same as though he had that
status by birth? With adoption creating an increasing number of
relationships, construction problems of the type just illustrated
have become the subject of a seemingly endless stream of
80. Umw. ADOPTION AcT § 14, 9 U.L.A. 44-45 (1971). Other commentators share this
view. See Brantley & Effland, Inheritance,The Share of The Surviving Spouse, and Wills:
Arkansas Law and the Uniform Probate Code Compared, 3 Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 361,
373-74 (1980). This author recognizes, however, that sometimes a parent consents to the
adoption of his child out of an honest and selfless belief that such adoption will best serve
the child's welfare. Such parents typically continue to maintain emotional and financial ties
with the child after the adoption. These are cases of placing the child's ultimate well-being
above the parent's own ego. To cover these cases a court should have the power, upon a
showing of good cause, to preserve the child's inheritance rights from the relinquishing natural parent.
81. The discussion in this section assumes that neither the doctrine of worthier title
nor the Rule in Shelley's Case is applicable.
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litigation.2
We start with the proposition that whether or not an adoptee

partakes depends on the donor's intent in using the terminology he
used. The status of adoptees under the adoption, descent, and distribution statutes is not controlling on this issue.8 3 When the transferor's intent is clear from the instrument,84 or clearly shown by
surrounding circumstances or other admissible extrinsic evidence,
that intent should be honored.8 5 In most instances, however, the
instrument is totally unenlightening and it is probably safe to assume that the question never presented itself to the donor's mind
for, if it had, he would have expressed his desires explicitly. In this,
the vast majority of cases, the court must find the donor's intent
somehow and does so by indulging in a presumption as to what the
average donor using the language he used must have intended.
Here is where the adoption statutes and the statutes of descent
and distribution come in by the back door. Most courts now view
these statutes as reflective of community attitudes toward
adoptees and thus, by inference, reflective of the attitude of the
particular donor as a member of the community. As Justice Weintraub of the New Jersey Supreme Court explained, "[t]he important point is that the statute reflects the feeling and attitude of the
82. See generally Halbach, The Rights of Adopted Children Under Class Gifts, 50
IOWA L. Rav. 971 (1965); Note, The Dilemma of Adoptees in the Class Gift Structure-The

Kentucky Approach: A Rule Without Reason, 59 Ky. L.J. 921 (1971); Comment, Eligibililty
of Adopted Children to Take by Intestate Descent and Under Class Gifts in Missouri, 34
Mo. L. Rzv. 68 (1969). For the problems posed by adoption in determining maximum class
membership, see Fetters, The Determination of Maximum Membership in Class Gifts in
Relation to Adopted Children: In re Silberman's Will Examined, 21 SYRcusE L. REv. 1
(1969).
83. See Estate of Pierce, 32 Cal. 2d 265, 269, 196 P.2d 1, 3-4 (1948); see also In re
Estate of Nicol, 152 N.J. Super. 308, 377 A.2d 1201 (1977); Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
v. Willim, 151 W. Va. 429, 153 S.E.2d 114 (1967).
84. See, e.g.,Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Andrews, 264 N.C. 531, 142 S.E.2d 182
(1965); Vaughn v. Vaughn, 161 Tex. 104, 337 S.W.2d 793 (1960) (court considered the use of
the word "born" to show a clear intent to exclude adoptees). Commenting that "[b]irth is
not synonymous with adoption," the court in Wachovia deemed the word "born" sufficient
to rebut a statutory presumption in favor of adoptees. 264 N.C. at 538, 142 S.E.2d at 187.
How much weight courts should give words and phrases chosen out of habit by a drafter is a
question that this Article considers.
85. See, e.g., In re Ward's Will, 9 A.D. 2d 950, 195 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1959), af'd, 9 N.Y.2d
722, 174 N.E.2d 326, 214 N.Y.S. 2d 340 (1961). For a discussion on this phase of the construction process, see generally 4 W. BowF & D. PARKER, PAGE ON WMLs §§ 30.6-.10 (rev.
ed. 1961). Courts and legislatures, however, often promulgate the modern pro-inclusion constructional preference with a companion rule requiring that donor's contrary intent be expressed within the four corners of the instrument. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying
text. In this writer's view, a rigid rule rejecting extrinsic evidence in all cases is a mistake.
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average man and hence its policy should be followed unless the
benefactor explicity reveals a contrary purpose.""8
A. Instruments Executed by an Adoptive Parent
As a general rule, a class gift that designates the transferor's
own "children," "issue," or "heirs" includes a child adopted by the
transferor himself. This is generally true even when the adoption
takes place after execution of the dispositive instrument." A few
courts have departed from this general rule to avoid letting the
adoptee take in two capacities when the adoptor-transferor is the
adoptee's natural grandparent and the class gift includes both children and grandchildren of the transferor.88
B. Instruments Executed by Someone Other than the Adoptive
Parent
The cases of greatest difficulty have been those in which an
adoptee seeks to take under an instrument executed by someone
other than the adoptive parent. The intent of the donor, not the
adoptor, controls, but the donor's actual intent is usually nonexistent or unascertainable. Until quite recently the prevailing presumption was that when a person not a party to the adoption
made a gift to someone else's "children," "issue," "grandchildren,"
or other class of relations, he did not intend to include anyone not
biologically born into the class. This "stranger-to-the-adoption"
doctrine, which presumptively barred one from entering a designated class by virture of adoption when the donor was not the
adoptor,89 probably reflected the traditional English reverence for
bloodlines in inheritance and property dispositions. One must also
remember that in the early twentieth century when this doctrine
developed, adoption was not as widespread and socially accepted
as it is today. Also, the adopted child in those days had only a
limited status within his adoptive family under most state intestacy laws.
Even in its heyday, the "stranger-to-the-adoption" presumption yielded to an affirmative showing of intent to include the
adoptee. One circumstance sometimes held to rebut the presump86.

In re Coe, 42 N.J. 485, 489, 201 A.2d 571, 574 (1964).

87. See Halbach, supra note 82, at 976 nn.23-28 and accompanying text; Note, supra
note 82, at 928 nn.51-55 and accompanying text.

88. See, e.g., Einstein v. Michaelson, 107 Misc. 661, 177 N.Y.S. 474 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
89. See 2 Am. Jun. 2D Adoption § 98 (1962); Halbach, supra note 82, at 978 nn.33-53
and accompanying text; Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 12, 17 (1962).
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tion was that the adoption antedated execution of the instrument
and the donor knew of the adoption.90 A less commonly employed
exception was that if the parent of the designated class was apparently incapable of having children, the court would presume that
the donor contemplated the possibility of children being adopted
into the class."1 If the donor designated the adoptor's "heirs" or
"next of kin" as the beneficiary class, an adoptee could generally
take because courts presumed that the donor referred to the applicable statutes of descent and distribution under which an adopted
child would always be an heir of his adoptive parent.2 A few
courts drew distinctions between terms like "children" on the one
hand and "issue" or "bodily heirs" on the other because they
thought the latter terms had a peculiarly biological connotation.
Most courts, particularly in recent years, have questioned the usefulness of such distinctions. 4
90. See, e.g., Mesecher v. Leir, 241 Iowa 818, 43 N.W.2d 149 (1959); In re McEwan's
Estate, 128 N.J. Eq. 140, 15 A.2d 340 (Prerog. Ct. 1940); Estate of Breese, 7 Wis. 2d 422, 96
N.W.2d 712 (1959); see also 2 AM. JuR. 2D Adoption § 98 (1962); Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 12, 18
(1962).
91. See Halbach, supra note 82, at 984 nn.62-63 and accompanying text.
92. On the other hand, if the donor designated his own "heirs" as the beneficiary class,
an adoptee would not necessarily take because until quite recently adopted children were
denied inheritance rights through their adoptive parents from their adoptive parents' lineal
and collateral kindred.
93. See, e.g., Poertner v. Burkdoll, 201 Kan. 41, 439 P.2d 393 (1968); Holter v. First
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 135 Mont. 27, 336 P.2d 701 (1959); In re Fisler, 131 N.J. Eq. 310,
25 A.2d 265 (Prerog. Ct. 1942), aff'd, 133 N.J. Eq. 421, 30 A.2d 894 (1943), overruled, In re
Thompson, 53 N.J. 276, 250 A.2d 393 (1969); see also Note, supra note 82, at 929-30 nn.5365 and accompanying text.
94. As Chief Justice Weintraub commented:
[W]e would not, as an original matter, distinguish among issue, descendants, children
and heirs, since ordinarily the word is not selected by the testator but rather by the
scrivener, who, if he were conscious of the question whether adopted children should be
in or out, would elicit the testator's wish and express it unequivocally ....
[A] competent draftsman would not deliberately pick a word which instead of controlling the
context is easily colored by it.
In re Estate of Coe, 42 N.J. 485, 494, 201 A.2d 571, 577 (1964); see also In re Trusts Created
by Agreement with Harrington, 311 Minn. 403, 410, 250 N.W.2d 163, 167 (1977). In Harrington Justice Scott of the Minnesota Supreme Court said:
Given the judicial history of the rights of adopted children, the use of the term "issue
of her body" without further elaboration is not sufficiently explicit to exclude an
adopted child from the benefits of this trust. To hold otherwise would cast a cloud over
this state's policy toward adopted children and add to the reports another mindless
case based on sham "intent" manifested in virtually meaningless common-law phrases.
This trustor, we believe, had no intent at all regarding inclusion or exclusion of
adopted children. In such a case, a strong public policy provides a better reason for
decision than an old common law phrase.
Id. at 410, 250 N.W.2d at 167. Contra Moore v. McAlester, 428 P.2d 266 (Okla. 1967). Al-
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With family relationships routinely being established by adoption, courts have increasingly questioned the assumption underlying the "stranger-to-the-adoption" rule. The majority opinion in In
re Estate of Coe95 aptly expressed the judicial attitude prevailing
today, saying:
We cannot believe it probable that strangers to the adoption would differentiate between the natural child and the adopted child of another. Rather we
believe it more likely that they accept the relationships established by the
parent whether the bond be natural or by adoption and seek to advance those
relationships precisely as that parent would. None of us discriminates among
children of a relative or friend upon a biological basis .... We ought not
impute to others instincts contrary to our own."

Most courts which have had occasion recently to consider the issue
have jettisoned the "stranger-to-the-adoption" rule and have replaced it with a presumption that a donor intends to include persons entering the designated class by adoption unless the instrument expressly excludes them. 97 One court has taken the emphatic
view that explicit language must be used to exclude an adoptee so
that no mere inference based on "interpretation of words which
though Oklahoma had adopted the Uniform Adoption Act, which has a strong presumption
in favor of adoptees, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in McAlester held that the adopted
child of testator's daughter was not "issue of her body," explaining that the phrase " 'issue
of her body' has a clear and well-defined meaning. It is not ambiguous or doubtful. It is such
a phrase as is customarily used (as distinguished from the word 'issue') for one purpose and
one purpose only to exclude adopted children from the class described." Id. at 270.
95. 42 N.J. 485, 201 A.2d 571 (1964).
96. Id. at 492, 201 A.2d at 575 (1964) (citations omitted). Justice Neely of the West
Virginia Supreme Court expressed it more pungently. See infra note 112 and accompanying

text.
97. See, e.g., In re Estate of Heard, 49 Cal. 2d 514, 319 P.2d 637 (1957); Brown v.
Trust Co., 230 Ga. 301, 196 S.E.2d 872 (1973) (gift of remainder under testamentary trust to
testator's "nephews and nieces" presumptively includes child adopted by one of testator's
sisters); Elliott v. Hiddleson, 303 N.W.2d 140 (Iowa 1981) (gift of remainder to children's
"lineal heirs" under testamentary trust presumptively includes child adopted by daughter
after testator's death); In re Thompson, 53 N.J. 276, 250 A.2d 393 (1969) (postponed testamentary gift to daughter's "lawful issue" presumptively includes child adopted by daughter
after testator's death); In re Estate of Coe, 42 N.J. 485, 201 A.2d 571 (1964) (bequest to
"lawful children" of Theodora presumptively includes children adopted by Theodora after
testatrix' death); Estate of Tafel, 449 Pa. 442, 296 A.2d 797 (1972) (gift of remainder to
child's "children" under testamentary trust presumptively includes children adopted by son
after testator's death); Vaughn v. Gunter, 458 S.W.2d 523 (Tex.Civ. App.), aff'd, 461
S.W.2d 599 (1970) (gift of remainder to son's "children" under inter vivos trust presumptively includes child adopted by son after settlor's death); Wheeling Dollar Say. & Trust Co.
v. Hanes, 237 S.E.2d 499 (W. Va. 1977) (gift of remainder to life beneficiary's "children"
under irrevocable inter vivos trust presumptively includes children adopted by life beneficiary after settlor's death); see also McCaleb v. Brown, 344 So. 2d 485 (Ala. 1977); Wallin v.
Torson, 88 Mich. App. 775, 279 N.W.2d 310 (1979); In re Estate of Park, 15 N.Y.2d 413, 207
N.E.2d 859, 260 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1965).
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generations of careless draftsmen have taught are frequently used
synonymously with child or children" will suffice to exclude
adoptees from class gifts.9 s Moreover, although authority is scant,
extrinsic evidence of an intent to exclude adoptees may not be admissible to rebut the new presumption. 9
The complete turnabout just described has been effected in
some states by the enactment of statutory presumptions favoring
adoptees in the construction of class gifts.10e In other states this

turnabout represents a judicial response to the legislative policy
expressed in modern statutes of putting adoptees on the same footing as biological children, thus granting the adopted child the same
status as a natural child with respect to intestate succession by,
from, and through his adoptive parents.101 Courts that have judicially created the new presumption have reasoned that when the
98. Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Trust Co. v. Hanes, 237 S.E.2d 499, 504 (W. Va. 1977);
accord Weilert v. Larson, 84 II1. App. 3d 151, 154, 404 N.E.2d 1111, 1113 (1980) (the term
"issue of their body" does not show plain intent to exclude adoptee in view of statutory
presumption that "an adopted child is deemed a natural child unless a contrary intent is
plainly shown [by the terms of the instrument]"); In re Trusts Created by Agreement with
Harrington, 311 Minn. 403, 250 N.W.2d 163 (1977). According to the Harrington court,
"[a]dopted children are conclusively presumed to have the same rights as any other children
under a will or similar document, unless adopted children are explicitly excluded. . . ." Id.
at 411, 250 N.W.2d at 167. "The fact that trustor here used the term "issue of the body"
rather than lawful issue is too slender a reed to outweigh that presumption." Id. at 408, 250
N.W.2d at 166 (footnote omitted). Contra Moore v. McAlester, 428 P.2d 266 (Okla. 1967).
99. Gotlieb v. Klotzman, 369 So. 2d 798 (Ala. 1979) (judicial presumption favoring
adoptee; court will not look beyond the "four corners of the instrument" unless latent ambiguities exist); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Chichester, 369 A.2d 701 (DeL 1976) (judicial presumption favoring adoptee; extrinsic evidence of intent to exclude inadmissible absent ambiguity in instrument itself), aff'd, 377 A.2d 11 (DeL 1977); Wielert v. Larson, 8411. App. 3d
151, 404 N.E. 2d 1111(1980) (statutory presumption requires that contrary intent plainly
appear by the terms of the instrument).
100. See, e.g., Brown v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 230 Ga. 301, 196 S.E.2d 872 (1973).
Vaughn v. Gunter, 458 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Civ. App.), aff'd, 461 S.W.2d 599 (1970) (applying
1951 statutory amendment codified in Tzx. FAm. CODE ANN.§ 16.09 (Vernon 1975)). Some
of the statutory presumptions, like the Georgia enactment cited herein, apply only to the
construction of wills, although a court might apply the presumption by analogy to an inter
vivos transfer. U.P.C. § 2-611 states a rule of construction favoring the inclusion of adoptees,
halfbloods, and illegitimate children in class gift terminology, but it too is limited to the
construction of wills. U.P.C. § 2-611, 8 U.L.A. 151 (1982). Warner v. First Nat'l Bank, 242
Ga. 661, 251 S.E.2d 511 (1978), later overruled the decision in Brown on the question of the
effective date of the law to be used in construing the instrument.
101. See, e.g., Elliott v. Hiddleson, 303 N.W.2d 140 (Iowa 1981); In re Estate of Coe,
42 N.J. 485, 201 A.2d 571 (1964) (in construing 1897 instrument, court could not rely on
statutory presumption expressly made applicable only to instruments executed after July 1,
1954); Wheeling Dollar Say. & Trust Co. v. Hanes, 237 S.E.2d 499 (W. Va. 1977). For an
interesting case in which a court surcharged trustees for failure to confirm an adoptee's
status as a trust beneficiary once the jurisdiction's highest court adopted the new presumption, see Estate of Sewell, 487 Pa. 379, 409 A.2d 401 (1979).
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donor's actual intent cannot be found, they should assume that his
intent was in harmony with public policy. UPC section 2-611,
which governs the construction of generic terms in wills, simply
states that "adopted persons... are included in class gift terminology ... in accordance with rules for determining relationships
for purposes of intestate succession."102

C. The Retroactivity Problem
The "stranger-to-the-adoption" 10 rule may be buried in most
jurisdictions, but it continues to rule from the grave in a surprising
number of cases. The problem arises as follows: Donor executes an
inter vivos or testamentary trust in 1920, providing for his daughter for life, with remainder to her "children" or "issue." Donor dies
in 1921. Daughter later has both biological and adoptive children
and dies in 1983, at which time the corpus becomes distributable.
In 1920 when the donor executed the instrument, adopted children
had only a limited status under the domiciliary state's intestacy
laws, and the "stranger-to-the-adoption" rule was in full flower. By
the time the life tenant dies in 1983 the jurisdiction has rejected
the "stranger-to-the-adoption" presumption as unsound and has
replaced it with a presumption favoring the inclusion of adoptees.
In deciding whether the donor intended adoptees to share in the
remainder, can the court apply the new presumption or must it
apply the presumption in vogue when the donor executed the instrument (or, alternatively died) even though the court now feels
the old presumption was a bad guide to donative intent? The
courts have divided sharply on this issue. ° 4
Occasionally, the retroactivity issue is felt to be decided by
statute. Some statutes expressly provide for retroactive application
of the new presumption. e5 If the new presumption is statutory and
102. The inclusionary rule of U.P.C. § 2-611 is given retroactive effect by virtue of § 8101(5) which provides that "any rule of construction or presumption provided in this Code
applies to instruments executed.. . before the effective date unless there is a clear indication of a contrary intent." U.P.C. § 8-101(5), 8 U.L.A. 565 (1982).
103. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
104. For discussions on retroactive application of new rules of construction in construing dispositive instruments, see generally Halbach, Stare Decisis and Rules of Construction
in Wills and Trust, 52 CALu. L. Rxv. 921 (1964); Levin, Section 6104(d) of the Pennsylvania Rule Against Perpetuities:The Validity and Effect of the Retroactive Application
of Property and Probate Law Reform, 25 VmL. L. Rav. 213 (1980).
105. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 78(c) (1981). The pro-inclusion rule of U.P.C.
} 2-611, when read together with U.P.C. § 8-101(5), has this effect as well; see supra note
102.

738

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:711

by its terms applicable only prospectively, the court may feel that
the legislation itself forbids retroactive application of the modern
constructional preference. 10 6 Even when the statute is silent on the
matter, or when the pro-adoptee presumption is judicial in origin,
however, a substantial number of courts have refused to apply the
new rule to old instruments." 7 As one commentator has noted, this
prospective-only approach results in a kind of "time layering,"
with different rules being applied and opposite results being obtained in identical transactions depending on the "effective time
selected for choice of law."1 8 It also produces unpredictability in
the construction of older instruments with an attendant increase in
litigation.1 09
At the root of decisions refusing to apply the new presumption
of inclusion retroactively is an assumption that the average American citizen of fifty or eighty years ago would not have wished nonblood related adoptive family members to partake of his bounty.
This assumption may or may not be true. We know that medieval
England's feudal landholding system promoted a preoccupation
with bloodlines. 110 We also know that, although feudal trappings
like primogeniture never took hold in the United States, the British colonists largely incorporated English precedent into the fabric
of American law. What we do not know is whether the common
American citizen shared the xenophobia that American lawmakers
106. See, e.g., Shortridge v. Sherman, 84 11. App. 3d 981, 406 N.E.2d 565 (1980) (alternative holding). But see In re Estate of Coe, 42 N.J. 485, 201 A.2d 571 (1964). In In re
Estate of Coe the legislature's enactment of a presumption applicable only prospectively did
not stop the New Jersey Supreme Court from fashioning its own rule favoring adoptees and
applying it retroactively, the majority's reasoning apparently being that since the courts
made the "stranger-to-the-adoption" rule, the courts could abolish it before the legislative
abolition became effective.
107. See, e.g., Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Summerlin, 445 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Kelchner v. Summerlin, 404 U.S. 851 (1971); Nunnally v. Trust Co. Bank, 243 Ga.
42, 252 S.E.2d 468, afld, 244 Ga. 697, 261 S.E.2d 621 (1979) (second appeal); Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co. v. Andrews, 264 N.C. 531, 142 S.E.2d 182 (1965); Central Trust Co. v.
Bovey, 25 Ohio St. 2d 187, 267 N.E.2d 427 (1971).
108. Levin, supra note 104, at 215 (footnote omitted).
109. Some courts may chafe at the distasteful "stranger-to-the-adoption" rule and
seek to escape its effects by the backdoor of "discovered" contrary intent speculatively gathered from unconvincing details of the particular litigation. For a lengthy examination of this
phenomenon, see Halbach, supra note 82.
110. Since land was the primary source of political power, social status, and wealth,
medieval English property owners naturally wished to keep family property in the family
bloodlines. See generally T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, PRFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 9 (1966); 3 W. HoLDswoRTH,A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 34-73, 171-85 (5th
ed. 1942); 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 363 (2d ed. reissued
1968).
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so readily accepted from English legal precedent. A plausible legal
argument can be made that courts should not apply the new proadoptee presumption to old instruments. Nevertheless, since we do
not know how the average American citizen of yesteryear felt
about adoptees, this writer believes it preferable to assume that his
intent was consistent with the attitudes and policies behind our
present overlapping adoption and succession laws.""' As the West
Virginia Supreme Court said in judicially promulgating the new
pro-inclusion presumption for retroactive construction of a 1938
trust instrument:
While there may be testators and trustors who are so concerned with medieval concepts of "bloodline" and "heirs of the body" that they would truly be
upset at the thought that their hard-won assets would one day pass into the
hands of persons not of their blood, we cannot formulate general rules of law
[presumably the court meant rules of construction] for the benefit of
eccentrics.112

Opinions refusing to give the new pro-adoptee presumption
retroactive application have offered a confusing array of reasons.
Courts have said (1) that to apply the new presumption retroactively would constitute a deprivation of property without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment; 1 ' (2) that
111. For a recent appellate decision following this tack, see In re Solid, 32 Wash. App.
349, 647 P.2d 1033 (1982).
112. Wheeling Dollar Say. & Trust Co. v. Hanes, 237 S.E.2d 499, 503 (W. Va. 1977). In
the New Jersey In re Estateof Coe decision the writer of the majority opinion commented,
"nor should be [sic] think we are different from our ancestors of 1877 ....
[T]he adoption
act of that year [referring to New Jersey's first general adoption statute] did not amend
human nature; it yielded to it." 42 N.J. 485, 492, 201 A.2d 571, 575 (1964).
113. See, e.g., Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Andrews, 264 N.C. 531, 142 S.E.2d 182
(1965). The traditional assumption has been that a court cannot apply a substantive rule
retroactively to divest or diminish a vested property interest. Not all courts have agreed
with this assumption and the Supreme Court has never definitively decided the issue. See
Levin, supra note 104, at 216, 223, 226-31. In favor of the new rule's retroactive application
to class gifts, it may be argued that all class gifts are by nature subject to fluctuation (increase or decrease of class membeship) and that accordingly class gifts cannot be said to be
totally vested until further fluctuation is rendered impossible by distribution or by some
other event. However, because of the elusive and chameleon-like quality of concepts like
vested versus contingent and substantive versus procedural, any attempt to decide questions
of retroactive application on the basis of whether the interest in question vested before the
enunciation of the new rule or whether the rule is substantive or procedural is bound to lead
to chaotic results and ultimate judicial despair. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. D'Amario,
368 Mass. 542, 333 N.E.2d 407 (1975). Distinctions based on whether the change is judicial
or legislative also fall in the category of distinctions without a difference because the practical effect of retroactive application is the same whether the rule is judicial or legislative.
Obviously, once property has been distributed to a class of beneficiaries under the old rule,
a new rule cannot be used to divest the beneficiaries of what they have already received.
Beyond that, courts must decide the question of retroactive application vel non on the basis
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the best guide to a donor's actual intent is the law existing at the
time the donor executed the instrument or, alternatively, at the
time of the donor's death; 11 4 (3) that the donor or his drafter relied
on the then existing state of the law in framing his dispositions; 115
and (4) that an intent to exclude the adoptee is discernable from
the instrument as a whole so that reliance on any presumption,
new or old, is unnecessary. 11 6 Particularly confusing are the opinions that glide from one reason to an inconsistent reason in a manner which makes the actual basis 7 of the court's refusal to apply the
11
new rule impossible to discern.

Despite the reliance argument and the other objections just
noted, a considerable number of courts have been willing to apply
the new pro-adoptee rule of construction to old instruments.1 8
The reasoning of the court in Haskell v. Wilmington Trust Cornof fairness and practical policy. For a more extensive discussion and suggestions regarding
the proper criteria for deciding questions of retroactivity, see Levin, supra note 104.
114. See, e.g., Riggs Nat'1 Bank v. Summerlin, 445 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Kelchner v. Summerlin, 404 U.S. 851 (1971); Nunnally v. Trust Co. Bank, 244 Ga.
697, 261 S.E.2d 621 (1979); Shortridge v. Sherman, 84 Ill. App. 3d 981, 406 N.E.2d 565
(1980) cert. denied sub nom. Shartel v. Blasingham, 450 U.S. 921 (1981); Central Trust Co.
v. Bovey, 25 Ohio St. 2d 187, 267 N.E.2d 427 (1971).
115. See, e.g., Riggs Natl Bank v. Summerlin, 445 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Kelchner v. Summerlin, 404 U.S. 851 (1971).
116. See, e.g., id.; Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Andrews, 264 N.C. 531, 142 S.E.2d
184 (1965).
117. Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Summerlin, 445 F.2d 201, 208 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Kelchner v. Summerlin, 404 U.S. 851 (1971), is an example. The majority began by
purporting to find an actual intent to exclude adoptees based on factors the import of which
were a "mystery" to the dissenting judge as well as this writer, but ended up with the reason
that "the draftsman must have known and relied upon the long-established principle in the
construction of wills that the law which may be regarded as relevant in ascertaining the
intent of the testator is that which was in existence at the time of his death." Id. at 208
(citations omitted). Another example is Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Andrews, 264 N.C.
531, 142 S.E.2d 182 (1965). The court began by saying that retroactive application of a proadoptee statutory presumption by its terms applicable retroactively would violate the federal and state constitutions. In response to counsel's argument that this application would
not be constitutionally infirm because the presumption merely created a rule of evidence to
employ in ascertaining the testator's intent when the donor executed the will, the court
switched to the argument that the word "born" in the disposition indicated an intent to
exclude adoptees. Besides entertaining doubts regarding the significance of the passing use
of the word "born" in introducing a class, this writer was left wondering whether or not the
court would have applied the new presumption had the word "born" not appeared in the
instrument.
118. See, e.g., Gotlieb v. Klotzman, 369 So. 2d 798 (Ala. 1979); Haskell v. Wilmington
Trust Co., 304 A.2d 53 (Del. 1973); Elliott v. Hiddleson, 303 N.W.2d 140 (Iowa 1981) (retroactive application without discussion of the issue); In re Thompson, 53 N.J. 276, 250 A.2d
393 (1969); In re Estate of Coe, 42 N.J. 485, 201 A.2d 571 (1964); Wheeling Dollar Sav. &
Trust Co. v. Hanes, 237 S.E.2d 499 (W. Va. 1977).
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pany'1 9 shows that a court which favors retroactive operation can
also play the reliance-intent game with a different outcome, of
course. The Delaware Supreme Court in Haskell justified retroactive application of the new presumption on the ground that when a
donor makes a gift to a class whose membership is determinable in
the indefinite future, he is presumed to know that the laws governing membership in the class may change prior to distribution
and, therefore, is presumed "to have intended that the statutes in
effect at the time the gift becomes operative be resorted to in de'120
termining membership in the class.
A more realistic approach is to recognize frankly that we do
not know what the typical donor circa 1920 would have said (had
he been asked) about an adoptee sharing his gift. Thus, any reliance on the state of the law governing the status of adoptees,
whether it be existing law or the law that may develop in the future, is largely mythical or, as Justice Cardozo might have said, is
"a figment of excited brains. ' 12 1 In the vast majority of cases the
donor or his drafter probably did not think about the matter at all,
much less rely on the law to fill in the donor's intent. 2 2 Once this
is recognized, concerns about violating some reliance interest or
unconstitutionally divesting a property disposition disappear. In
using the new presumption, the court is simply applying an evidentiary rule that it believes best reflects the attitudes of the average
person, not only now but also at the time of the instrument's execution. 12 3 In those extremely rare cases when the instrument reliably reveals an actual intent one way or the other, courts still will
respect the donor's justifiable reliance on his own clearly expressed
intent.
119. 304 A.2d 53 (Del. 1973); see also Wilmington Trust Co. v. Huber, 311 A.2d 892
(Del. Ch. 1973).
120. 304 A.2d at 54 (quoting Major v. Kammer, 258 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Ky. 1953)).
121. The picture of the bewildered litigant lured into a course of action by the false
light of decision, only to meet ruin when the light is extinguished and the decision is overruled, is for the most part "a figment of excited brains." B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICiAL PROCESS 122 (1921).

122. As Professor Halbach points out,
[i]f a question concerning the disposition of property under certain conditions occurs to
a lawyer while drafting a non-negotiated, unilateral instrument, even if he knows the
relevant rule, he does not deliberately omit covering the point in reliance upon a presumption of intent, especially one that is overcome by faint--or imagined-glimpses of
contrary intent.
Halbach, supra note 104, at 947.
123. For cases appearing to follow this approach, see In re Thompson, 53 N.J. 276, 250
A.2d 393 (1969); In re Estate of Coe, 42 N.J. 485, 201 A.2d 571 (1964); Wheeling Dollar Sav.
& Trust Co. v. Hanes, 237 S.E.2d 499 (W. Va. 1977).
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D. Adopted-Away Children
Thus far this Article has been concerned with the constructional rules that determine whether class designations like "children" or "issue" in private dispositive instruments should include
persons who allege membership in the class by virtue of adoption.
The converse of this problem is whether courts should hold these
terms to exclude persons who have been adopted-out of the donor's biological family. Suppose, for example, that T executes a
testamentary trust directing paying of income to his son, S,for life,
with corpus distributable to S's children. When T executes the
will, S is married to W and has a biological child, X. After T's
death S and W divorce. W remarries, whereupon S consents that
W's new spouse, X's stepfather, adopt X. S also remarries and has
another biological child, Y. In a state which follows the modern
view that adoption removes the adoptee from the bloodstream of
his biological family, at least for the purposes of intestate succession, should X share in the distribution of corpus along with Y?.
Should it make any difference that the adoption-out was to a complete stranger rather than to a stepparent or to some other person
known to the biological family?
Athough a few cases concern gifts from a relinquishing parent
to his own children, most involve instruments executed by a more
remote relative-usually a grandparent or great-aunt of the
adopted-out child. Many of the cases involve stepparent adoptions
as illustrated above. Since divorce is epidemic, more and more
cases like this will arise to plague the courts.
Although many factual variations exist, typically the problem
is that the child meets the class description when the donor executes the instrument, but because of a subsequent adoption-out or
change in state law, no longer meets the class description when the
gift becomes distributable. Yet the issue is not the technical status
of the child in the eyes of the law. Strictly speaking, the issue is
whether this particular donor meant to include the adopted-out
child whether or not he technically answers the class description.
As some judges have said, "[t]he question ... is one of identity of
donees, not the right of inheritance. ' 124 The task then is to find the
124. Estate of Garrison, 175 Cal. Rptr. 809, 816 (1981). Similarly, in In re Estate of
Daigle, 642 P.2d 527, 529 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) the court said "[t]he question ... is 'one of
identity and not the right of inheritance."' Id. (quoting with approval from Monroney v.
Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 291 Md. 546, 556, 435 A.2d 788, 793 (Md. App. 1981),
which in turn quoted with approval from In re Taylor's Estate, 357 Pa. 120, 124, 53 A.2d
136, 138 (1947)).
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donor's intent at the time he executed the instrument. Alas, once
again, the instrument itself does not address the question, and
what the donor would have said had he thought about the matter
is anyone's guess.
The courts are sharply divided on how to deal with the
adopted-out child in the class gift setting, some including and
others excluding the claimant on comparable facts. 12 5 For example,
two 1981 decisions, Crumpton v. Mitchell 26 and Estate of Garrison,1 27 reached opposite conclusions in construing instruments
made by relatives other than the relinquishing parent before the
claimants were adopted-out to stepparents. In each case the adoption-out did not occur until after the donor's death. Crumpton
concerned a deed to Ruth Crumpton for life, remainder to Ruth's
living issue per stripes. One of Ruth's sons predeceased her, leaving five children, two of whom were adopted-out to their stepfather
before Ruth died. The North Carolina Supreme Court refused to
let the adopted-out claimants take along with the remaining issue
125. Several tangential issues concerning adopted-out children exist. For example,
should a court deem an adopted-out child unmentioned in the will of his relinquishing biological parent pretermitted? Most cases have held that the answer should be "no." See, e.g.,
Estate of Dillehunt, 175 Cal. App. 2d 464, 346 P.2d 245 (1959); Wailes v. Curators of Central
College, 363 Mo. 932, 254 S.W.2d 645 (1953). Conversely, most courts have held that an
adopted-in child should come within the pretermitted child statute applicable to his own
adoptor's will. See, e.g., In re Estate of Frizzell, 156 So. 2d 558 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963),
cert. dismissed, 162 So. 2d 666 (1964); In re Matter of Jackson, 117 N.H. 898, 379 A.2d 832
(1977); In re Will of Stier, 74 Misc. 2d 634, 345 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1973). Similarly, the question
arises whether courts should deem adopted-out children class A beneficiaries of their biological relatives for inheritance tax purposes. The courts have gone both ways on this issue.
See, e.g., People v. Estate of Murphy, 29 Colo. App. 195, 481 P.2d 420 (1971); Estate of
Carlson, 479 Pa. 421, 388 A.2d 726 (1978). But see Estate of Dennery, 52 Cal. App. 3d 393,
124 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1975); Barnum v. Department of Revenue, 270 Or. 867, 530 P.2d 28
(1974). Adopted-in children should qualify, as most cases have held, for preferable inheritance tax treatment when taking from their adoptive relatives. See, e.g., In re Estate of
Iacino, 189 Colo. 513, 542 P.2d 840 (1975); Palmer v. Kingsley, 27 N.J. 425, 142 A.2d 833
(1958); In re Will of Clark, 87 N.M. 108, 529 P.2d 1229 (1974). Finally, the question arises
whether adopted-out children should qualify as "heirs" or "issue" to prevent a lapse under
antilapse statutes designed to carry out the donor's presumed intent to save the gift of a
predeceased blood relative for the relative's issue. Except for stepparent adoptions and
other relative adoptions, the answer should be "no." See, e.g., In re Estate of Goulart, 222
Cal. App. 2d 808, 35 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1963); Turner v. Weeks, 384 So. 2d 193 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980). But see Estate of Esposito, 57 Cal. App. 2d 859, 135 P.2d 167 (1943). For discussion of an analogous problem, see supra text accompanying note 124. Adopted-in children
clearly should qualify under the terms of antilapse statutes, and most courts have so held.
See, e.g., In re Estate of Blacksill, 124 Ariz. 130, 602 P.2d 511 (1979); In re Estate of Baker,
172 So. 2d 268 (Fla. App. 1965); Headen v. Jackson, 255 N.C. 157, 120 S.E.2d 598 (1961).
But see Arnold v. Helmer, 327 Mass. 722, 100 N.E.2d 886 (1951).
126. 303 N.C. 657, 281 S.E.2d 1 (1981).
127. 122 Cal. App. 3d 7, 175 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1981).
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of Ruth, holding that the term "issue" excludes "persons adoptedout of the family unless a contrary intent plainly appears from the
terms of the deed."12 The court referred to the state's adoption
and intestacy laws making the adoptee a legal stranger to his biological bloodline and reasoned that it should resolve any constructional problem by asking whether the claimant could take under
the instrument had he been born into his adoptive family instead
of his biological family. 129 Any other approach, the court said,
would violate the spirit of state laws severing the adoptee from his
natural family. Garrison concerned a substitutional gift of corpus
under a testamentary trust to the lawful issue of any son who predeceased the income beneficiary, testator's wife. The adopted-out
claimants in Garrisonwere the only grandchildren the testator had
at the time he executed his will. The California appellate court included the Garrison claimants, reasoning that because they were
still a part of the biological family when the testator executed his
will they were indentifiable as objects of his donative intent and
that this intent was not affected by their later "unanticipated
adoption." 8 0 The Garrison court distinguished Estate of Russell, 31 an earlier California appellate case reaching the opposite result, on the ground that the excluded great-grandchild was born
after testator Russell's death and, therefore, was never know to
him. Justice Langford dissented from the Garrison majority's refusal to follow Russell. The dissent urged that in the interest of
predictability and uniformity of will construction, the law should
presume a testator to have had an intent compatible with state law
regarding the modern-day consequences of adoption unless he has
32
affirmatively expressed a contrary intent.
128. 303 N.C. at 665, 281 S.E.2d at 6.
129. Id. at 663, 281 S.E.2d at 5 (quoting with approval A Survey of Statutory Changes
in North Carolina in 1955, 33 N.C.L. Rnv. 513, 522 (1955)).
130. 175 Cal. Rptr. at 815. The Wisconsin Supreme Court made this identity approach
even more explicit in Estate of Zastrow, 42 Wis. 2d 390, 166 N.W.2d 251 (1969). Zastrow
concerned a substitutional gift to the "children of the body" of her nephew, Robert, in the
event he predeceased her, which he did. The stepfather of Robert's two sons (testatrix'
great-nephews) adopted them after the testatrix executed her will but before she died. In
holding that these adopted-out great-nephews took under the will the court seemed to reason that they clearly were identifiable as the children of the body of Robert when the testatrix executed her will. Therefore, according to the court, they were the objects of the testatrix' donative intent as fully as if the will named them by name, and their later adoption did
not affect this intent.
131. 17 Cal. App. 3d 758, 95 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1971).
132. An interesting sidenote is that the Garrison grandmother who lived to see the
adoption-out of these grandsons "cut [them] off without a sou." 175 Cal. Rptr. at 819. Of
course, as the dissent pointed out, the grandmother's actions could not "be used to impute a
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Several cases have presented instruments executed years after
the claimant's adoption out of the family. Commerce Trust Co. v.
Duden 33 dealt with an inter vivos trust. At the settlor's death the
corpus was to be divided into separate trusts for the benefit of the
settlor's sons or, upon certain contingencies, for the benefit of their
"children, both natural and adopted." One of the settlor's sons had
relinquished his only child to the child's stepfather twenty years
before the trust's execution. The Duden court excluded the settlor's adopted-away grandson. It did so by imputing to the settlor
an awareness of the legal consequences of adoption and presuming
that the settlor meant to include only those persons legally in her
son's bloodstream. "Any other conclusion," the court said, "would
do violence to the adoption laws of this state and the public policy
embodied therein. 1u In Monroney v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit and
Trust Co. 13 5 the presumption that the donor was aware of existing

state law at the time of execution worked to produce the opposite
result. As in Duden, the adoption-out in Monroney occurred years
before the donor executed the trust. At the time the donor executed the testamentary trust, however, state law still permitted
adoptees to inherit from their biological relatives. The law was not
amended to remove adopted-away children from their biological
bloodstream until after the testatrix died. The court first found an
intent not to exclude claimant from the fact that the testatrix
knew of the adoption-out and still used class gift terminology. It
then went on to hold for the claimant, reasoning that the subsequent changes in the state's adoption and intestacy laws did not
affect testatrix' intent. As the Monroney court saw it, "[w]hen
Edna signed her will and when she died Michael was the son of
John even though he was adopted-out of the family of John." Ergo,
"Edna's gift to the children of John includes Michael."' 6 Interestingly, the North Carolina Supreme Court in Crumpton anticipated
and rejected this line of argument, stating that its exclusionary
construction would apply "regardless of whether the [instrument]
was executed before or after entry of the final order of adoption
similar state of mind to the testator at the time he drew the will." Id. Her disherison of
these grandchildren, however, does throw ice water on the majority's assumption that any
grandparent who knew the grandchildren would want to provide for them even if they were
later adopted-out of the family. 175 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
133. 523 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
134. Id. at 101.
135. 435 A.2d 788 (Md. 1981).
136. Id. at 796.
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and regardless of whether it was executed before or after enactment of [the statute construed to exclude adopted-out children
from class gift terminology]. 137
A 1982 case, In re Estate of Best,""' allowed an illegitimate
son adopted out to strangers twenty-one years before his biological
grandmother made her testamentary trust to share in income distributions under the trust along with a later born legitimate
grandchild. The court felt driven to this result by New York's statute that severed intestate succession ties between the adoptee and
his biological family but stated that its terms "shall not affect the
right of any child to distribution of property under the will of his
natural parents or their natural... kindred ...
,,131
Noting the
mischief a potential adopted-out class of lurking unknown beneficiaries might create in the settlement of estates, the court urged
the New York legislature to amend its statute to bar such claimants from taking under the wills of their biological kindred unless
1 40
expressly included.

As noted, a few cases have dealt with instruments that the relinquishing parent himself executed. In DePrycker v. Brown14 1 the
court held a residuary gift to the decedent's own "children who
survive" to exclude the testator's biological child by a prior marriage whom the testator's ex-wife's second husband had adopted.142
A 1982 Colorado case, In re Estate of Daigle,1 4 8 reached the oppo-

site result. The court allowed adopted-out children of a first marriage to take along with the children of a second marriage under
the will of their biological father. The Daigle court reasoned that
the laws in effect when the testator executed his will barred only
intestate succession from the child's biological father and, thus, did
not affect what the court viewed as the primary meaning of the
term "children" in his will.
137. 303 N.C. at 665, 281 S.E.2d at 6.
138. 116 Misc. 2d 365, 455 N.Y.S.2d 487 (Sur. Ct. 1982).
139. Id. at 368-69, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 490 (quoting N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw. § 117 (McKinney 1977)). The court also speculated that the testatrix' knowledge of the birth and adoption-out of her illegitimate grandchild coupled with her failure to exclude the grandchild by
limiting the income gift to her daughter's lawfully begotten issue meant that the testatrix
did not intend to exclude her illegitimate grandchild.
140. 116 Misc. 2d at 375, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
141. 358 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
142. The court followed an earlier Florida decision that used the adoption statute's
severence of legal ties between adoptees and their natural parents to deny an adopted-out
child a claim for the wrongful death of his biological father. See Gessner v. Powell, 238 So.
2d 101 (Fla. 1970).
143. 642 P.2d 527 (Colo. App. 1982).
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The colliding holdings and competing rationalia of the cases
just surveyed cry out for guidelines to bring predictability to this
corner of the law. In all but one of the cases reviewed the donor's
intent ranged from completely unascertainable to speculative at
best. Absent a clear indication of inclusionary intent, decisions like
Crumpton v. Mitchell and Commerce Trust Co. v. Duden'4 seem
justified in presuming that the donor's intent was compatible with
the public policy expressed in modern statutes removing the
45
adopted child from the blood stream of his biological family.
This exclusionary presumption represents the better approach.
One aspect of the Crumpton and Duden decisions, however, did
give this writer some pause. In each case the court held that the
exclusionary presumption would control unless the instrument itself plainly expressed a contrary intent. Because the issue still is
what the donor in fact intended, we should not applaud any absolute prohibition of extrinsic evidence without examining its reason. 14 6 When such reason does not exist, neither should the
prohibition.
One may defend a strict exclusionary rule such as the rule the
Crumpton and Duden courts applied on the ground that it is
needed to facilitate the expeditious settlement of trusts and estates
and to foster predictability in the construction of class gifts.' 4
Specifically, a rule giving adopted-out persons access to the wills
and trusts of long lost relatives invites jurisdictional mishaps described by Surrogate Judge Brewster in In re Estate of Best'4 as
follows:
Where... a child is adopted out of the family and the will directs distribution to a class of which the adopted out child would be a member, the failure
to cite such adopted out child results in a failure to achieve complete jurisdiction. As the existence of an adopted out child may not be known to biological
kindred of the adopted out child making a will directing distribution to a
class, a careful will draftsman must protect against this contingency to avoid
144. For a discussion of Crumpton and Duden, see supra notes 126, 128-29 & 133-34
and accompanying text.
145. The exclusionary presumption of Crumpton and Duden has been codified in Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 851.51(3) (West 1971).
146. For example, the court should disallow extrinsic evidence if it is of questionable
reliability or if there is a sound policy reason for excluding it.
147. Justice Langford made this argument dissenting in Estate of Garrison,when he
said: "The truth is we do not and cannot know what the testator's intent would have been
with respect to adoption-out, if he had thought about it. There should be some degree of
uniformity and predictability in the construction of wills under these circumstances." 175
Cal. Rptr. at 819 (Langford, J., dissenting).
148. 116 Misc. 2d 365, 455 N.Y.S.2d 487 (Sur. Ct. 1982).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:711

a possible failure of jurisdiction in a subsequent proceeding.","

Moreover, lenient evidentiary rules that allow claimants to get
their feet in the door may encourage adoptees to declassify their
adoption files and to do some fortune hunting among their biologi-

cal roots. 150 Accordingly, Judge Brewster urged passage of a pro-

viso denying adopted-out claimants access to the wills of their biological kindred unless expressly included. Judge Brewster warned
that "[tlo continue the existing statute without amendment will
give rise to litigation, delays in the settlement of estates and the
distribution of property to persons not only unknown to a testator
but to unintended beneficiaries." 5 ' Yet cases may arise that do not
present the dangers just described. Some flexibility should be retained for such cases.
This writer suggests a compromise between the absolute bar to
extrinsic evidence A la Crumpton and Duden urged by Judge
Brewster and a rule permitting extrinsic evidence in all class gift
149. Id. at 375, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
150. As Judge Brewster put it, failure to achieve total severance in succession matters:
presents a reason to seek to breach the privacy of adoption proceedings which the legislature has provided the adopted child, the natural parents and the adoptive parents. It
is not unreasonable to anticipate that resourceful adopted children, learning of this
statute, will seek to break the seal and open their adoption proceedings to obtain the
names of their natural parents and their kindred with a view to obtaining information
which will lead them to wills of biological kindred which contain directions for distribution to a class of which they are members.
Id. at 375, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 493-94.
151. Id. at 375, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 494. Morris v. Ulbright, 558 S.W.2d 660 (Mo. 1977),
illustrates the mischief even a known adopted-out claimant may cause. The Ulbright grantors, after reserving a life estate for themselves, deeded real property to their son "Logan
... and his bodily heirs." Under Missouri law this created a life estate in Logan Sr. with a
contingent remainder in fee in Logan Jr., Logan Sr.'s only child. Three years after execution
of the fee tail deed Logan Jr.'s stepfather adopted him. After the grantors died, Logan Sr.
and the other heirs conveyed the land to a couple named Alspaugh. Apparently, the parties
to this conveyance believed that they represented all outstanding interests in the property.
Following the death of Logan Sr., the Alspaughs conveyed the property to Dorothy and
Ralph Ulbright. Whether or not these Ulbrights were related to the original grantors is not
clear. After his last conveyance the adopted-out Logan Jr. swept in from the wings to snatch
title as Logan Sr.'s bodily heir from the Ulbrights who, following an attorney's advice that
their title was good, had already improved the land. The Missouri Supreme Court held for
the adopted-out Logan. The court's theory was that Logan Jr. took as a purchaser under the
original fee tail deed rather than as an heir of his father and that, therefore, the Missouri
statute cutting off all ties between an adoptee and his natural parents did not prevent him
from taking title under the deed. The dissent rightly criticized the majority for failing to ask
whether a child adopted out by his biological father can any longer be described as his
biological father's bodily heir, whether he claims as a purchaser under a deed or by inheritance from such biological father. The Ulbrights, in a separate proceeding, sought unsuccessfully to recover the value of their improvements from Logan Jr. See Morris v. Ulbright,
591 S.W.2d 245 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).

1984]

IMPACT OF ADOPTIONS

cases involving adopted-out claimants. A real difference exists between the in-family adoption and the adoption to strangers. With
in-family adoptions the adoptee's new name and whereabouts remain known to his biological kindred; with adoptions to strangers,
by contrast, the new identity and whereabouts of the adoptee is
purposely hidden from his biological family. Because of the jurisdictional uncertainties, instability of titles, and other mischief a
potential class of unknown beneficiaries may inject into the settlement of trusts and estates, the courts should refuse to consider evidence outside the instrument itself in any case in which the adoption-out was to strangers. If donors want to include adopted-out
relatives with whom they no longer have contact, the law should
require them to gay so in the instrument itself. When, however, the
adoptee and his biological relatives continue to know each other
because the adoption occurred within the biological family, the
hazards catalogued by Judge Brewster in In re Estate of Best152
are not as great. Therefore, a court, in its discretion, may permit
extrinsic evidence of the donor's actual intent without compromising the expeditious settlement of trusts and estates.
VI. THE IMPACT OF ADULT ADOPTIONS ON INTESTATE SUCCESSION

AND CLASS GIFTS
Adult adoptions pose special problems in the application of
intestacy laws and the construction of class gifts. The adoption of
an adult is not an uncommon occurrence. Adult adoptions are being increasingly utilized for a variety of social and economic purposes and today enjoy widespread recognition within our legal system. Thus, while two states flatly prohibit the adoption of an
adult153 and some others restrict the practice by requiring a specified age differential or relationship between the adoptor and his
adult adoptee,15 ' most states permit adult adoptions without quali152. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
153. See Appeal of Ritchie, 155 Neb. 824, 53 N.W.2d 753 (1952); ARiz. Rzv. STAT. ANN
§ 8-102 (Supp. 1974-1983).
154. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 227P (WEsT 1982) (adoptee must be younger than
adoptor); HAWAII Rzv. STAT. § 578-1.5 (1976) (adoptee must be the adoptor's niece, nephew,
or stepchild); N.J. Stat. Ann § 2A22-2 (Supp. 1983-1984) (adoptee must be at least 10 years
younger than adopter); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 31, § 531 (1967) (adoptee must be at least 16
years younger than adopter). Such restrictions do little to alleviate the problems that adult
adoptions pose. Some states require a showing that the adoptee lived with the adopter a
specified number of years or that he had a filial relationship with the adoptor during his
minority. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 16-1501 (1979) (adult adoption allowed only if adult would
have been adopted as a minor but for the adoptor's inadvertence); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, §
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fication. Moreover, the statutory procedures are generally much
simpler for adult adoptions than for child adoptions. 15 5 In most
adult adoption cases, for example, there is no home investigation
nor is parental consent required. 156 As one court commented,
"[a]doption of adults is ordinarily quite simple and almost in the
nature of a civil contract.' 57 The adoption need not change the
life-style of either party to the adoption as the obligation of support and other parental obligations associated with the adoption of
a minor do not exist in the case of adult adoptions.5 8 Indeed, in
many cases the adoptee, who may have children of his own, does
not change his surname, live with the adoptor, or change his life in
any way following the adoption. 9
The motives revealed in adult adoption cases are a testament
to the fertility of human imagination. A wealthy, unmarried attorney adopted his stenographer-mistress, who was married to another, in order to deny his blood relatives standing to contest his
will in her favor. 60 Tax conscious individuals have adopted collateral relatives or strangers in an effort to qualify them for the lower
inheritance tax rate reserved for lineal relatives.' 6 A Colorado
adoption was consummated to circumvent a zoning ordinance restricting residential use of property to related individuals. 6 ' In
New York, where the highest court recently held private homosex1504 (1980) (unrelated adult adoptee must have resided with adoptor for two years); OHio
REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.02 (Page 1980 & Supp. 1982) (adult may be adopted only if disabled,
mentally retarded, or if adoptor and adoptee established a child-parent relationship while
adoptee was still a minor); VA. CODE § 63.1-222 (1980) (adoptee must have resided with
adoptor for one year during minority).
155. Wadlington, Adoption of Adults: A Family Law Anomaly, 54 CORNELL L. REV.
566, 571-73 (1969); Note, Adult Adoptions, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 253, 257-58 (1972).
156. Wadlington, supra note 155, at 571-73; Note, supra note 155, at 257-58. Some
states, however, do require that the adoptor's spouse consent to the adoption of another
adult. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 227p (West 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-67 (1981);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 2711 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984).
157. In re Estate of Griswold, 140 N.J. Super. 35, 52, 354 A.2d 717, 726 (1976).
158. A California case, Williams v. Ward, 15 Cal. App. 3d 381, 384-87, 93 Cal. Rptr.
107, 109-11 (1971), noted these distinctions between adult and child adoptions. For a more
detailed treatment of the differences between adult and child adoptions, see Wadlington,
supra note 155, at 570-74; Note, supra note 155, at 255-60.
159. See, e.g., In re Estate of Fortney, 5 Kan. App. 2d 14, 611 P.2d 599 (1980); Evans
v. McCoy, 291 Md. 564, 436 A.2d 436 (1981); In re Estate of Griswold, 140 N.J. Super. 35,
354 A.2d 717 (1976).
160. See Greene v. Fitzpatrick, 220 Ky. 590, 295 S.W. 896 (1927).
161. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. People, 403 Ill. 493, 87 N.E.2d 637 (1949). This ploy will
not work in states like Colorado that have enacted provisos denying adult adoptees inheritance tax breaks reserved for child adoptees. COLO. Rsv. STAT. § 39-23-112 (1982).
162. See W.D.A. v. City & County of Denver, 632 P.2d 582 (Colo. 1981).
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uality between consenting adults constitutionally protected from
prosecution, 1 s homosexual couples are beginning to use adoption
as a vehicle for gaining formal recognition as a family unit.""
Adoptions like the ones just described may become routine because, as a New York judge recently noted, "the trend, in most
jurisdictions in recent years has been to loosen restrictions and to
deemphasize the benefits to the parties and the motive for adoption when the adoptee is an adult."11 5 Adult adoptions are frequently motivated by a desire to manipulate succession by qualifying the adoptee as an heir or bringing him within the terms of a
pre-existing trust or devise to prevent the vesting of a substitutional gift-over. In the private class gift setting these attempts to
redirect the original donor's bounty through adoption invariably
take place long after the donor has died. In a 1973 Minnesota case,
In re Adoption of Berston,1 e" the twenty-nine year old petitioner
sought to adopt his fifty-three year old mother to bring her within
the terms of a trust his late father had made after divorcing the
mother to benefit the petitioner, the petitioner's issue, or an educational institution.1 6 7 The Minnesota Supreme Court allowed the
adoption but refused to say whether its decree would qualify the
fifty-three year old adoptee as a trust beneficiary. Two justices dissented on the ground that an adoption "for the sole purpose of
frustrating the intent of an express trust"1 8 violated public policy.
As Berston illustrates, adult adoption cases present two distinct issues which our jurists frequently blur in their deliberations.
First, should the adoption be allowed at all? Second, once allowed,
163. See People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980).
164. In a 1981 case a male couple, fearing that disapproving relatives might set aside
their property arrangements, sought adoption to "establish a more permanent legal bond"
and thus "facilitate inheritance, the handling of their insurance policies and pension plans,
and the acquisition of suitable housing." In re Adoption of Adult Anonymous, 106 Misc. 2d
792, 793, 435 N.Y.S.2d 527, 528 (Fain. Ct. 1981). Similarly, in a 1982 adoption case, the men
testified that they wished to express their "emotional bond" by formalizing "themselves as a
family unit." In re Adult Anonymous 11, 88 A.D.2d 30, 35, 452 N.Y.S.2d 198, 201 (1982). By
adoption, the couple also hoped to avoid eviction from their apartment, which the landlord
originally had leased to the older man with the condition that only members of his immediate family occupy the apartment. The court found this was "not a frivolous consideration"
because the landlord had been evicting tenants for minor lease violations in an effort to coop the building and the couple wished to remain and purchase their apartment when the
building did go co-operative. Id. at 32, 452 N.Y.So2d at 200.
165. In re Adoption of Adult Anonymous, 106 Misc. 2d 792, 796, 435 N.Y.S.2d 527,
529 (Fam. Ct. 1981).
166. 296 Minn. 24, 206 N.W.2d 28 (1973).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 28, 206 N.W.2d at 31 (dissenting opinion).
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what consequences should the adoption have in matters of succession? This Article does not address the first issue because it has
been covered adequately by other commentators.16 9 This writer
will, however, offer guidelines for resolution of the second issue,
which is cropping up with increasing frequency to plague our
courts. This inquiry will be complicated by the fact that not all
adult adoptions are sought for ulterior motives. The same considerations of love and duty that we expect in child adoptions motivate some adult adoptions. An adoptor may wish to adopt an adult
he has raised from childhood to validate an earlier attempt at
adoption that either failed for procedural reasons or for lack of
funds. A stepparent who actually raises his stepchild and wishes to
adopt the child all along may be prevented from consumating the
adoption until the stepchild reaches the age of majority, at which
time the other biological parent's consent is no longer required.
But then, to muddy things, there are the borderline cases in which
there is evidence of a parent-child type relationship yet it also appears that this adult's adoption was partly motivated by
0
cupidity.

17

A brief look at the agonies of one jurisdiction in dealing with
the consequences of adult adoptions will set the stage for our survey of recent decisions and suggestions for reform.
A.

The Kentucky Blues-One Jurisdiction'sStruggle with the
Consequences of Adult Adoption

In cases concerning child adoptions, Kentucky was one of the
first jurisdictions to grope its way toward replacement of the
"stranger-to-the-adoption" rule with a presumption favoring the
inclusion of adoptees in class designations. During the transition
period, the most famous case in the annals of so-called fraudulent
adoptions, Bedinger v. Graybill's Executor & Trustee,17 2 hit the
Kentucky judiciary. Bedinger involved a testamentary trust in
169.

See Wadllngton, supra note 155 (urging that the phenomenon of adult adoption

is a perversion of the adoption process that has no place in the realm of family law); Note,
supra note 155 (arguing that with appropriate safeguards against abuse, adult adoptions can
serve a useful role as an estate planing device).
170.

See, e.g., Wilson v. Johnson, 389 S.W.2d 634 (Ky. 1965); In re Trusts Created by

Agreement with Harringten, 311 Minn. 403, 250 N.W.2d 163 (1977).
171. See the decisions in Isaacs v. Manning, 312 Ky. 326, 227 S.W.2d 418 (1950), and
Major v. Kammer, 258 S.W.2d 506 (Ky. 1953), which eroded Kentucky's "stranger-to-theadoption" rule as formerly articulated in Copeland v. State Bank & Trust Co, 300 Ky. 432,
188 S.W.2d 1017 (1945).
172. 302 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1957).
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which the testatrix provided for her son, Robert, for life with a
remainder to the son's heirs at law as of the time of his death. A
codicil provided that in the event Robert died without heirs, the
estate should "be divided between Foreign Missions & Ky.Mountain School." 1 " Eighteen years after the testatrix' death, Robert
(age fifty-eight) and his wife (age forty-five) were childless. Not
wishing to see any part of the corpus go to his cousins or the designated charities, Robert proceeded to adopt his wife as his child
and lawful heir. Thirty-two years after the testatrix' death Robert
died. The court permitted the wife to take the entire corpus as his
heir at law. The court felt impelled toward this result both by
Kentucky's intestacy laws, which did not distinguish between child
adoptees and adult adoptees, and by its decision in Major v. Kammer,17 4 a child adoptee case in which the court held that class designations like "heirs" or "heirs at law" include adoptees unless the
instrument itself shows a contrary intent. The court rejected the
argument that it should ignore the adoption on policy grounds as
sanctioning incest because, as the court pointed out, the adoptor
1
and adoptee were not related by blood. "

In two 1965 adult adoption cases, Wilson v. Johnson17 and
Pennington v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co.,1 77 the Ken-

tucky court seized upon class designations like "child" or "children" to distinguish the facts from Bedinger and thus avoid what
even the Bedinger majority admitted was an absurd result. Wilson
and Pennington reasoned that since most donors employ terms
like "child" or "children" in their commonly understood sense,
these donors did not mean to include one who was no longer a
child in the lay sense when the adoption took place. Pennington
concerned a devise to the child or children of the testatrix' daughter, Annie. Many years after the testatrix died, the seventy-one
year old childless Annie adopted her seventy-four year old husband that he might take under the will. The court simply observed
that the husband was no longer a child.178
173. Id. at 596.
174. 258 S.W.2d 506 (Ky. 1953).
175. 302 S.W.2d at 600.
176. 389 S.W.2d 634 (Ky. 1965).
177. 390 S.W.2d 671 (Ky. 1965).
178. Courts from other jurisdictions have used terms like "child" or "children" to exclude adult adoptees. See, e.g., In re Estate of Comley, 90 N.J. Super. 498, 218 A.2d 175
(1966); In re Nicol's Trust, 39 Misc. 2d 674, 241 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1963). First National Bank of
Dubuque v. Mackey, 338 N.W.2d 361. (1983) (same result with no statutory presumption).
The New Mexico Supreme Court, however, came to the opposite conclusion, reasoning that
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In 1967 the facts in Minary v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust
Co. 17 9 nearly foiled the Kentucky court again. Minary involved a
testamentary trust directing payment of income to the testatrix'
sons for life and payment of corpus to whomever of the testatrix'
heirs survived the life beneficiaries or to the First Christian
Church of Louisville. Thirty-five years after the testatrix died, her
childless son adopted his wife to qualify her as a remainder beneficiary. The magical term "children" was missing! Unlike Bedinger,
however, this trust directed payment of corpus to the testatrix'
heirs rather than the life beneficiary's heirs. The court rejected the
wife's claim, thus in effect overruling Bedinger. Although the court
in Minary could have distinguished Bedinger on the basis of the
language used, the court rightly observed that "no useful purpose
could be served by so distinguishing them," stating that:
Even though the statute permits such adoption and even though it expressly
provides that it shall be 'with the same legal effect as the adoption of a child,'
we, nevertheless, are constrained to view this practice to be an act of subterfuge which in effect thwarts the intent of the ancestor whose property is being distributed and cheats the rightful heirs. We are faced with a situation
wherein we must choose between carrying out the intent of deceased testators
or giving a strict and rigid construction to a statute which thwarts that
intent. 80

The court opted for honoring the testator's intent. Of course, the
court was wrong in assuming its laudable decision might violate
Kentucky's statutes for, as discussed earlier, the question in such
cases is not the technical status of the adoptee under the adoption
and intestacy laws. The real issue is whether this particular donor
meant to include this particular adoptee. The court's clear-cut approach to the problem is, nevertheless, commendable. As we shall
see, not all jurisdictions have taken such a clean approach.
Ten years after Minary the beleaguered Kentucky judiciary
was called upon to decide whether an adult adoptee could inherit
through his adoptor from the intestate estate of his adoptor's relative. Because intestacy laws rather than a private instrument governed the case, the court permitted the inheritance, limiting the
rule of Minary to testamentary dispositions."8 " The reasons why
the court may have been compelled to this result are explored
below.
the adult adoptee is the legal child of his adoptor. See Delaney v. First Nat'l Bank, 73 N.M.
192, 386 P.2d 711 (1963).
179. 419 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1967).
180. Id. at 343.
181. Harper v. Martin, 552 S.W.2d 690 (Ky. App. 1977).
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The Consequences of Adult Adoption for Intestate
1 82
Estates

Most intestate succession schemes, including the scheme of
the UPC, treat the adult adoptee exactly like the child adoptee.
Specifically, the adult adoptee inherits from and through his
adoptor and loses all rights of inheritance within his biological
family. Conversely, the adult adoptee's kindred by adoption may
inherit from him while his biological relatives may no longer do so.
In some states these results are mandated by an express statutory
provision.1 8s In others they obtain because the intestacy statutes
fail to say anything about the consequences of adult adoption.'"
No one seriously questions the right of the adult adoptee to
inherit from his own adoptor as the creation of one's own heir
through adoption is a practice followed by ancient civilizations and
long accepted in our own jurisprudence. 8 5 The controversial question is whether society should countenance the use of adoption
laws to qualify an adult as the heir of a stranger to the adoption.
The policy reasons for allowing this in child adoptions, which simulate biological birth into the adoptive family, do not exist in the
case of adult adoptions.
Professor Halbach believes that the problem of manipulative
adoption is far more pressing in the class gift setting where the
adoption invariably occurs long after the donor's death than it is in
cases in which the question is one of succession to the intestate
estate of a stranger to the adoption.1 8 ' He reasons that any adoption which might affect intestate succession will occur during the
intestate's lifetime so that he will have an opportunity to defend
himself by making a will excluding the adult adoptee. While it is
true that the opportunities for mischief are greatly increased when
the aim is to qualify the adoptee under a private instrument, we
should not oversimplify matters by ignoring the real opportunities
182. For a discussion of the statutes, see generally Wadlington, supra note 155, at 57374; Note, supra note 155, at 261-62. The UPC fails to make a distinction between persons
adopted as minors and persons adopted as adults. See U.P.C. § 2-109, 8 U.L.A. 66 (1982).
183. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-16 (1982); Ky. REv. STAT. § 405.390 (1982); MD.
ANN. CODE. art. 16, § 82 (1981).
184. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 257 (West 1956); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-8 (West
1972); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 117 (McKinney 1977).
185. For reference to ancient practices, see supra note 9 and accompanying text. For
early American precedent, see Collamore v. Learned, 171 Mass. 99, 50 N.E. 518 (1898)
(Holmes, J.).
186. See Halbach, The Rights of Adopted Children Under Class Gifts, 50 IowA L.
REv. 971, 988 (1965).
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for mischief that also exist when the lure is an intestate estate.
First of all, response by will is not always possible. Most state statutes do not even require that the parties to an adult adoption serve
187
notice of the adoption on their parents or other blood relatives.
Because the adult adoptee need not change his surname or even
live with his adoptor, the relatives whose estates the adoption may
affect may not even be aware of the adoption. How can one respond to something he does not even know has occurred? A 1977
Kentucky case, Harperv. Martin,188 presented an interesting variation on this problem. A woman dying of cancer adopted a fortyseven year old man for the sole purpose of making him an heir of
an incompetent relative who lacked a will. The court permitted the
adult adoptee to inherit through his adoptor from the incompetent's intestate estate even though the intestate had lacked the capacity to make a defensive will before dying.
To understand a decision like Harper one must remember
that such cases are governed by the intestacy laws in which the
intent of the particular intestate, even if known, is irrelevant. Because Kentucky's intestacy laws treated adult adoptees exactly like
child adoptees, the court had little choice but to permit the inheritance unless it wished to take the difficult route of implying an
exception to the statute's literal meaning to avoid "an unreasonable or absurd result."' 89 The terse opinion in Harper did not even
allude to the explanation just given. The court simply consoled itself with the thought that although Martin lacked the capacity to
disinherit the adult adoptee, he did not "while competent ...

pre-

pare a plan for the disposition of his estate which would be
thwarted by the adoption."110
Another consideration often overlooked is that adult adoption
also affects the status of the adoptee's biological parents and kindred who may no longer inherit from the adoptee. Again, these relatives may not even be aware of their change of status because the
adoption of an adult does not require parental consent in the vast
187. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-207 (Supp. 1983); R.I. GEN.LAws § 15-7-5 (1970);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.32.110 (Supp. 1983-1984).
188. 552 S.W.2d 690 (Ky. App. 1977).

189. In Williams v. Williams, 23 N.Y.2d 592, 599, 246 N.E.2d 333, 337, 298 N.Y.S.2d
473, 479 (1969), the New York Court of Appeals said:
[Courts should] not blindly apply the words of a statute to arrive at an unreasonable or
absurd result. If the statute is so broadly drawn as to include the case before the court,
yet reason and statutory purpose show it was obviously not intended to include that
case, the court is justified in making an exception through implication.
190. 552 S.W.2d at 692.

1984]

IMPACT OF ADOPTIONS

majority of jurisdictions.
The problems outlined above are significant enough to warrant
attention. Because the restraints of separation of powers make our
judiciary understandably reluctant to carve judicial exceptions to
intestacy statutes that treat adult and child adoptees alike, the solutions, if any, must come from the various state legislatures. Legislation either requiring notice to the adoptee's and adoptor's relatives within a certain degree of consanguinity or permitting the
court to limit inheritance rights in adult adoption cases to the
rights between the adoptor and his adoptee could lessen the opportunities for abuse affecting intestate succession. When the latter
approach is taken, a corollary measure should be enacted permitting the court to retain reciprocal inheritance ties between the
adoptee and his biological family. The element of discretion in this
approach gives the court the flexibility to tailor its adoption decree
to the purpose of the adoption and the relationship between the
adoptor and his adoptee. A few states have attempted fragmentary
solutions.19 1 Legislatures that have embraced the UPC and other
legislatures that have not distinguished between adult and child
adoptions should consider enacting provisions of the type
suggested.
C. Should Adult Adoptees Be Included in Class Gift
Designations?
Should adult adoptees reap the bounty of a stranger to the
adoption via inclusion in class gift designations irrevocably sealed
by the donor's death long before the gift becomes distributable?
Once again our task is to find the donor's intent at the time he
executed the instrument. Some courts have purported to find the
donor's intent in the instrument itself by distinguishing between
generic terms like "children," thought to have a familial connotation, and "heirs," thought to have a technical connotation. This
writer has already commented on the uselessness of such distinctions as a guide to actual intent. 192 Other courts have sought to
conjure up the long dead donor's intent by assuming he relied on
191. A Florida statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062 (West Supp. 1983), requires that the
adult adoptee's biological parents either consent to the proposed adoption or be served with
notice thereof. Vermont's statute, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 448 (1974), allows an adopted
adult to inherit from, but not through, his adoptor. Unfortunately, in Vermont, the same
restriction applies to child adoptees. A New Jersey statute retains inheritance ties between
the adult adoptee and his biological parents. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2%A22-2 (West 1952).
192. See supra notes 93-94 & 176-77 and accompanying text.
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the law governing adoptees in effect when he executed the instrument. Thus, two California appellate decisions denied adult
adoptees the benefits of a testamentary trust partly on the ground
that California had not even legalized adult adoptions when the
testator executed the wills in question.19 A Kansas decision, however, turned this argument around, reasoning that the donor in
making his class gift must have anticipated later changes in the
law that might affect membership in the class."9' As indicated in
our discussion of the retroactivity problem, any reliance on the
state of the law governing the status of adoptees, whether it be the
law existing when the instrument was executed or the law that
might develop in the future, is largely mythical.195 Here again, the
courts must realize that reference to generic terms in the instrument or to the state of the law at a given time as a guide to actual
intent is an exercise in futility.1 "' It seems safe to assume that the
donor never thought about the possibility of adult adoptions at all,
much less relied on the law to fill in his intent; if he had he would

19 7
have expressed his desire explicitly.

Notwithstanding the dearth of tangible guides to actual intent
in adult adoption cases, common sense tells us that a donor would
normally expect anyone partaking of his bounty to be a true family
member and not just some willing adult adopted for the purpose of
reducing or defeating a gift-over to others. As some courts have
pointed out, diversion of donative assets to artificial adoptees has
the effect of giving the adoptor a power of appointment over the
subject property.19 8 On the other hand, the same familial bonds of
love and duty commonly associated with child adoptions prompt
193. See Abramovic v. Brunken, 16 Cal. App. 3d 719, 94 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1971); Wil-

liams v. Ward, 15 Cal. App. 3d 381, 93 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1971).
194. In re Estate of Fortney, 5 Kan. App. 2d 14, 611 P.2d 599 (1980).
195. See supra notes 113-23 and accompanying text.
196. See id.
197. As a New Jersey probate judge expressed it,
[t]here being nothing in the language of the will which by itself reveals a clear intent to
either include or exclude an adult adoptee, and nothing to indicate that the subject was
either discussed or considered, it is probable that the subject was not thought about
and that there was therefore no specific intent of either the testator or the draftsman
of the will ....

In re Estate of Griswold, 140 N.J. Super. 35, 42, 354 A.2d 717, 721 (1976).
198. A California appellate court expressed this sentiment as follows: "When there is
an adult adoption... there is opportunity for a life tenant.., to reduce the remainder
simply by adoption of willing adults. It is improbable that the testator intended such results. If he had wished to give his daughter power of appointment, he could have done so."
Williams v. Ward, 15 Cal. App. 3d 381, 386, 93 Cal. Rptr. 107, 110 (1971); see also In re
Estate of Griswold, 140 N.J. Super. at 60-61, 354 A.2d at 722.
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some adult adoptions-especially stepparent adoptions. The task,
then, is to develop a sensible and workable approach that will weed
out the fortune hunters while permitting inclusion of adult
adoptees who would be natural objects of the donor's bounty. Professor Halbach, in what he terms the "loco parentis" concept, has
suggested that the basic inclusionary presumption for adoptees "be
limited to children who were adopted at a relatively early age and
reared by the adoptive parents."1" 9 Since "relatively early age"
presumably means sometime during minority, although this is not
entirely clear, Professor Halbach apparently would limit the inclusionary presumption to child adoptees. This approach has not been
widely used for reasons that will appear from an examination of a
few recent decisions.
Three recent cases, In re Estate of Fortney,0 0 Estate of Pittman,2 0 ' and Evans v. McCoy,2 02 demonstrate that the basic inclusionary presumption formulated with child adoptees in mind
(when applied in conjunction with laws that treat adult and child
adoptees alike for intestacy purposes) is a major stumbling block
to sensible resolution of adult adoption cases. The Fortney testators, by reciprocal wills made long before Kansas legalized adult
adoptions, devised land to their children, Elizabeth and John, with
a proviso that if both should die "without heirs by birth or by
adoption," the property should go to the children of the testators'
siblings. At age ninety the childless John adopted his wife's sixtyfive year old nephew, Lloyd, in order to keep the property from the
collateral relatives. In an opinion tinged with a note of regret, the
court allowed the mature adoptee, Lloyd, to take as an heir per the
terms of the original devise. 03 The Fortney court felt compelled to
this result by earlier precedent which it read as holding that donors must be presumed "to know the legislature might change both
the age of majority and the limitation that only minors could be
199. Halbach, supra note 187, at 990 (emphasis added).
200. 5 Kan. App. 2d 14, 611 P.2d 599 (1980).
201. 104 Cal. App. 3d 288, 163 Cal. Rptr. 527 (1980).
202. 291 Md. 562, 436 A.2d 436 (1981).
203. The court followed a 1955 decision of its supreme court, Meeks v. Ames, 177 Kan.
565, 280 P.2d 957 (1955), which applied the basic inclusionary presumption to a teenage
minor adoptee, and the Kansas adoption and intestacy laws, which treat adult and child
adoptees alike. The Fortney court felt that Meeks, although not directly on point, governed
by analogy because Meeks permitted a 19 year old adoptee to take under the will of a testator who died before the legislature authorized adult adoptions and before it extended the
age of minority from 18 to 21.
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adopted." 20 4 The effect of the decision in Fortney was to confer the
benefit of the basic pro-adoptee presumption on adult adoptees. As
we shall see, this grants adult adoptees a tremendous procedural
advantage.
The testatrix in Pittman died in 1915 with a testamentary
trust creating a contingent gift of income and corpus to the children and more remote issue of her eight children per stirpes. One
of the testatrix' late grandsons had adopted his two stepsons, who
had lived with him as teenagers, when they were thirty-three and
thirty-one. The trustee requested instructions as to whether these
adult adoptees should share in the per stirpital distributions of income and corpus under the trust. Inspired by Professor Halbach's
"loco parentis" concept, the Pittman court formulated a threestep approach for resolving the claims of adult adoptees under instruments executed prior to 1951-the date when adult adoptions
became legal in California. First, class designations in wills executed prior to 1951 presumptively would exclude adult adoptees.
Second, an exception to this exclusion would apply to adult
adoptees raised as minors in the home of their adoptors. Third, the
court would make an exception to the exception when "the purpose of the adoption was to diminish or defeat the income and remainder interests of other beneficiaries 'for purposes of financial
gain or as a spite device.' ",205 The court remanded the matter to
the lower court to afford the claimants an opportunity to prove
that they came within the Pittman court's "loco parentis" exception. In effect, the appellate court in Pittman retained the traditional "stranger-to-the-adoption" rule for adult adoptees claiming
under pre-1951 instruments, but gave the claimants an opportunity to rebut it. The three-pronged Pittman rule, albeit unnecessarily elaborate, provides a good approach that can and should apply
to the construction of instruments executed both before and after
the legalization of adult adoptions. What is so discouraging about
the Pittman case is that the court completely undid its good work
by assuming it would be forced to apply its judicially created inclusionary presumption to adult adoptees claiming under instruments
executed after California's recognition of adult adoptions. The
court was wrong in assuming this because the status of adult
adoptees under state adoption and intestacy laws does not control
204. See 5 Kan. App. 2d at 18-19, 611 P.2d at 603.
205. 104 Cal. App. 3d at 295, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 531 (quoting Halbach, supra note 187,
at 988, which in turn quoted Oler, Construction of Private Instruments Where Adopted
Children Are Concerned, 43 MICH. L. Rlv. 901, 938 (1945)).
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the construction of private instruments. The court is free to formulate whatever presumption seems most likely to carry out the donor's intent in construing a private instrument. The latter statement assumes, of course, that the state legislature has not carved
in cement an inclusionary presumption applicable to adult
adoptees.
Evans v. McCoy 208 is illustrative of a case in which legislatively imposed rigidity drove the court to a bad approach. The testator died in 1899 with a will devising a 200-acre farm to his children in fee, determinable in the event all of them died without
living issue in which case the farm was to go to the testator's
brothers' heirs. The testator had two children, James and Rebecca.
James died in 1962 without issue. At age seventy-six the childless
Rebecca contracted to sell the farm. The buyers, however, rejected
title upon learning of the defeasing condition. Upon the advice of
counsel, Rebecca proceeded to adopt her twenty-one year old
neighbor, and the sale closed. When Rebecca died in 1978, the
heirs of one of the testators' brothers brought an action to eject the
buyers. After buyers won the first round, the collateral heirs appealed. In deciding the appeal the Maryland Court of Appeals was
confronted with a Maryland statute which mandated that generic
terms such as "child," "issue," or "heirs" in private instruments
include adoptees unless the terms of the instrument plainly
showed a contrary intent. The statute expressly made application
of this inclusionary statutory presumption retroactive to old instruments if the adoption occurred after 1947, as it did in Evans.
Another Maryland statute provided that the adoption of an adult
should have the same legal effect as the adoption of a minor. In the
face of what the Evans court termed the "unfortunate rigidity" of
this legislation,2 0 7 the court was constrained to hold that the adult
adoptee qualified as Rebecca's "issue" because this term did not
plainly express an intent to exclude such adoptees. °8
The court toyed with the idea of applying Professor Halbach's
"loco parentis" exception, but rejected this approach because it
amounted to a judicial repeal of the statutory rule of construction.
The Evans court could have sprung this legislative trap by relying
206.

291 Md. 562, 436 A.2d 436 (1981).

207. Id. at 584, 436 A.2d at 447.
208. Having been hamstrung by the statutory presumption, the Evans court comforted itself with the thought that since the terms of the devise permitted Rebecca to transfer the fee to strangers if she left issue, its decision in favor of the buyers and free alienability did not mangle the testator's unclear intent too badly.
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on the rubric that an exception to the literal terms of a statute will
be implied when its terms produce an unintended and absurd result. Because most courts understandably blanch at the thought of
taking such a drastic out, relief from rigid all inclusive statutory
presumptions of the Maryland stripe will probably have to come
from the legislatures that enacted them in the first place. 0 9 Accordingly, states that have enacted UPC section 2-611's inclusionary rule for testamentary instruments should consider amending it
to provide needed flexibility at least regarding claimants seeking
inclusion via adult adoption.210
Fortunately, most states do not have a statutory rule because
the basic pro-adoptee presumption has been ushered in by judicial
decree. In these jurisdictions the courts must unshackle themselves
from the notion that the recognition of adult adoptees under state
adoption and intestacy laws requires that courts treat them like
child adoptees in the construction of private instruments. The
highest courts of Pennsylvania and Kentucky have taken that first
important step. When the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Estate
of Tafe211 replaced the traditional "stranger-to-the-adoption" rule
with a presumption favoring the inclusion of adoptees in class designations, it expressly limited the new rule to cases in which the
adoptee was a minor at the time of the adoption. 12 After strug209. See supra note 189. But recently one brave court faced with the legislative rigidity problem refused to apply the literal terms of the statute, saying:
We do not believe, however, that the Legislature intended the statutory presumption to
be automatically enforced in all cases without regard to the circumstances surrounding
the adoption procedure. Notwithstanding our conclusion that the terms of the trust do
not evidence an intent to exclude adopted persons generally, this Court is convinced
that it should not enforce the statutory presumption where there has been an abuse of
the adoption process and where the end result would violate the settlor's probable intent and normal expectations.
In re Nowel's Estate, 128 Mich. App. 174, -,
339 N.W.2d 861, 863 (1983).
210. A Wisconsin statute offers a solution by extending its inclusionary rule applicable
to all instruments only to those adoptees who have been adopted as minors or raised as a
member of the adoptor's household from "the child's 15th birthday or before." Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 851.51(3) (West 1971). Oregon legislation limits inclusion to one "adopted as a minor
or after having been a member of the household of the adoptive parent while a minor." OR.
RBv. STAT. 112, 195 (1981). A 1983 amendment to California's Probate Code, albeit more
detailed in its provisions, takes the same approach. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6152, 6408 (1983)
(effective Jan. 1, 1985). Although such provisions are an improvement over the all inclusive
statutes, the rigidity inherent in any statutory solution may prevent sensible resolution in
some fact situations.
211. 449 Pa. 442, 296 A.2d 797 (1972).
212. By the restriction of this rule of construction to minor adoptions we serve and
effectuate the purpose of preventing an adult adoptee . . . from being considered a
testamentary "child".. . where such adoption is undertaken by a person other than
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gling for a decade with the manipulative adoption problem that
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court anticipated, the Kentucky Court
of Appeals in Minary v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust 218 refused
to extend the benefit of the inclusionary presumption to adult
adoptees when the effect would thwart the donor's intent and
cheat the rightful takers.
A county probate court sitting in New Jersey bravely sought
to free itself from imagined statutory constraints in In re Estate of
Griswold. 4 The adult adoptee in Griswold contended that a 1951
revision of New Jersey's overlapping adoption and succession statutes created an inclusionary presumption for adult adoptees in
class gifts. The court disagreed, but held, inter alia, that even if
this statutory presumption did exist, the court should not apply it
retroactively to an instrument executed in 1950. Although the
judge's opinion waffled on this issue, the main thrust of his opinion
seemed to be that, because of the opportunities for fraud, courts
should not apply the inclusionary presumption to adult adoptees.
As Judge Long pungently commented,
[A]pplication of the [inclusionary] rule... to adult adoptions would... be
an open invitation to the diversion of remainders, "treasure hunts" and even
the sale of filiations to obtain the benefit of remainders in trusts established
many years ago. Without safeguards ordinarily present in child adoptions,
including
the obligation of support, the risk is substantial and should not be
"15
taken.

Judge Long tersely summed up the motives behind the adoption of
the adoptor's forty-one year old stepson, who had never lived with
the adoptor by noting that "[i]f there had not been a Griswold
' 218
trust no one would have thought of the adoption.
While decisions like Tafel, Minary, and Griswold represent a
step in the right direction, they offer little guidance as to how a
trial court should procedurally go about weeding out fortune
hunters while permitting inclusion of adult adoptees who would be
regarded as natural objects of the donor's bounty. Allocation of a
presumption is one way to accomplish this. Because he who has
the benefit of the presumption wins when evidence of the donor's
the testator to prevent a gift over in default of a natural "child".. . and thus, in
effect, rewrite the testator's will.
Id. at 454, 296 A.2d at 803.
213. 419 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1967). See supra text accompanying notes 179-80 for a discussion of the decisien in Minary.
214. 140 N.J. Super. 35, 354 A.2d 717 (1976).
215. Id. at 55, 354 A.2d at 728.
216. Id. at 63, 354 A.2d at 732-33.
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intent is evenly balanced or lacking entirely, the presumption chosen is often outcome determinative.2 117 The reader will recall Professor Halbach's suggestion that the basic inclusionary presumption "be limited to children who were adopted at a relatively early
age and reared by the adoptive parents.121 8 Although Professor
Halbach deliberately leaves what he means by a "relatively early
age" unclear, his "loco parentis" proposal seems to reserve the inclusionary presumption for minor adoptees in most cases.
Looking back over the cases, this writer suspects that the
courts have had a threefold problem with Professor Halbach's idea.
First, Professor Halbach has not clarified how the courts should
procedurally implement his "loco parentis" concept. Second, the
courts seem concerned that blanket retention of the "stranger-tothe-adoption" rule for adult adoptees might wrongly exclude
claimants raised by their adoptors, but not adopted during minority because of legal impediments or lack of funds.2 9 Third, the
courts have been extremely reluctant to apply one rule to adult
adoptees and another to minor adoptees in the face of statutes giving adult adoptions the same effect as child adoptions for intestacy
purposes.22 °
Courts and legislatures should resolve these concerns as follows. The "stranger-to-the-adoption" presumption should be applied to all adult adoptees in the first instance for two reasons.
First, the circumstances surrounding adult adoptions do not provide the safeguards against abuse that usually exist in more heavily
regulated child adoptions. Second, application of the inclusionary
presumption gives the adult adoptee too great a procedural advantage, which usually produces an absurd result, particularly when
the court refuses to look beyond the instrument to the actual relationship of the parties and the circumstances surrounding the
adoption. Admittedly, use of the exclusionary presumption will
place all adult adoptees at an evidentiary disadvantage in contro217. Judge Long's opinion in Griswold rightly observed that the ultimate disposition
of controversies over the donor's intent "may depend upon whether there is a presumption
and, if so, what the presumption is and whether the surrounding circumstances indicate a
contary intent and overcome the presumption." Id. at 41, 354 A.2d at 720.
218. Halbach, supra note 187, at 990 (emphasis added); see supra note 199 and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g., Estate of Pittman, 104 Cal. App. 3d 288, 294, 163 Cal. Rptr. 527, 531
(1980).
220. Judge Rodowsky, writing for the Maryland court in Evans v. McCoy, expressed
this concern, saying that "[t]he line cannot be drawn between adults and minors since adoption of adults is expressly permitted." 291 Md. 562, 582, 436 A.2d 436, 446 (1981).
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versies over the donor's intent but this presumption, like any
other, is rebuttable. If the adoptee can convince the trier of fact
that he and his adoptor enjoyed the functional equivalent of a normal parent-child relationship, he should prevail. Factors for consideration include (1) the age at which the adoptee entered the
adoptor's home, (2) the length of time the adoptee lived there, (3)
the length of time the adoptor actually supported the adoptee, and
(4) the nature and extent of the parenting role assumed by the
adoptor vis-a-vis the adoptee. Anyone who could reasonably be regarded as a natural object of the donor's bounty should have no
difficulty in meeting his burden of proof on this "loco parentis"
issue. An inquiry into the motives behind the adoption should be
unnecessary since anyone who would be a natural object of the donor's bounty should be included even if a desire to qualify the
adoptee as a beneficiary partly motivated the adoption. This simplified approach should dispose of the objection sometimes voiced
that since financial gain might also motivate some child adoptions,
courts and legislatures should not draw the line between child and
adult adoptions.22
The widespread judicial belief that courts must treat adult
and child adoptees alike in the construction of private instruments
has proved to be a major stumbling block to the sensible resolution
of adult adoptee claims. When legislatures have codified the basic
inclusionary presumption by statute and made it applicable to
adult adoptees, either expressly or by necessary implication, relief
will probably have to come from the legislatures themselves. In all
other cases the courts must come to realize that, regardless of the
status of adult adoptees under state adoption and intestacy laws,
they are free to use whatever presumption seems most likely to
carry out the donor's intent. It seems clear that the "stranger-tothe-adoption" rule is the only presumption that makes sense when
adult adoptees are concerned.
While most existing instruments understandably fail to address manipulative adoption, today's scrivener should ideally anticipate the problem and draft against it. The instrument might,
for example, condition inclusion on an unbiased trustee's finding
that the claimant would (under all the circumstances) be regarded
as a natural object of the donor's bounty.
221. The instrument could provide guidelines for the trustee's determination by
enumerating the factors listed supra. Professor Halbach suggests a similar, albeit more narrowly worded, drafting solution. See Halbach, Issues About Issie: Some Recurrent Class
Gift Problems, 48 Mo. L. Rav. 333, 348 (1983).
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EQUITABLE ADOPTION

Our review of succession by, from, and through adopted persons would be incomplete without a discussion of the so-called equitably adopted child. Although not adopted with statutory formalities, the equitably adopted child may be able to maintain a
claim in equity to at least some of the benefits that come with the
status of a biological or legally adopted child. Typically, these
claims present the following scenario. A child, Fred, is taken into a
foster home at a tender age. 222 Fred may be an orphan, or his biological parents may be unable or unwilling to care for him. The
parties to this new custodial arrangement are primarily concerned
that Fred be raised in a family environment so that his physical
and emotional needs may be met. Hence, the prospect of formal
adoption by the foster parents may or may not be discussed at the
time custody is transferred. The foster parents raise Fred in their
home, treating him in all respects as their child and representing
him to the public as their child. They may tell Fred that he is their
adopted child. Just as often, however, the foster parents say nothing and, having entered the home as an infant and knowing no
other home, Fred naturally assumes that the foster parents are his
parents.2 s In either case, Fred grows up with the belief that he is
the biological child or at least the legally adopted child of his foster parents. The foster parents may make an attempt at formal
adoption that fails because of some technical defect in the adoption proceeding.224 Usually, however, the foster parents make no
attempt to effect a formal adoption. One foster parent dies, leaving
all to the surviving foster parent. Upon the surviving foster parent's death intestate, Fred claims the right to inherit from the only
parent he knows. To his dismay, he is told, usually by the intestate's collateral blood relatives, that because he is not the intestate's biological or formally adopted child, he has no right to inherit under the statutes of descent and distribution, which provide
222. See Note, Equitable Adoption: They Took Him into Their Home and Called
Him Fred, 58 VA. L. REv. 727 (1972). Although terms like "foster parent," "foster family,"
and "foster home" generally suggest a relationship more limited than the relationship that
equitable adoption creates, this Article uses such terms to avoid cumbersome, but more
accurate, phrases like "equitable adoptor" or "putative adoptive family."
223. See, e.g., Barlow v. Barlow, 170 Colo. 465, 463 P.2d 305 (1969) (child placed in
custody of foster parents when 10 days old; did not learn he was not their biological child
until he reached age 34).
224. See, e.g., Young v. McClannahan, 187 Iowa 1184, 175 N.W. 26 (1919) (adoptive
parents failed to record adoptive instrument); Cubley v. Barbee, 123 Tex. 411, 418, 73
S.W.2d 72, 76 (1934) ("careless lawyer" neglected to file adoption deed).

1984]

IMPACT OF ADOPTIONS

only for legal spouses and relatives by blood or formal adoption.
To correct the injustice that would result were the intestacy
laws woodenly applied, most jurisdictions grant equitable relief,
when appropriate, to the extent of permitting Fred to take the
child's share he would have inherited had the foster parent legally
adopted him. The doctrinal heading under which courts grant this
relief is variously called "equitable adoption," "virtual adoption,"
"de facto adoption," or "adoption by estoppel." 22 5 No matter the
label, we shall see that unless the foster parent has made a substantial attempt to comply with formal adoption proceedings, a
court will almost invariably condition the granting of relief on a
showing that the foster parent agreed to formally adopt the foster
child.22 The courts have traditionally limited the doctrine to narrow circumstances, reasoning that the adoption statutes are in derogation of the common law and thus provide the exclusive means
for effecting an adoption or obtaining its benefits. Pennsylvania,

for example, limits application of the doctrine to the situations in
which minor deviations from the statutory procedures have
2
occurred.

When an equitably adopted foster child is permitted to inherit
from his foster parent, an intestate share goes to one whom the law
views as a complete stranger to the intestate. That equity commonly permits this is startling given that inheritance rights derive

exclusively from the statutes of descent and distribution under
which informal adoptees have no standing whatsoever. When the
equitable adoption doctrine is confined to its original con225. For earlier commentary on the doctrine, see generally Bailey, Adoption "By Estoppel," 36 Tax. L. Rzv. 30 (1957); Note, supra note 222; Note, Equitable Adoption and the
Contract to Adopt, 40 N.D.L. Rav. 183 (1964); Comment, Adoption by Estoppel: History
and Effect, 15 BAYLOR L. Rav. 162 (1963); Comment, Equitable Adoption: A Necessary
Doctrine?, 35 S. CAL.L. lRv. 491 (1962); Comment, The Doctrine of EquitableAdoption, 9
Sw. L.J. 90 (1955).
226. Thus, in Cavanaugh v. Davis, 149 Tex.573, 235 S.W.2d 972 (1951), the court said:
[I]t was incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove ... that. ... [the foster
mother] undertook to effect a statutory adoption but failed to do so because of some
defect in the instrument of adoption or in itsexecution or acknowledgment, or because
of the failure to record it; or [the foster mother] agreed with respondent, or with respondent's parents or with some other person in loco parentis that she would adopt
respondent. The effort to comply with the statute in the [former] instance and the
agreement to adopt in the [latter] instance are a necessary predicate for the interposition of the equity powers of the courts to decree an adoption by estoppel in favor of
one who, acting under and by virtue of such defective proceeding or such agreement,
confers affection and benefits upon the other.
Id. at 576, 235 S.W.2d at 974 (emphasis added).
227. See In re Sulewski, 113 Pa. Super. 301, 173 A. 747 (1934).
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text-inheritance from the foster parent-the overwhelming equities in the child's favor demand that some exception be made to
prevent a species of fraud upon the child. 228 But invariably the
facts of real life overflow the channels that the judiciary originally
carved and present novel questions never contemplated at the inception of a doctrine. Hence, like most doctrines designed to provide relief in an appealing case, the equitable adoption doctrine
has become a Pandora's Box, emitting the following host of perplexing questions. Can the equitably adopted child inherit through
the foster parent from the foster parent's blood relatives? 2 2 9 Can
the foster parent or his blood relatives inherit from a deceased equitably adopted child to the exclusion of the child's blood relatives?2 30 If the equitably adopted child is entitled to inherit from
his foster parent, is he also entitled to inherit from his biological
parent? 28 1 When the equitably adopted child does inherit from his
foster parent is he entitled to the lower inheritance tax rate available to biological and legally adopted children?2 32 Does an equitably
adopted child have standing to contest the unfavorable will of his
228. Thus, in Wooley v. Shell Petroleum Corp. 39 N.M. 256, 264, 45 P.2d 927, 932
(1935), the New Mexico Supreme Court remarked that in view of the "child's equity...
nothing but fraud could result if the law of descent were allowed to take its course." Similary, in Cubley v. Barbee, 123 Tex. 411, 73 S.W.2d 72 (1934), the Texas Supreme Court,
after noting that "it would be a manifest fraud upon [the foster child] to now permit those
who claim under [the foster mother] to assert the invalidity of the adoption proceedings,"
explained that:
[e]quity follows the law except in those matters which entitle the party to equitable
relief, although the strict rule of law be to the contrary. It is at this point that their
paths diverge. As the archer bends his bow that he may send the arrow straight to the
mark, so equity bends the letter of the law to accomplish the object of its enactment.
Id. at 425, 428, 73 S.W. 2d at 79, 81 (emphasis omitted) (quoting in part Holloway v. Jones,
246 S.W. 587, 591 (Mo. 1922)).
229. For a recent case saying "no," see Pouncy v. Garner, 626 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1981) (following Asbeck v. Asbeck, 369 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. 1963), and Mennes v. Cowgill,
359 Mo. 697, 223 S.W.2d 412 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 949 (1950)). But cf. Wheeling
Dollar Sav. & Trust Co. v. Singer, 250 S.E.2d 369 (W. Va. 1978) (permitting equitably
adopted daughter of life beneficiary of testamentary trust to take remainder as life beneficiary's child under will that a stranger to the equitable adoption executed).
230. See Estate of Riggs, 109 Misc. 2d 644, 440 N.Y.S.2d 450 (1981) (no); Geiger v.
Estate of Connelly, 271 N.W. 2d 570 (N.D. 1978) (no); Heien v. Crabtree, 369 S.W.2d 28
(Tex. 1963) (no).
231. This author's research has not yet uncovered a case directly on point.
232. See Wooster v. Iowa State Tax Comm'n 230 Iowa 797, 298 N.W. 922 (1941) (no);
Goldberg v. Robertson, 615 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. 1981) (no). But see In re Estate of Radovich, 48
Cal. 2d 116, 308 P.2d 14 (1957) (yes); Estate of Reid, 80 Cal. App. 3d 185, 145 Cal. Rptr. 451
(1978) (yes). In two other cases, In re Estate of Van Cleve, 610 S.W.2d 620 (Mo. 1981), and
Calvert v. Johnston, 304 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957), the courts avoided the question
by finding that no equitable adoption had occurred.
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foster parent?23 3 After divorce, does the foster parent have a continuing duty to support his equitably adopted child, 3 " and, if so, is
the biological parent still liable for child support? Can the equitably adopted child recover a workmen's compensation death benefit
for the death of this foster parent? 23 5 Can the foster parent recover
a workmen's compensation death benefit for the death of his equi-

tably adopted foster child? 236 Can the equitably adopted child
2 87

bring a wrongful death action for the death of his foster parent?
Can the foster parent bring a wrongful death action for the death
of his equitably adopted child? 233 When a stranger to the informal
adoption makes a gift in a private instrument to someone else's
"children," "issue," "grandchildren," or "heirs," can one enter the
233. See Vincent v. Bronis, 365 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) (yes). A later case,
In re Estate of Staehli, 86 I. App. 3d 1, 407 N.E.2d 741 (1980), concerned a foster granddaughter's attempt to contest her foster grandfather's will. The court avoided the question
by finding no equitable adoption, but seemed to assume that petitioner would have had
standing to contest had decedent equitably adopted her natural mother.
234. See Ellison v. Thompson, 240 Ga. 594, 242 S.E.2d 95 (1978) (no). Pierce v. Pierce,
645 P.2d 1353 (Mont. 1982) (no). But see In re Marriage of Valle, 53 Cal. App. 3d 837, 126
Cal. Rptr. 38 (1975) (yes) (following Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal. App. 2d 658, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 707 (1961), in which the court indicated it would order support if the record established an equitable adoption); Wener v. Wener, 35 A.D.2d 50, 312 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1970) (yes);
Lewis v. Lewis, 85 Misc. 2d 610, 381 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1976) (yes). In most of the cases imposing
liability, the foster father represented to the child that he was the natural father; this was
not the case in Ellison. Hence, although the Georgia Court flatly held that virtual adoption
does not extend to child support controversies, this factual difference may explain in part
the apparent conflict. In two other cases, Sargeant v. Sargeant, 88 Nev. 223, 495 P.2d 618
(1972), and Fuller v. Fuller, 247 A.2d 767 (D.C. 1968), the courts avoided the question by
finding that no equitable adoption had occurred.
235. In House v. House, 222 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949), the court avoided the
question by finding that no equitable adoption had occurred but seemed to assume that the
foster child could partake of the benefit were equitable adoption established.
236. See Servantez v. Aguirre, 456 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (no). But see
Jones v. Loving, 363 P.2d 512 (Okla. 1961) (yes).
237. See Grant v. Sedco Corp., 364 So. 2d 774 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (no) (following Limbaugh v. Woodall, 121 Ga. App. 638, 175 S.E. 2d 135 (1970)). But see Bower v.
Lands, 78 Nev. 246, 253, 371 P.2d 657, 661 (1962) (yes, equitable adoptee would be entitled
to inherit from foster parent and therefore comes within Nevada wrongful death statute's
term "heirs," defined as "any person entitled to inherit the estate of a decedent"). In Greer
Tank & Welding, Inc. v. Boettger, 609 P.2d 548 (Alaska 1980), the court allowed decedent's
former stepson a claim as a dependent under Alaska's wrongful death statute, which lists as
wrongful death beneficiaries decedent's "husband or wife, and children... or other dependents." Id. at 550 (emphasis added).
238. See In re Estate of Edwards, 106 IMI.App. 3d 635, _ , 435 N.E.2d 1379, 1382
(1982) (no, foster parent does not come within the term 'next of kin' in wrongful death
statute); Whitechurch v. Perry, 137 Vt. 464, 472, 408 A.2d 627, 632 (1979) (no, Vermont
wrongful death statute's "term 'next of kin'. . . denotes those persons most nearly related
to the decedent by blood," and but for special statutory provisions, "would not include the
parties to a statutory adoption.").
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designated class by way of equitable adoption?28 9
The conflict of authority on these questions240 suggests that
the time has come to reexamine the equitable adoption doctrine
with a view to developing guidelines for its future application. In
approaching equitable adoption one must address two distinct
questions. First, what criteria should be used to determine whether
a child has been equitably adopted? Second, if the court finds that
a child has been equitably adopted, what consequences should flow
from that determination, or in other words, what status can the
equitably adopted child gain through use of the doctrine?24 1 To answer these questions one must have a clear understanding of the
theoretical tools available for analysis of the cases and of the policy
considerations that may be helpful in determining whether, assuming an equitable adoption has occurred, the court should grant the
remedy requested.
A.

The Theoretical Bases of Equitable Adoption

In decreeing an informally adopted child's right to share in his
foster parent's estate, the courts sometimes invoke the maxim that
"equity regards as done that which ought to have been done. 2 42
This is an admittedly slim reed on which to base an extreme departure from the statutes of descent and distribution. Understandably the courts have struggled to come up with some kind of theory to explain the laudable results achieved in the decisions. Two
theories have emerged: the contract theory and the estoppel theory. Courts using the contract theory presuppose that the foster
parent as promisor has contracted to effect a legal adoption and
that by granting relief the court is specifically enforcing that contract. Thus, in sanctioning a deviation from the intestacy statutes
for a foster child, the Utah Supreme Court explained:
It is generally recognized that where a child's parents agree with the adoptive
239. See Wheeling Dollar Say. & Trust Co. v. Singer, 250 S.E.2d 369 (W.Va. 1978)
(yes). But cf. Robinson v. Robinson, 283 Ala. 257, 215 So. 2d 585 (1967) (equitable adoption
of child did not prevent life tenant's death without issue).
240. See supra notes 229-39 and accompanying text.
241. Both determinations are frequently complicated by conflicts of laws considerations that are beyond the scope of this Article and have been treated adequately elsewhere.
See, e.g., Kuchenig v. California Co., 410 F.2d 222 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 887
(1969); In re Estate of Johnson, 100 Cal. App. 2d 73, 223 P.2d 105 (1950); Schultz v. First
Nat'l Bank, 220 Or. 350, 348 P.2d 22 (1959); Smith v. Green, 4 Or. App. 533, 480 P.2d 437
(1971); Annot., 81 A.L.R. 2d 1128 (1962).
242. Calista Corp. v. Mann, 564 P.2d 53, 60 (Alaska 1977); Tuttle v. Winchell, 104
Neb. 750, 758, 178 N.W. 755, 757 (1920).
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parents to relinquish all their rights to the child in consideration of the adoptive parents' agreement to adopt such child, and to care and provide for it the
same as though it were their own child, and such agreement is fully performed by all parties connected with such contract except there is no actual
adoption, the courts will decree specific performance of such contract and
thereby award to the child the same distributive share of the adoptive parent's estate as it would
have been entitled to had the child actually been
2 4
adopted as agreed. 3

Courts using the estoppel theory stress the child's performance of
filial services for the foster parent and purport to protect the child
"against the fraud of the adoptive parents' neglect or design in
failing to do that which he in equity was obligated to do. ' 244 The
Texas Supreme Court expressed the essence of the estoppel rationale when it spoke of:
an estoppel in pais to preclude adoptive parents and their privies from asserting the invalidity of adoption proceedings or, at least, the status of the
adopted child, when, by performance upon the part of the child, the adoptive
parents have received all the benefits and privileges accruing from such performance, and they by their representations induced such performance under
the belief of the existence of the status of adopted child.14 5

It is often difficult to tell whether the court is proceeding on a contract analysis or an estoppel analysis since the decisions commonly
contain elements of both theories. 246 Regardless of the theory used,
243. In re Williams' Estates, 10 Utah 2d 83, 85, 348 P.2d 683, 684 (1960) (emphasis
added). For other cases stressing the contractual aspects of the situation, see Habecker v.
Young, 474 F.2d 1229 (5th Cir. 1973) (applying Florida law); In re Estate of Lamfrom, 90
Ariz. 363, 368 P.2d 318 (1962); Laney v. Roberts, 409 So. 2d 201 (FI. Dist. Ct. App. 1982);
Williams v. Murray, 239 Ga. 276, 236 S.E.2d 624 (1977).
244. Jones v. Guy, 135 Tex. 398, 403, 143 S.W. 2d 906, 909 (1940).
245. Cubley v. Barbee, 123 Tex. 411, 425-26, 73 S.W. 2d 72, 79-80 (1934) (quoting
Annot., 27 A.L.R. 1365, 1365 (1923)). In a similar vein is the oftquoted statement of the
Supreme Court of Missouri that
[O]ne who takes a child into his home as his own, receiving the benefits accruing to
him on account of that relation, assumes the duties and burdens incident thereto, and
that where justice and good faith require it the court will enforce the rights incident to
the statutory relation of adoption. The child having performed all the duties pertaining
to that relation, the adoptive parent will be estopped in equity from denying that he
assumed the corresponding obligation. In equity it will be presumed that he did everything which honesty and good conscience required of him in justification of his course
.... [H]e who has taken possession of a child in the capacity of an adopting parent
cannot escape the duties and liabilities incident to that capacity by failing to follow the
forms that the statute has prescribed to that end.
Holloway v. Jones, 246 S.W. 587, 591 (Mo. 1922). For estoppel based decisions quoting and
following Holloway v. Jones, see Mize v. Sims, 516 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); Wooley
v. Shell Petroleum Corp. 39 N.M. 256, 45 P.2d 927 (1935); Jones v. Guy, 135 Tex. 398, 143
S.W.2d 906 (1940); Cubley v. Barbee, 123 Tex. 411, 73 S.W.2d 72 (1934).
246. See, e.g., Calista Corp. v. Mann, 564 P.2d 53 (Alaska 1977); Ramsay v. Lane, 507
S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
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unless they find substantial compliance with the adoption statutes,
the courts almost unanimously require that a 2 contract
to adopt be
47
proved before they will grant equitable relief.

Although the contract and estoppel theories are widely accepted, the facts of most cases do not fit either of these traditional
legal constructs very well. The contract analysis is particulary artificial because it is difficult to find a mutuality of remedy, and other
aspects of the so-called contract seem dredged up for the occasion.
The widespread assumption is that the consideration for the foster
parent's promise to adopt consists of two elements: the transfer of
custody and the child's performance of services for the foster parent.24 8 The courts also seem to assume that the contract is between

the natural parents, or other persons relinquishing custody, on the
one hand and the foster parents on the other.24 9 This relegates the

child to the role of a third party beneficiary, and indeed, some
courts speak in terms that classify the child as such. 250 The prob-

lem with this classification is that the child supplies at least half of
the consideration. As one commentator has noted, if "enforcement
247. Thus, in Cavanaugh v. Davis, 149 Tex. 573, 577, 235 S.W.2d 972, 974 (1951), the
court said: "In no case has this Court upheld the adoptive status of a child in absence of
proof of an agreement of contract to adopt.. . . The necessity for the existence of a contract
or agreement has been recognized by the courts of many of our states." See also Hanks v.
Hanks, 281 Ala. 92, 199 So. 2d 169 (1967), Bowden v. Caldron, 554 S.W.2d 25 (Tex.Civ.
App. 1977). Some courts have intimated that maintenance of a family relationship alone
might be sufficient for equity to intervene. See, e.g., Holloway v. Jones, 246 S.W. 587, 591
(Mo. 1922). Others have attenuated the contract requirement to mere meaninglessness. See,
e.g., Herring v. McLemore, 248 Ga. 808, 286 S.E.2d 425 (1982); Williams v. Murray, 239 Ga.
276, 236 S.E.2d 624 (1977). Apparently, only one court has expressly done away with the
requirement that the claimant show a contract to adopt. See Wheeling Dollar Say. & Trust
Co. v. Singer, 250 S.E. 2d 369 (W. Va. 1978). Two California cases dealing with the question
of a foster parent's continuing child support obligation have impiedly dispensed with the
contract requirement by failing to mention it. See In re Marriage of Valle, 53 Cal. App. 3d
837, 126 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1975); Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal. App. 2d 658, 11 Cal. Rptr.
707 (1961).
248. See, e.g., In re Estate of Lamnfrom, 90 Ariz. 363, 368 P.2d 318 (1962); Laney v.
Roberts, 409 So. 2d 201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Williams v. Murray, 239 Ga. 276, 236
S.E.2d 624 (1977). The court in In re Estate of Lanfrom made this explicit, stating that:
"the considerations flowing to the promisor must be twofold: (a) the promisee parents must
turn the child over to the promisor, and (b) the child must give filial affection, devotion,
association and obedience to the promisor during the latter's lifetime. .. " 90 Ariz. at 367,
368 P.2d at 321.
249. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 247.
250. See, e.g., Prince v. Prince, 194 Ala. 455, 69 So. 906 (1915); Hilt v. Hooper, 203
S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). In an early case, Van Dyne v. Vreeland, 11 N.J. Eq. 370
(1857), the court said: "It is objected that this agreement cannot be enforced by the [child],
because he was not a party to it. But he was the party for whose benefit the agreement was
made.. . . [T]he most valuable portion of [the consideration]... has been rendered by the
[child] himself." Id. at 379.
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is . . . contingent upon the child's 'performance,' . . . [this] requirement would seem to be foreign to the theory of third party
beneficiaries."2 51 If the child is a primary party to the contract
rather than a third party beneficiary, then we must assume that
the natural parents or other persons surrendering custody to the
foster parent have contracted on his behalf as his agent. After all,
the child is usually too young to speak for himself.2 52 Some opinions appear to assume that the child is the real party to the alleged
adoption contract, the natural parents acting merely in a representative capacity.2 53
Whether the child is a third party beneficiary or a primary
party, the question arises whether anyone has the authority to
make a legal contract designating the child's adoptor. 25 Implicit in
the cases predicating relief on proof of a contract to adopt is the
assumption that the biological parents or persons in loco parentis
have this authority.2 55 This assumption requires the qualification
that the child's welfare overrides any private agreement for adoption. A biological parent might be bound by his promise to relin-

quish custody should the court find the relinquishment to be in the
child's best interests. But no court would enforce a new custodial
arrangement or agreed-upon adoption which it found to be inimi251. Comment, The Doctrine of Equitable Adoption, 9 Sw. L. J. 90, 94 (1955) (footnote omitted); see also Bailey, supra note 225, at 35 n.19 (author notes that "[riegarded as a
third-party-beneficiary contract it must be conceded that the arrangement is characterized
by most peculiar features, since the courts uniformly recognize that the child's services constitute the performance bargained for by the adopting parent").
252. See, e.g., Luker v. Hyde, 260 Ala. 248, 69 So. 2d 421 (1953) (child entered foster
home as infant); Barlow v. Barlow, 170 Colo.465, 463 P.2d 305 (1969) (contract for adoption
made with unwed mother before child's birth); Winder v. Winder, 218 Ga. 409, 128 S.E.2d
56 (1962); Bank of Maryville v. Topping, 216 Tenn. 597, 393 S.W.2d 280 (1965) (child entered foster home when six weeks old); Heien v. Crabtree, 369 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. 1963).
253. In Price v. Price, 217 S.W.2d 905, 906 (Tex.Civ. App. 1949), and Howell v.
Thompson, 190 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945), the courts spoke of a requirement
that the child prove a contract between himself or someone acting on his behalf and the
would-be adopter. In Wooley v. Shell Petroleum Corp. 39 N.M. 256, 264, 45 P.2d 927, 932
(1935) (emphasis added), the court spoke of "the child's performance of the promise made
in his behalf," but went on to classify the child's action as one of estoppel rather than
contract.
254. A promise to relinquish parental rights and a promise to allow a particular person
to adopt are distinguishable.
255. In Foster v. Cheek, 212 Ga. 821, 825, 96 S.E.2d 545, 548 (1957), the court indicated that the biological mother could ratify a grandparent's agreement to allow another to
adopt, and in Besche v. Murphy, 190 Md. 539, 545, 59 A.2d 499, 502 (1948), the court indicated that a person in loco parentis would have authority to make an agreement for adoption of the child. Cf. Winder v. Winder, 218 Ga. 409, 412, 128 S.E.2d 56, 58 (1962) (holding
that doctors and nurses who attended the child's delivery had no legal right "to contract for
disposition of the child"; the resulting invalidity of the "contract" barred the child's claim).
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cal to the child's welfare. 56
Most states have enacted regulations for the screening and approval of prospective adoptors, 57 and some state statutes prohibit
private adoption arrangements. 58 In any state that prescribes investigative procedures designed to ensure the suitability of a prospective adoptor, the idea of a binding private contract for adoption must be taken with a grain of salt. In all fairness, the courts
recognize the weakness of the contract rationale. They concede
that the "contract" cannot be specifically enforced after the foster
parent's death.2

59

A corpse cannot adopt anyone. Moreover, the

vastly prevailing view is that an equitably adopted child cannot
obtain the status of a legally adopted child.260 Specific performance
is equally unfeasible during the lifetime of the parties for two reasons. First, it is arguable that the promisor does not breach his
contract until he dies without having effected a legal adoption.
Second, equity has long adhered to the rule that it will not command performance of a contract involving personal services or the
assumption of an intimate relationship.261
256. See Beach v. Bryan, 155 Mo. App. 33, 133 S.W. 635 (1911). As stated in Besche v.
Murphy, 190 Md. 539, 59 A.2d 499 (1948):
The [adoption] statute involves action by the court, looking always to the best interest
of the child.. . . [A]doption is not a contract alone between the parties. It requires
judicial determination of the advisability of permitting such action, and if a court decrees otherwise, it is not within the power of one person to adopt another.
Id. at 544, 59 A.2d at 501-02.
257. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
258. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. ANN. LAWS ANN. ch. 28A, § 11(c) (West 1981) "No person
unrelated to... a child by blood or marriage... shall receive such a child for purposes of
adoption except from a licensed or approved placement agency."). Section 15 of the Massachusetts law provides criminal penalties for violation of this section. See also infra note 391
and accompanying text.
259. In Laney v. Roberts, 409 So. 2d 201, 202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), the court
remarked that "[s]uch an action seeks the specific performance of an agreement to adopt
after the death, intestate, of the last surviving putative foster parent, when, paradoxically,
the agreement can no longer be specifically performed." In a similar vein, Justice Watson of
the New Mexico Supreme Court explained:
The relief afforded ... is generally classified as specific performance of contract...
but the classification is not accurate. A specific performance of a contract to adopt is
impossible after the death of the parties who gave the promise. Equity was driven to
the fiction that there had been an adoption. That fiction being indulged, the case was
not one of specific performance. It remained merely to apply the statutes of descent
and to decree the succession.
Wooley v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 39 N.M. 256, 263-64, 45 P.2d 927, 931-32 (1935).
260. See infra notes 321-72 and accompanying text.
261. See, e.g., Williams v. Richardson, 523 F.2d 999, 1005 (2d Cir. 1975) (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring); Northern Del. Indus. Dev. Corp. v. E.W. Bliss Co., 245 A.2d 431, 434
(Del. Ch. 1968); DeRivafinoli v. Corsetti, 4 Paige Ch. 264 (N.Y. 1833). These points were
brought home in Besche v. Murphy, 190 Md. 539, 59 A.2d 499 (1948), as follows:
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One commentator, unable to find a bilateral contract in the
typical arrangement, has suggested that courts view the transaction as a unilateral contract in which the act of living as the child
of the foster parent serves as the child's acceptance of the foster
parent's offer to adopt in exchange for this act.262 The problem
with this or any other contract theory is that the child is usually
too young when he enters the foster home to know of any contract
or to understand its import if he did know of it. 263 All such a child

knows is that he is being maintained in the home in which he finds
himself. Having no better offers of shelter and nurture, he has no
place else to go. Surely, the child's performance of filial services is
more explicable as a natural response to the circumstance that the
foster home is the only home he knows than it is explicable as a
premeditated performance of some bargain supposedly entered
into on his behalf. In this typical case, can a court honestly find
any contractual meeting of the minds or consideration flowing between the foster child and his foster parent?
The estoppel theory comes closer to explaining the cases than
does the contract analysis. The courts may insist on finding an
agreement to adopt, but they recognize that, while the language of
contracts is used, the real reason for granting a decree of equitable
adoption is that equity estops the foster parent and his privies
from denying the relationship they represented to the child. Thus,
the New Mexico Supreme Court, after expressing the view that a
"decision

. .

.is not properly to be reached by pigeonholing it as

one for specific performance, and then simply applying the law of
"that the real classification
contracts," continued by pointing out
'26
of the remedy is that of estoppel.

4

[the child] could not have filed a bill for specific performance against [the foster
mother] during the latter's lifetime. There would have been no mutuality of remedy to
enforce such a contract, because personal services on the part of the child would be
involved, that being part of the obligation of a daughter. Such a contract could not
have been enforced against the [child], and consequently the [child] could not have
enforced it against [the foster mother] .... The relationship of parent and child is of
the most intimate, personal nature. Equity will not ordinarily enforce a contract to
create such relationship.
Id. at 543-44, 59 A.2d at 501-02. In Menees v. Cowgill, 359 Mo. 697, 223 S.W.2d 412 (1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 949 (1950), and Van Dyne v. Vreeland, 11 N.J. Eq. 370 (1857), however, limited equitable relief was granted during the foster parent's life. In Menees, however,
relief against the still living foster mother was merely declaratory.
262. See Comment, Equitable Adoption: A Necessary Doctrine?, 35 S.CAL. L. REv.
491, 495 (1962).
263. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 252.
264. Wooley v. Shell Petroleum Corp. 39 N.M. 256, 264-65, 45 P.2d 927, 932 (1935)
(quoting in part Cubley v. Barbee, 123 Tex. 411, 432, 73 S.W.2d 72, 83 (1934)). In Cubley

776

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:711

"[E]quitable estoppel is a rule of fundamental fairness
whereby a party is precluded from benefiting from his inconsistent
conduct which has induced reliance to the detriment of another."2'6 5 Its essential elements are: (1) a promise or representation of fact; (2) actual and reasonable reliance on the promise or
representation; and (3) resulting detriment. 6 Some courts add
that the relying party must lack the representator's knowledge of
the true state of affairs.2 87 Albeit the estoppel rationale is less
strained than the contract analysis, it, too, has its theoretical
weaknesses when applied to the typical cases.
The estoppel elements that pose the greatest difficulty in the
equitable adoption context are actual reliance and detriment. Detriment in the economic sense will usually be difficult to prove because the foster parents have given the child the home, education,
and support that the biological parents were presumably unwilling
or unable to provide. With respect to reliance, the cases are vague
regarding whether the child's detrimental reliance must be on the
contract to adopt per se or upon the representation of status. At
least some cases actually "indicate the former." e8 Reliance on the
agreement itself is usually impossible because a young child cannot
comprehend the import of a contract. Reliance on a representation
of status is almost as difficult to establish. It seems safe to assume
that most children, even if they knew of their lack of status, would
remain in the foster home and continue to act as dutiful children
simply because they would have no other viable option. Not surprisingly, courts which adhere strictly to the reliance requirement
find themselves rejecting meritorious equitable adoption claims for
the Texas Supreme Court said:
[T]he real classification of the remedy is that of estoppel. In those cases which designate the proceedings as suits for specific performance, the courts generally recognize
that performance cannot be decreed within the usual meaning of that term ....

How-

ever, the technical classification here is of no consequence. The defendants . . . are
plainly estopped from asserting the invalidity of the deed of adoption ....
Id.; see also Calista Corp. v. Mann, 564 P.2d 53, 60-62 (Alaska 1977); Mize v. Simms, 516
S.W.2d 561, 564 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
265. In re Marriage of Valle, 53 Cal. App. 3d 837, 840, 126 Cal. Rptr. 38, 41 (1975)
(citations omitted).
266. See Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 57, 77 N.W. 365, 367 (1898); E.A. Coronis
Assocs. v. M. Gordon Constr. Co., 90 N.J. Super. 69, 79, 216 A.2d 246, 252 (1966); Panorama
Residential Protective Ass'n v. Panorama Corp., 28 Wash. App. 923, 934, 627 P.2d 121, 129
(1981).
267. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Valle, 53 Cal. App. 3d 837, 841, 126 Cal. Rptr. 38, 41
(1975).
268. See Comment, Adoption by Estoppel:History and Effect, 15 BAYLOR L. REv. 162,
169 & n.39 (1963).
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want of the requisite reliance.2 69 The opinions of these courts suggest that equity will intervene only on behalf of a child who is so
calculating, covetous, and ungrateful that he is willing to perform
filial services in the family home only on condition that he get an
heirship out of it.
Because strict insistence on the reliance requirement would
defeat the child's claim in so many worthy cases, the courts have
often interpreted and applied the requirement leniently. Laney v.
Roberts,2 70 a contract based case, and Ramsay v. Lane,2 71 an estoppel based case, are illustrative. Each case involved a claim to an
intestate share of the deceased foster parent's estate. The claimant
in Laney admitted that she knew she was not formally adopted
and denied that she was aware of any contract to adopt. This testimony made it logically impossible for her to claim that she performed as a child in consideration of an adoption agreement or in
reliance upon a representation of adoptee status. The court, nevertheless, allowed her claim. Similarly, the court in Ramsay recited
as an apparently uncontroverted fact that the claimant and her
foster parents discussed the possibility of legal adoption but decided to forego formal proceedings because of the cost.272 Although
269. In Garcia v. Saenz, 242 S.W.2d 230 (TeL Civ. App. 1951), a boy was 10 when he
learned he was not his uncle's natural child, yet he remained in his uncle's home and continued his filial duties as before. The court gave as one of its reasons for refusing to decree an
estoppel the finding that "[t]here was no evidence presented which would show that [the
child] had performed his tasks by reason of any reliance upon representations made to him
which induced such performance under the belief that he was an adopted child." Id at 231.
Similarly, in Calvert v. Johnston, 304 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) the claimant testified that he would have continued to live with his foster parents even had he known he was
not formally adopted. In refusing to decree an equitable adoption, the court reasoned in
part that even if it found a contract to adopt, it did not find reliance on its performance.
See id. at 398. In cases following a contract analysis, the same problems of detriment and
reliance arise in the guise of a search for consideration. In re Estate of Staehli, 86 IlM. App.
3d 1, 407 N.E. 2d 741 (1980), is illustrative. The claimant sought standing to contest her
foster grandfather's will. The court refused to grant standing, explaining inter alia that:
[n] either consideration nor a substantial change in position as a result of the purported
oral contract finds a basis in the factual allegations .... The only inference of consideration is plaintiff's representation that she provided care, comfort and society to decedent for a number of years; but this circumstance ... is as fully or more readily explainable as a natural outgrowth of being raised in the same household as decedent
occupied and partially under his care.
Id. at 4, 407 N.E.2d at 744. The nature of the relief sought may partly account for the
courts' stringency in Calvert and Staehli. For example, the Calvert claimant commanded
little sympathy as he had already been willed his foster parent's entire estate and was seeking an equitable adoption decree merely to obtain more favorable inheritance tax treatment.
270. 409 So. 2d 201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
271. 507 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
272. See id. at 906.
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the conclusion was irresistible that the claimant did not count on
being formally adopted, the Ramsay court found sufficient evidence of reliance, stating "there is evidence that the Durhams represented that Jo Ann was their child by their words and actions.
An inference can be drawn that by such conduct Jo Ann was led to
believe that she had been adopted, and that she continued the
family relationship in reliance on the agreement."2' " While the result in Ramsay may be correct, one winces at the fiction of reliance
in the face of such evidence. Because of the proof problems associated with the reliance requirement in equitable adoption cases,
Alaska has dispensed with it." 4 Similarly, though not as explicit in
jettisoning the reliance requirements as the Alaska court, a Missouri opinion pointed out the unfairness of requiring someone
taken in as a child to prove reliance, stating:
[A] child's love, affection, companionship and service need not be given in
response to an offer to adopt communicated to him, as is contended for by
defendant.... "Equity acts to protect the child," and equitable adoption is
not based upon direct communication to the child but rather upon the
ground that it is "'....

inequitable and unjust to allow one to fail to comply

with an agreement made with the parent or custodian of a child to adopt it,
when he has taken the child at such an age that it had no will or choice in the
matter, that, after the child has performed everything contemplated by the
relation provided for, the intended adoptive parent or his heirs will be estopped to deny the adoption,"'. . . We do not cast a burden upon a child of
tender age to remember events beyond his little comprehension. 7 5

Although, as indicated, any finding of reliance on a contract or
representation of adoptive status is bound to be fictional, one
senses that in the typical case the child does suffer a species of
detrimental reliance, however difficult to articulate or prove. This
detriment is psychological. Any child who grows up with the belief
that he is a natural child of the only parents he knows is bound to
be distressed when he learns that society views him as a legal
stranger to his family. A few cases have recognized that the real
harm is intangible. Justice Tobriner remarked in Clevenger v.
Clevenger27 1 that the putative father's representation that he was
the child's natural father "would induce the child to hold himself
out to the community as [his] natural son. . only to suffer the
abrupt removal of that status, and to undergo the subsequent social injury."2 7 7 Justice Tobriner quoted with approval from Gossett
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Id. at 907.
See Calista Corp. v. Mann, 564 P.2d 53, 62 & n.22 (Alaska 1977).
Mize v. Sims, 516 S.W.2d 561, 566 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
189 Cal. App. 2d 658, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1961).
Id. at 671-72, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 715. Justice Tobriner went on to find, however, that
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v. Ullendorff,2 78 a fascinating older case, that spells out the psycho-

logical damage suffered by the child. The facts in Gossett are
worth reciting. The putative mother acquired one week old twins
from the biological parents, brought them home, and represented
them to her husband and the community as born to her and her
husband. The twins were raised in all respects as the children of
the putative parents. More than twenty years later, the putative
mother tried to avoid sharing the putative father's estate with the
twins by revealing that the deceased was not their natural father.
The Gossett court acknowledged that detriment could not "be said
to exist in a material sense, 279 but recognized the mental injury,
stating that:
no one can say what the psychological reaction upon them may be on the
discovery that the person whom they had all their lives learned to love and
revere as their father was not their parent in fact. So in a sense it is entirely
possible that the two children have been injured by the deceitful or disingenuous conduct of the complainant during the years in which to gratify her own
purposes she secured the assurance of personal and domestic satisfaction and

comfort by her course of conduct.280

Reviewing the cases, one suspects that the theoretical impediments to the use of estoppel in equitable adoption cases are more
semantic than real. Courts have traditionally applied estoppel in a
commercial context, which has colored the terminology of reliance
and detriment. But the underlying principle of fundamental fairness remains constant whether the context is commercial or familial. A California appellate court has made the most realistic attempt to translate the traditional estoppel elements into the terms
of a typical equitable adoption case. That court indicated that:
in order to establish an estoppel vis-a-vis the putative father, there must be a
showing that (1) the putative father represented to the child that he was his
father; (2) the child relied upon the representation by accepting and treating
the putative father as his father; (3) the child was ignorant of the true facts;
and (4) the representation was of such duration that it frustrated the realistic
opportunity to discover the natural father and to reestablish the child-parent
2 81

relationship between the child and the natural father.

This framework could accommodate most meritorious equitable
the factual record before the court in that case did not support the elements of estoppel.
278. 114 Fla. 159, 154 So. 177 (1934).
279. Id. at 167, 154 So. at 180.
280. Id. at 168-69, 154 So. at 181.
281. In re Marriage of Valle, 53 Cal. App. 3d 837, 841, 126 Cal. Rptr. 38, 41 (1975)
(paraphrasing with approval Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal. App. 2d 658, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707
(1961)).
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adoption claims. 8 2
B. Proof of the Contract to Adopt
As stated earlier, the claimant must usually show that the foster parent made a contract to formally adopt him before a court
will grant relief.283 This seems to be true whether the court proceeds on a contract analysis or an estoppel analysis. Even if the
theoretical problems just discussed in connection with the contract
and estoppel theories are overcome, the claimant still encounters
serious proof problems in meeting this contract requirement.
The alleged contract to adopt will usually be oral. Traditionally the courts have viewed these parol contracts with "grave suspicion" because claimants usually assert these agreements only after
the alleged adoptor has died and can no longer dispute the
claim.2 " Hence, the standard of proof for a contract to adopt is
high. Most courts purport to require evidence "so clear, cogent,
and convincing as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the fact that
such agreement was made. 2 85 A minority merely require proof by
a preponderance of the evidence. 286 Although a few courts have insisted on direct evidence of a contract,2 87 most permit proof by circumstantial evidence such as "the acts, conduct and admissions of
the parties. 2 88 Though no one factor is conclusive to establish or
282. This framework is probably flexible enough to cover even the situation of the
claimant in Ramsay v. Lane who did not count on being legally adopted. See supra notes
271-72 and accompanying text. By the time a child like the claimant in Ramsay is mature
enough to comprehend his lack of status, it is usually too late for him to reestablish ties
with his biological family or to act on his knowledge in any other way.
283. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
284. See Burdick v. Grimshaw, 113 N.J. 591, 597, 168 A. 186, 189 (N.J. Ch. 1933);
Cavanaugh v. Davis, 149 Tex. 573, 583, 235 S.W.2d 972, 978 (1951); House v. House, 222
S.W.2d 337, 338-39 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
285. Barlow v. Barlow, 170 Colo. 465, 473, 463 P.2d 305, 309 (1969); see also In re
Estate of Van Cleve, 610 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Mo. 1981); Keller v. Lewis County, 345 Mo. 536,
543, 134 S.W.2d 48, 51 (1939); Johnson v. Olson, 71 S.D. 486, 489, 26 N.W.2d 132, 133-34
(1947).
286. See Moran v. Alder, 570 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. 1978); see also Roberts v. Caughell, 65
So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1953) (followed in Laney v. Roberts, 409 So. 2d 201 (Fla. App. 1982)).
287. See Luker v. Hyde, 260 Ala. 248, 69 So. 2d 421 (1953); Franzen v. Hallmer, 404
III. 596, 89 N.E.2d 818 (1950).
288. Cavanaugh v. Davis, 149 Tex. 573, 578, 235 S.W.2d 972, 975 (1951); see also In re
Estate of Lamfrom, 90 Ariz. 363, 367, 368 P.2d 318, 321 (1962) ("[T]he contract to adopt
need not be express but may be implied from the acts, conduct, and admissions of the
adopting parties.") (footnote omitted)). "The word 'adopt' need not necessarily appear in
[the] agreement, so long as the contract comprehends and intends a legal adoption." Williams v. Murray, 239 Ga. 276, 236 S.E.2d 624, 625 (1977) (citation omitted) (oral agreement
between biological mother and foster parents in which the mother gave "my youngest
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to defeat proof of the contract, courts have found certain factors
suggestive of the existence of a contract to adopt.8 9 It will help the
claimant's case if he can show that he assumed the foster parent's
surname, was referred to as the foster parent's child, and addressed the foster parent as "mommy" or "daddy." As one commentator has noted, "the strongest type of circumstantial evidence
consists of statements made by the adopting parent during his lifetime from which the agreement may be inferred."2 90 But proof of a
family relationship alone will not suffice. The cumulative effect of
the circumstantial evidence must point to some sort of an understanding between the alleged adoptor and the biological parents or
their counterparts. 9 1 If absolutely no evidence of such an understanding appears, or if the alleged contract is invalid for some rea-

son, 2

2

the claim will fail notwithstanding ample proof that the

child and foster parent enjoyed the functional equivalent of a normal parent-child relationship.
The requirement that emerges from the decisions is that statements or conduct claimed to establish a contract to adopt must be
unequivocally referable to such an agreement. This requirement
explains the cases that distinguish between a mere intention to
adopt versus a promise to adopt 9 3 or between an agreement to
rear and educate versus a contract to adopt.2 4 When the alleged
adoptor is the child's stepparent the courts almost invariably find
the proof insufficient on the grounds that the conduct of the pardaughter,... which is about two years old to raise as their own" found sufficient); see also
Benefield v. Faulkner, 248 Ala. 615, 618, 29 So. 2d 1, 4 (1947) (written agreement to "treat
.. . and care for [foster son] in every particular as if he were his own child" found
sufficient).
289. See Holland v. Martin, 355 Mo. 767, 198 S.W.2d 16 (1946).
290. Comment, The Doctrine of Equitable Adoption, 9 Sw. L.J. 90, 101-02 (1955).
291. See Bailey, supra note 225, at 30, 39 n.36.
292. See, e.g., King v. Heirs & Beneficiaries of Watkins, 624 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Ct. App.
1981); Winder v. Winder, 218 Ga. 409, 128 S.E.2d 56 (1962); Rucker v. Moore, 186 Ga. 747,
199 S.E. 106 (1938); Franzen v. Halmer, 404 Ill. 596, 89 N.E.2d 818 (1950). In each case the
court intimated that the parties surrendering the child to the foster parents lacked authority to contract for the child's adoption. In Rucker the court remarked: "The evidence in the
instant case, even if sufficient to show a contract of adoption with some person, failed to
show that the contract was entered into with the father or mother of the child, or that the
contract, if made, was ratified by either parent. .. ." 186 Ga. at 748, 199 S.E. at 108. The
claimants in Franzen came from a Catholic orphanage. Although both biological parents
were dead, the court indicated that the orphanage lacked authority to contract for the children's adoption. After reading the court's opinion this writer was left wondering whether,
according to the court, anyone would have authority to contract on behalf of these orphans.
293. See, e.g., House v. House, 222 S.W. 2d 337 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); King v. Heirs &
Beneficiaries of Watkins, 624 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981).
294. See, e.g., Garcia v. Saenz, 242 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
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ties was as consistent with a normal stepparent-stepchild relationship as it was with a contract to adopt.2 "
Courts that emphasize the high standard of proof are trying to
ensure that the alleged promisor truly intended to adopt the child.
A benevolent person may, of course, take in a homeless child without intending to adopt him. Courts fear that if they relaxed the
standard of proof a person could not help out a needy child without having a de facto adoption foisted upon him after death. The
Missouri Supreme Court articulated this concern in an oft quoted
passage in which the court remarked:
We might again call attention to the wisdom of the rule as to the character
and quantum of proof required... to support adoption by estoppel .... If
this rule is relaxed, then couples, childless or not, will be reluctant to take
into their homes orphan children, and for the welfare of such children, as well
as for other reasons, the rule should be kept and observed. No one, after he
or she has passed on, should be adjudged to have adopted a child unless the
evidence is clear, cogent, and convincing so as to leave no reasonable doubt.296
295. See, e.g., C. St. Foodland v. Estate of Renner, 596 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1979); In re

Estate of Van Cleve, 610 S.W.2d 620 (Mo. 1981); House v. House, 222 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1949). The relief requested in each cash was atypical, which may explain in part the
stringency of the decisions. In C. St. Foodland the Alaska Supreme Court stressed the
master's finding that "Mr. Renner treated Lewis no differently than any good stepparent
would" and concluded the "[s]uch treatment, without more, does not show the implied
agreement to adopt necessary for a finding of equitable adoption. 596 P.2d at 1171. In Lee v.
Green, 217 Ga. 860, 126 S.E.2d 417 (1962), the Georgia Supreme Court reached the same
result by finding a want of consideration rather than a want of proof. The court reasoned
that since the stepparent could expect to receive the affection and filial obedience of his
stepchildren whether or not he adopted them, the alleged promise to adopt did not have any
consideration.
296. Benjamin v. Cronan, 338 Mo. 1177, 1188, 93 S.W.2d 975, 981 (1936). The Texas
Supreme Court expressed the same concern as follows:
It would not have been unnatural when viewed in the light of common knowledge and
experience for this aunt to take her orphaned infant niece and rear her to maturity,
giving her all the care and advantage of which the aunt was capable, receiving in return
that which was justly due in the way of affection and normal services, without any
agreement or intention on the part of the aunt to adopt the child and thereby make her
a legal heir to her property. Someone had to care for the respondent or she would have
become a charge upon the public. The question here is raised, as is ordinarily true in
such cases, when the lips of the alleged adoptor have been sealed by death and in an

effort to establish an interest in property. Such claims should be received with caution.
Before one should be decreed to be the adopted child and heir of another in the absence of compliance with the statute prescribing a simple method of effecting the status, proof of the facts essential to invoke the intervention of equity should be clear,
unequivocal and convincing.
Cavanaugh v. Davis, 149 Tex. 573, 583, 235 S.W.2d 972, 978 (1951). In a similar vien a Texas
appellate court remarked:
Acts of human kindness referable to an undertaking to rear and educate a helpless
child do not prove an agreement to adopt. Nor is loco parentis the equivalent of adoption .... The devolution of the estates of benevolent families and the operation of the
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Whatever the stated standard of proof, courts can apply it
with varying degrees of strictness depending on whether or not
they want to find a contract. An example of lenient application is
Williams v. Murray,9 in which the only evidence supporting a
contract to adopt was that the foster parents treated the child as a
daughter and that the biological mother had orally given them "my
youngest daughter, . . .which is about two years old to raise as
their own."298 The Georgia Supreme Court found this sufficient to
sustain a jury verdict of virtual adoption. By contrast, at the strict
end of the spectrum is Luker v. Hyde.2ee The claimant in Luker
entered the home of James and Emma Snead, the foster parents,
when she was only a few weeks old. The court's opinion recites
that she was known in school as Lillie Snead, that she called the
Sneads "Mama" and "Daddy," that the Sneads described Lillie as
their daughter in naming her the beneficiary of their modest life
insurance policies, and that "Lillie helped about the home and was
a great comfort to [the Sneads] to whom no child was ever
born." 00 A disinterested witness testified that Emma Snead said in
his presence that she and James had adopted Lillie and that she
showed him some papers captioned "Contract of Adoption" containing the names of James Snead, Lillie, and Lillie's biological father. Notwithstanding this testimony and other direct evidence of
a written contract to adopt, the Alabama Supreme Court entertained "grave doubt" regarding the existence of the alleged contract and refused to decree an equitable adoption because no proof
of its terms and provisions existed.30 1
The willingness to find a contract to adopt also varies with the
relief requested. When the claimant goes beyond the traditional
claim to an intestate share and demands the status of a legally
adopted child for other purposes, he is less likely to succeed in establishing an equitable adoption. For example, in Calvert v. Johnston 02 the claimant, who had already taken under his foster falaws of descent and distribution do not rest upon a showing so tenuous and slender as
ishere presented.
Garcia v. Saenz, 242 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951). Notwithstanding these concerns, the Texas Supreme Court later indicated that the correct standard of proof is a "preponderance of the evidence." See Moran v. Alder, 570 S.W.2d 883, 885 (Tex. 1978).
297. 239 Ga. 276, 236 S.E.2d 624 (1977).
298. Id. at 277, 236 S.E.2d at 625.
299. 260 Ala. 248, 69 So. 2d 421 (1954).
300. Id. at 250, 69 So. 2d at 422.
301. Id. at 254, 69 So. 2d at 425.
302. 304 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
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ther's will, sought the more favorable inheritance tax status
accorded biological and legally adopted children. In House v.
House303 the claimant sought a share of the workmen's compensation benefit paid on account of her stepfather's accidental death.
Although in each case there was evidence on which a lenient court
might have found the existence of a contract to adopt, the courts
in both cases avoided granting the extraordinary relief requested
by finding that no equitable adoption had occurred.20
C. Suggested Criteriafor Equitable Adoption
Having seen how the courts test equitable adoption claims, we
are ready to address our initial inquiry: What criteria should a
court use to determine whether a child has been equitably
adopted? We may begin by asking why most courts insist that the
claimant prove a contract to adopt before equitable relief will be
granted.30 5 The cases already discussed suggest that the purpose is
to assure the court that the foster parent intended to adopt the
child as his heir and that the child grew up in the belief that he
303. 222 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
304. When claim affects realty and the alleged contract is oral, some courts have assumed the applicability of the Statute of Frauds provision requiring contracts for the sale of
land to be in writing. See, e.g., In re Rivolo's Estate, 194 Cal. App. 2d 773, 15 Cal. Rptr. 268
(1961) and Luker v. Hyde, 200 Ala. 248, 69 So. 2d 421 (1954). A contract to adopt, however,
unlike a contract to make a will or to die intestate, does not fetter the promisor's disposition
of his estate since he can disinherit an adopted child just as he might disinherit a biological
child. Therefore, some courts have taken the more logical position that contracts to adopt
are not within the Statute of Frauds. See, e.g., Tuttle v. Winchell, 104 Neb. 750, 178 N.W.
755 (1920); Jones v. Guy, 135 Tex. 398, 143 S.W.2d 906 (1940). The court in Jones drew the
distinction between a contract to adopt and a contract to convey land as follows:
It is our opinion that the effect of sustaining an estoppel in pals to preclude the adoptive parents and their privies from asserting the invalidity of adoption proceedings or
at least the status of the adopted child ... is not enforcing a parol contract for the
sale of real estate. This is true for the obvious reason that an adopted child does not
inherit property in virtue of the status of an adopted child alone but depends upon the
intestacy of the adoptive parent, together with the statutes of descent and distribution.
Moreover, the status of an adopted child with respect to the property of the adoptive
parent is the same as that of parent's own children ....
Mr. Pierce [the foster parent]
had the right to dispose of his property by will ....
135 Tex. 398, 406, 143 S.W.2d 906, 910. Occasionally one sees the argument that a promise
to adopt carries with it an implied promise to leave the child a share of the promisor's
estate. See, e.g., In re Lanfrom's Estate, 90 Ariz. 363, 368 P.2d 318 (1962). This viewpoint
seems to stretch an already thin and largely fictional agreement to encompass matters never
contemplated by the parties. Even if a court applies the Statute of Frauds, the child's performance and the foster parent's part performance, if clearly referable to the contract,
should suffice to remove the contract from its bar. Laney v. Roberts, 409 So. 2d 201 (Fla.
App. 1982).
305. See supra text accompanying note 226.
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was legally adopted.30° The assumption seems to be that if the foster parent promised to formally adopt the child, he must have
communicated that intention to the child, so that the representation needed for an estoppel may also be inferred.301 The courts
thus use the contract requirement as a rough divining rod to distinguish between the cases that do and do not merit extraordinary
equitable intervention. The finding vel non of a contract to adopt
is not, however, a reliable indicator of the meritoriousness of a
child's claim. One can readily find cases in which the child loses for
failure to establish the requisite contract, although on the equities
he clearly deserved to participate in his foster parent's estate. In
two such cases the court denied equitable relief to children raised
in the foster hoine from infancy and treated in all respects like
biological children because the parties who surrendered the children to the foster parents were not competent to contract for their
adoption. 8
The contract requirement imparts an appearance of guidance
and predictability. Yet one must question whether this requirement is as useful a guide as it might first appear. As indicated, in
most cases the finding of a contract to adopt is largely fictional,309
as is any finding that a child of tender years relied on a contract or
representation of adoptive status. 10 Moreover, even if the usual arrangement can be found to constitute a bona fide contract, the
court's freedom to find or not find a contract according to how
strictly it applies the standard of proof can produce different re3 11
sults on identical facts.

In view of the artificiality of the contract requirement and its
malleability to achieve whatever result the court desires, a more
realistic guide would better serve both bench and bar. A better test
for the meritoriousness of these claims is whether the foster parent
led the child to believe that he was a biological or legally adopted
306. See supra text accompanying notes 293-96; Laney v. Roberts, 409 So. 2d 201 (Fla.
App. 1982).
307. See, e.g., supra note 296 and accompanying text; see also Bailey, supra note 225,
at 41-42.
308. See Winder v. Winder, 218 Ga. 409, 128 S.E.2d 56 (1962); Rucker v. Moore, 186
Ga. 747, 199 S.E. 106 (1938). For other cases in which meritorious claims foundered for
inability to prove the requisite contract, see Luker v. Hyde, 200 Ala. 248, 69 So. 2d 421
(1954); Franzen v. Hallmer, 404 Ill. 596, 89 N.E.2d 818, (1950); King v. Heirs and Beneficiaries of Watkins, 624 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981).
309. See supra notes 248-63 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 269 & 270-75 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 297-304 and accompanying text.
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member of his foster family. If estoppel is the true basis for the
granting of equitable relief,3 12 whether or not a contract existed or
even whether or not the foster parent intended to formally adopt
the child should be beside the point. The courts should hold that
the only finding essential to raise an estoppel is that the foster
family's acts or omissions induced the child to believe that he was
the foster parent's biological or formally adopted child. As one
commentator has noted, "a most effective means of leading a child
to believe that it will be entitled to all the rights of a natural child
is to refrain from revealing the fact that it is not a natural
child."3 13 This holding out, whether by affirmative representation
or by silence, is all that is needed to invoke the doctrine of adoption by estoppel against the foster parents or their privies. This
suggestion presupposes a community belief that one who appears
to be the child's parent, although he lacks intent to adopt the
child, should have a legal as well as a moral obligation to disabuse
the child of the misconception that society will treat him like any
other child at the death of the only parents he knows. 1 "
An approach that focuses on what the foster parent reasonably
led the child to believe rather than what the foster parent intended
eliminates the need to chase after the phantom contract to adopt.
It also eliminates the need for any rigid rules regarding the age
beyond which equitable adoption cannot occur.31 5 Looking at our
basic question-what the child was led to believe-the usual inference would be that the older the child the less likely he would be
to believe that he was a natural or formally adopted child. On the
other hand, a child who enters the home as an infant or toddler,
who is treated like a biological child and is never told otherwise
would quite understandably believe that he was the child of the
people who raised him, regardless of the actual intent of the foster
parents or the existence vel non of a contract to adopt.
Some courts have attenuated the contract requirement to near
meaninglessness. 1 6 But only one court, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, has used the approach this Article suggests and
312. See supra notes 248-81 and accompanying text.
313. Bailey, supra note 225, at 42 n.49.
314. Obviously, this disclosure cannot be made until the child is able to comprehend
its import, but in most cases, the child can be meaningfully informed well before the foster
parent's death.
315. See, e.g., Thompson v. Mosleey, 344 Mo. 240, 245, 125 S.W.2d 860, 862 (1939) (no
equitable adoption of one who was an adult at the time the agreement to adopt was made).
316. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
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expressly jettisoned the contract requirement. That court, in
Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust Co. v. Singer,3 17 listed the circumstances tending to establish an equitable adoption,",8 noted
that a finding of equitable adoption is usually predicated on proof
of an express or implied contract to adopt, and then observed:
While the existence of an express contract of adoption is very convincing evidence, an implied contract of adoption is an unnecessary fiction created by
courts as a protection from fraudulent claims. We find that if a claimant can,
by clear, cogent and convincing evidence, prove sufficient facts to convince
the trier of fact that his status is identical to that of a formally adopted child,
except only for the absence of a formal order of adoption, a finding of an
equitable adoption is proper without proof of an adoption contract.",

This writer submits that other jurisdictions should follow the lead

of West Virginia in dispensing with the contract requirement and
focusing instead on what
the foster family received and what it led
3 10
expect.
to
the child
D.

The Consequences of Equitable Adoption

The foregoing section advocated that the contract requirement

be scrapped and that the test for equitable adoption be modified
to focus on what the foster child was reasonably led to believe.
This section addresses our second inquiry: Once a court finds that
a child has been equitably adopted, what consequences should flow
from that determination? For example, should an equitably
adopted child be given the more favorable inheritance tax status
317. 250 S.E.2d 369 (W. Va. 1978).

318. The circumstances enumerated by the court were:
the benefits of love and affection accruing to the adopting party

..

,

the performances

of services by the child... ; the surrender of ties by the natural parent... ; the soci-

ety, companionship and filial obedience of the child...; an invalid or ineffectual adoption proceeding...; reliance by the adopted person upon the existence of his adoptive
status...; the representation to all the world that the child is a natural or adopted

child...; and the rearing of the child from an age of tender years by the adopting
parents.

Id. at 373-74 (citations omitted).
319. Id. at 374.
320. The Wheeling case concerned a gift under a long-term trust to the life benefi-

ciary's children. Neither the trustor, who died long before the alleged equitable adoption,
nor her heirs, whom the trust named as alternate takers, could be said to be claiming
through the alleged adopting parent. Thus, the only disturbing aspect of the Wheeling decision is that the court did not give in-depth treatment to the question of whether, even
assuming the child had been equitably adopted, the donor could be said to have intended to
include equitably adopted children on the same basis as biological and formally adopted
children. Notwithstanding the strong equities in the child's favor on such an issue, strong
policy reasons for resisting such an assumption exist. This aspect of the case is discussed in
the next subsection on the consequences of equitable adoption.
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accorded biological and legally adopted children? Can an equitably
adopted child inherit through his deceased foster parent from the
foster parent's lineal and collateral kindred? Does equitable adoption work in reverse so that the foster parent and his relatives can
inherit from the equitably adopted child? In short, does an equitably adopted child have the same status as a legally adopted child?
In the typical equitable adoption case, the child receives the
same share of his foster parent's estate he would have received had
he been legally adopted. But some cases present more novel claims
for relief that require the court to consider whether to treat the
child as legally adopted for other purposes.21 In dealing with the
consequences of equitable adoption most decisions have limited
the child to relief against the foster parent or his successorial privies and have denied the foster parent or his privies any standing in
equity against the equitably adopted child. A few decisions, however, have gone beyond the traditional confines of the equitable
adoption doctrine to give relief approximating a de facto legal
adoption.3 2 Do these cases augur a trend toward treating the equitably adopted child like a legally adopted child for all purposes?
Do these decisions have a sound theoretical basis and, more importantly, have the courts thought through the policy implications of
treating the equitable adoptee like a legal adoptee in all respects?
In evaluating the cases we must remember that equitable
adoption is a remedy fashioned by equity and that the true basis of
granting relief is that the parties against whom relief is sought
have acted in such a way as to estop themselves from denying that
they legally adopted the child. Therefore, theoretically it should
follow that the test for all claims should be whether the party
against whom the effects of legal adoption are sought has done
anything to warrant the raising of an estoppel.
Most courts considering the matter have made it clear that a
decree of equitable adoption does not confer the status of a legally
adopted child. These courts have viewed compliance with the statutory procedures for adoption as the exclusive means, short of biological begetting, by which a legal parent-child relationship may be
created. In a 1981 case, Pouncy v. Garner,23 the claimant sought
to inherit the intestate estate of his dead foster parents' daughter
by claiming to be her brother by equitable adoption. Although will321. See supra notes 229-39 and accompanying text.
322. See, e.g., Estate of Reid, 80 Cal. App. 3d 185, 145 Cal. Rptr. 451 (1978); Wheeling
Dollar Say. & Trust Co. v. Singer, 250 S.E.2d 369 (W. Va. 1979).
323. 626 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981).
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ing to admit the equitable adoption, the court rejected his claim on
the ground that "the estoppel to deny the adopted status does not
operate or work against collateral kindred not in privity with the
adoptive parents.

3

24

Similarly, in Menees v. Cowgill s 25 the claim-

ant sought to inherit by representation the intestate estate of the
sister of her long dead foster father. In denying relief the Missouri
Supreme Court said:
While it is in effect admitted that the appellant would have been entitled to a
decree of equitable adoption against Guy M. Cowgill [the foster father]...
she is not entitled to such a decree as against the collateral kind of his sister,
who were not parties to the adoption contract and who are not bound
thereby. No equities exist in her favor as against them authorizing a decree of
equitable adoption by him as against them....
If Guy M. Cowgill had legally adopted appellant in compliance with statutory requirements, the adoption would have been binding on all persons
.. but in an equitable proceeding based upon contract, only the parties
thereto or those in privity with them are bound. Equity acts only against
specific individuals and, in such case, one person may be bound and not
another."'5

Several cases have dealt with an attempt by relatives of the foster
parents to inherit from the foster parents' deceased equitably
adopted children. The relatives did not succeed in any of these
cases because the equitably adopted children had done nothing to
invoke the aid of equity against them. 2 7 In two of the cases the
property escheated to the state apparently because the intestate
324. Id. at 342 (following Asbeck v. Asbeck, 369 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. 1963)). Bank of
Maryville v. Topping, 216 Tenn. 597, 393 S.W.2d 280 (1965), presented the question of
whether the widow and biological issue of a predeceased foster child could inherit through
him from the estate of the foster mother. The foster mother's estate was treated as intestate
property because her holographic will's residuary clause was too vague to be given effect.
The Tennessee Supreme Court denied the inheritance, holding that Tennessee would not
recognize the equitable adoption doctrine when, as here, neither "a substantial compliance
with the adoption statute" nor "a contract of adoption and inheritance" was present. Id. at
605, 393 S.W.2d at 284. The court did say, however, that if an equitable adoption existed on
the facts presented, the dead foster child's widow and issue would take through him from
the foster mother's estate. Id. at 602, 393 S.W.2d at 282. Although the beginning of the
opinion seems to reject categorically the equitable adoption doctrine in toto, a close reading
of the opinion shows that Tennessee does afford equitable relief under a different label in
cases presenting either a substantial effort to comply with the adoption statute or "a contract of adoption and inheritance." Id. at 605, 393 S.W.2d at 284.
325. 359 Mo. 697, 223 S.W.2d 412 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 949 (1950).
326. Id. at 707-08, 223 S.W.2d at 418. But cf. Wheeling Dollar Say. & Trust Co. v.
Singer, 250 S.E.2d 369 (W. Va. 1978) (permitting equitably adopted daughter of life beneficiary of testamentary trust to take remainder as life beneficiary's child under will executed
by a stranger to the equitable adoption).
327. See In re Estate of Riggs, 109 Misc. 2d 644, 440 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sur. Ct. 1981);
Geiger v. Estate of Connelly, 271 N.W.2d 570 (N.D. 1978); Heien v. Crabtree, 369 S.W.2d 28
(Tex. 1963).
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foster children's biological relatives were unknown. 8s Thus, a
number of cases clearly establish that the equitably adopted child
cannot inherit through his foster parents from their relatives and
that equitable adoption does not work in reverse to give the foster
parents or their privies any rights against the equitably adopted
child. It would seem to follow that mutual inheritance rights would
continue to exist
between the equitably adopted child and his bio32 9
logical family.

When it comes to the status of equitably adopted children
under inheritance tax statutes the cases have not been so uniform.330 The highest courts of two states have refused to grant equitable adoptees the favorable tax treatment accorded biological
and legally adopted children. In a 1981 decision, Goldberg v. Robertson,3s1 the Missouri Supreme Court denied an equitably
adopted child the lower inheritance
tax rate, explaining that it had
"carefully circumscribed"332 the equitable adoption doctrine to fit
the doctrine's sole justification that it would be inequitable to allow one who has failed to formalize the parent-child relationship,
after receiving its benefits, to deny the child's adoptive status. In
Wooster v. Iowa State Tax Commission3s the Iowa Supreme
Court made this more explicit:
The principle which the court has sought to apply... is to do justice and
equity... to one who, though having filled the place of a natural born child,
through inadvertence or fault has not been legally adopted. In such case,
property recompense has been measured in the amount fixed by the statutes
of descent and distribution. But we have never held.., that in so doing our
decision so cured the defects in the adoption as to effect a legal adoption as
though the statutory proceedings had been fully complied with. Since the
matter of adoption is strictly statutory and cannot be effected by the mere
agreement of the interested parties, with better reason may it be said that it
cannot be effected by estoppel in pals, or by conduct.33'
328. See Geiger v. Estate of Connelly, 271 N.W.2d 570 (N.D. 1978); Heien v. Crabtree,
369 S.W.2d 28 (Tex.1963). Interestingly, the relatives' claim in Helen failed notwithstanding that the Texas Probate Code governing inheritance from and through adopted children
defined the term "child" to include "an adopted child, whether adopted by any existing or
former statutory procedure, or by acts of estoppel ...." 369 S.W.2d at 30 (dissenting
opinion).
329. Unfortunately, no case law exists directly on point.
330. Some older cases have denied even legal adoptees the lower tax rate applicable to
biological children. See, e.g., In re Strunk's Estate, 369 Pa. 478, 87 A.2d 485 (1952); State v.
Yturria, 109 Tex.220, 204 S.W. 315 (1918).
331. 615 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. 1981).
332. Id. at 62.
333. 230 Iowa 797, 298 N.W. 922 (1941).
334. Id. at 800, 298 N.W. at 924. (quoting Caulfield v. Noonan, 229 Iowa 955, 295 N.W.
466 (1940)).

IMPACT OF ADOPTIONS

19841

If equitable adoption is based on estoppel, it is difficult to see how
state taxing authorities could do anything to estop themselves
from denying a legal adoption that did not in fact occur. Taxing
authorities do not usually involve themselves in arrangements for
the child's upbringing. " '
Notwithstanding the logic of these arguments, the California
courts have given equitable adoptees the status of legally adopted
children for inheritance tax purposes."' 6 In re Estate of
Radovich5 7 concerned the rate classification of George Radovich,
who, in a probate proceeding to establish his property rights, had
received the estate he would have inherited from his intestate foster father had he been legally adopted. In holding that the state
should assess George at the lower tax rate applicable to natural
and formally adopted children, the California Supreme Court
seemed to reason that the probate proceeding was an heirship proceeding in rem and, therefore, binding on the whole world, including the California state taxing authorities."' 8 The high courts of
Missouri and Iowa have expressly rejected the idea of equitable
adoption as an in rem adjudication.33 9 As Justice Welliver said in
Goldberg v. Robertson, "[a]n equitable adoption is an in personam
action, binding only on the parties to the action and those in privity with them.

34 0

The niceties of the distinction between proceed-

ings in rem and proceedings in personam would not necessarily, in
this author's view, dictate the Wooster holding over the holding of
Radovich. Another concern which inclines this writer to prefer the
position of Wooster and Goldberg over that of Radovich is that
formal adoption procedures designed to ensure suitable placement
of adoptees may be eroded if courts give informal and formal adop335. As the Wooster opinion put it, "[o]bviously, when a party fails to take the steps
required by the state to effectuate a legal adoption the estoppel against said party resulting
from such noncompliance. . . does not bar the state from standing upon the facts as they
actually exist in making classifications for inheritance tax purposes." Id. at 803, 298 N.W. at
925.
336. See In re Estate of Radovich, 48 Cal. 2d 116, 308 P.2d 14 (1957); Estate of Reid,
80 Cal. App. 3d 185, 145 Cal. Rptr. 451 (1978).
337. 48 Cal. 2d 116, 308 P.2d 14 (1957).
338. Id. at 123, 308 P.2d at 19. As the dissent in Radovich pointed out, the majority's
rationale is at odds with the view of other jurisdictions that a decree of equitable adoption is
not strictly speaking a declaration of heirship, but rather is an equitable remedy fashioned
to correct injustice by giving the equitably adopted child what he would have received had
his foster parent taken the necessary legal steps to make him an heir. Id. at 129-30, 308 P.2d
at 23 (Schauer, J., dissenting; joined by McComb, J.).
339. See Goldberg v. Robertson, 615 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. 1981); Wooster v. Iowa State Tax
Comm'n, 230 Iowa 797, 298 N.W. 922 (1941).

340.

615 S.W.2d at 63.
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tions the same effect. This consideration will be addressed following review of the cases.
Even nontraditional claims by the child against the foster parent or his estate have a sounder theoretical basis than claims by or
against third parties. Thus, a court has granted an equitably
adopted child standing to contest the unfavorable will of his foster
parent. 1" A number of cases have cropped up presenting the question whether one who has equitably adopted a child may be compelled to support that child after divorce breaks up the family
unit. Although this kind of scenario usually provides some basis for
the raising of an estoppel, the jurisdictions have gone both ways on
this issue.
The courts of New York and California have fixed unofficial
parents with continuing liability for the support of their equitably
adopted children. Wener v. Weners 2 presented the following scenario. A childless New York couple heard that an infant whose
birth was imminent would be available for adoption in Florida. According to the court's findings the husband arranged "for his wife
to go to Florida and bring the infant back to New York. He picked
them up at the airport upon their return and drove them back to
the parties' apartment, where a bassinet, bottles, and diapers were
waiting."3 43 A year later the husband and wife separated and di-

vorce proceedings ensued. Although the husband sent the child an
Easter card signed "Love Dad," in the divorce proceedings he denied any obligation to support the child whom he never legally
adopted. In affirming the trial court's holding that the husband
was liable for the child's support, the appellate court commented:
We cannot ignore the realities of this infant's plight.... This infant was
taken from her natural mother when but a few days old, albeit with her
mother's consent. Her natural parents and their whereabouts are unknown
(no one has ever suggested she be returned to them) and she has never been
legally adopted. Still, the parties at bar are the only "parents" she has ever
known. Having brought the child into their home, they must, of necessity,
4
shoulder the burden of her support.3
341. See Vincent v. Bronis, 365 S.W.2d 835 (Tex.Civ. App. 1963). A later case, In re
Estate of Staehli, 86 IlM. App. 3d 1, 407 N.E.2d 741 (1980), concerned a foster granddaughter's attempt to contest her foster grandfather's will. The court avoided the question
by finding no equitable adoption, but seemed to assume that the petitioner would have had
standing to contest had the decedent equitably adopted her natural mother.
342. 35 A.D.2d 50, 312, N.Y.S.2d 815 (1970).
343. Id. at 52, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
344. Id. at 53, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 818. The Wener court relied in part on an earlier New
York decision, Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1963), that fixed
liability for the support of a child who, with the husband's consent, had been conceived by
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A California case, In re Marriage of Valle,3 5 presented facts similar to those in Wener. The Valles, a childless couple, brought the
husband's young niece and nephew from Mexico to live with them
in California. The birth certificates by which the children entered
the country listed the Valles as the biological parents. Three years
later the Valles separated and in the ensuing dissolution proceedings Mr. Valle denied any obligation to support the children unless
the court awarded him custody. The court estopped Mr. Valle from
denying paternity for support purposes because the couple had led
the children to believe that they were their natural parents and
had thereby frustrated any "realistic opportunity to reestablish the
child-parent relationship between the children and their natural
parents." 8 "4 The Valle court stressed that "the estoppel runs in
favor of the child, not the spouse. '"3

7

By contrast, Lewis v.

Lewis, 4 8 a

1976 New York case, fixed liability for child support on
an unofficial father by finding an estoppel in favor of his spouse.
The Lewis fact pattern is probably fairly common. Mr. Lewis married the natural mother of Kim, a three year old child by another
man. After the marriage he listed himself on Kim's birth certificate
as her natural father. In a divorce action brought several years
later, the wife, although conceding that Mr. Lewis was not Kim's
biological father, sought to hold him liable for her support. Noting
that Mr. Lewis had listed himself as and assumed the role of Kim's
father, the court found that the wife "was justified in relying upon
his sincerity in being responsible for the child" and concluded that
"the theory of equitable estoppel now prevents the husband from
denying that assumption of responsibility upon which his wife
,3 49

relied."

artificial insemination. The Gursky court found that technically the child was born out of
wedlock, but nevertheless, in annulment proceedings held the husband primarily responsible
for the child's support "on the basis for [sic] an implied contract to support or by reason of
application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel." Id. at 1089, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
345. 53 Cal. App. 3d 837, 126 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1975), (following Clevenger v. Clevenger,
189 Cal. App. 2d 658, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1961), in which the court had indicated it would
order support if the record established an estoppel regarding the child).
346. 53 Cal. App. 3d at 842, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
347. Id. at 841, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
348. 85 Misc. 2d 610, 381 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1976).
349. Id. at 612-13, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 633. In a District of Columbia case presenting facts
almost identical to the facts in Lewis, the court refused to find that an equitable adoption
had occurred and, thus, never squarely decided whether an equitable adoptor is liable for
his equitably adopted child's support. See Fuller v. Fuller, 247 A.2d 767 (D.C. 1968). Another decision which avoided the question is that of the Nevada Supreme Court in Sargeant
v. Sargeant, 88 Nev. 223, 495 P.2d 618 (1972).
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Contrary to these New York and California decisions, the high
courts of Montana and Georgia appear to have taken the position
that the doctrine of equitable adoption has no place in controversies over child support or custody. Pierce v. Pierce,350 a 1982 Montana case presenting facts very similar to the facts in Lewis, concerned a stepfather who had assumed a father role vis-i-vis his
stepson and had falsely signed an affidavit of parentage. After
holding that the stepfather had no standing in the divorce proceedings to contest the biological mother's custody of the child, the
Montana Supreme Court concluded that the stepfather accordingly
had no continuing duty to support his equitably adopted child.
The stepfather was thus left with no parental rights but with no
parental obligations either. The Georgia case, Ellison v. Thompson,351 presented an odd twist that may crop up quite frequently in
our divorce prone society. Following divorce of the biological parents, the biological mother remarried, and her second husband formally adopted her two toddlers. When this second marriage ended
in divorce, the biological father, husband number one, reassumed
some of his former parental role. In support proceedings the trial
court found that husband number one had virtually readopted his
children and held him liable for their support. On appeal, the
Georgia Supreme Court said that "the theory 'virtual adoption' is
not applicable to a dispute as to who is legally responsible for the
support of minor children"' 52 and refused to hold husband number
one liable for child support. Ellison might be distinguished from
decisions attaching child support liability on equitable adoptors
because in Ellison, unlike in most other cases, the child had an
official adoptive father to look to for support. 5 s The Ellison court,
however, did not rely on this consideration; instead, it categorically
held that the doctrine of virtual adoption does not extend to child
support controversies.
Should the equitable estoppel theory be used in child support
litigation? Certainly, as Ellison illustrates, the doctrine can inject
complexity into child support disputes involving multiple parent
figures. On the other hand, in a case like Wener v. Wener in which
350. - Mont. _, 645 P.2d 1353 (1982).
351. 240 Ga. 594, 242 S.E.2d 95 (1978).
352. Id. at 596, 242 S.E.2d at 97.
353. "The adoption by Gunn [husband number two] of the children relieved Ellison
[husband number one] of all obligations and created the relationship of parent and child
between Gunn and the children. Gunn is therefore legally responsible for the support of the
children as long as this relationship continues to exist." Id.
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the child has no one but the equitable adoptors to look to for support,354 it would seem that the court has no choice but to use the
doctrine to ensure the child's maintenance. Whenever the parties
induce the child to look to them as his only parents, a sound theoretical basis exists for estopping the equitable adoptors from denying the obligations of the parent-child relationship thus represented. On balance it seems that courts may appropriately use the
equitable adoption doctrine to fix child support liability. But
courts should limit its application to situations in which, by their
actions, the equitable adoptors have denied the child any real opportunity to reestablish ties with his biological or official adoptive
parents.
The courts have dealt with a miscellany of other questions
concerning the consequences of equitable adoption. For example,
litigants have raised the question whether an equitably adopted
child may recover a workmen's compensation death benefit for the
death of his foster parent. A Texas case avoided the question by
finding that no equitable adoption had occurred but seemed to assume that the foster child could partake of the benefit were equitable adoption established.
In the converse situation another
Texas decision denied a foster parent's claim to recover a workmen's compensation benefit for the accidental death of the equitably adopted child he had raised from infancy. 5
Courts have also examined the ramifications of equitable
adoption in the context of wrongful death claims. The results vary
depending on the terms of the applicable statute. Grant v. Sedco
Corp.5 concerned a claim for the foster mother's death brought
by her minor equitable adoptee's guardian under Florida's statute,
which included the decedent's "minor children" as wrongful death
beneficiaries. The Florida court held that one who did not legally
qualify as the decedent's child could not maintain a child's claim
55 A Nevada case, Bower v. Landa, 5 ' decided
under the statute.3
354. See supra notes 342-44 and accompanying text.
355. See House v. House, 222 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
356. See Servantez v. Aguirre, 456 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). But cf. Jones v.
Loving, 363 P.2d 512 (Okla. 1961) (allowing a claim by biological mother for the death of
her adopted-away son after an incomplete attempt to readopt him as her child).
357. 364 So. 2d 774 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
358. The court followed and quoted with approval a Georgia decision, Limbaugh v.
Woodall, 121 Ga. App. 638, 175 S.E.2d 135 (1970), which held that "the terms 'child' or
'children' as used in our wrongful death statutes do not encompass one claiming to be like a
child as to another acting in loco parentis, even when such relationship obtains under an
agreement to 'adopt' but the legal adoption has never transpired." Id. at 641, 175 S.E.2d at
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under a differently worded statute, permitted such a claim. After
an automobile accident killed both of his foster parents, the equitably adopted child intervened in a wrongful death action brought
for the benefit of the foster father's siblings. An earlier Utah probate proceeding had decreed the child the estate he would have
inherited from his foster father had he been legally adopted. The
Nevada Supreme Court allowed the equitably adopted child's
claim to the exclusion of the siblings' claim, reasoning that, because the child had been decreed his foster father's entire estate,
he came within the Nevada wrongful death statute's term "heirs,"
which, said the court, "includes any person entitled to inherit the
estate of a decedent."3 60 This rationale seems a bit shaky because a
decree of equitable adoption is not strictly speaking a declaration
of heirship but rather is an equitable remedy fashioned to correct
injustice by giving the child the estate he would have received had
the foster parents taken the necessary steps to make him an heir.
Moreover, if the wrongful death claim is tested against the estoppel theory, it is difficult to see who is estopped. The claim is not
against the foster parent or his estate, and it seems doubtful that
either the foster parent's collateral relatives or the wrongful death
defendants would have done anything to warrant the raising of an
estoppel against them. If these claims are to be allowed, this
should be accomplished by amendment of the wrongful death statutes to include the decedent's dependents as beneficiaries whether
or not they legally qualify as his children. In the converse situation
several courts have denied equitable adoptors standing to sue for
the wrongful deaths of their equitably adopted children36 because,
as stated in a 1982 Illinois decision, a "foster parent does not3 come
62
within the term 'next of kin' in the wrongful death statute.
138.
359. 78 Nev. 246, 371 P.2d 657 (1962).
360. Id. at 253, 371 P.2d at 661; cf. Greer Tank & Welding Inc. v. Boettger, 609 P.2d
548, 550 (Alaska 1980) (Decedent's former stepson was allowed to claim as a dependent
under Alaska's wrongful death statute, which lists as wrongful death beneficiaries decedent's
"husband or wife, and children ... or other dependents." (emphasis added)).
361. See, e.g., In re Estate of Edwards, 106 Ill. App. 3d 635, 435 N.E.2d 1379 (1982);
Whitchurch v. Perry, 137 Vt. 464, 408 A.2d 627 (1979).
362. In re Estate of Edwards, 106 Ill. App. 3d 635, - 435 N.E.2d 1379, 1382 (1982).
A unique and complex area deserving treatment beyond the scope of this Article is the
status of the equitably adopted child in qualifying for the benefits under social welfare legislation. In cases arising under the Social Security Act some courts have permitted equitably
adopted children to qualify for benefits when the federal statute does not mandate formal
adoption proceedings and state law would recognize the adoption. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d),
416 (1976 & Supp. 1981) for provisions defining the term "child" for purposes of old age,
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A construction problem of particular difficulty arises when a
stranger to the informal adoption makes a gift to someone else's
"children," "issue," or "heirs," and a claimant seeks to qualify as a
member of the designated class by dint of equitable adoption. Suppose, for example, that T in 1940 executes a testamentary trust
directing payment of income to his son S for life with corpus distributable either to S's issue or to T's next of kin as of S's death in
the event S dies without issue. After T dies, S, who has no biological issue, takes another's child, X, into his home, raises X as his
own, but never formalizes the relationship by legal adoption. When
S dies in 1983, X claims the fund as S's equitably adopted child,
and T's collateral relatives claim the fund as T's next of kin.
Should the trustee distribute the corpus to X or to T's collateral
relatives? Although some courts might approach the matter by
asking whether X legally qualifies as S's issue, that is not really the
question. Strictly speaking the question is whether T meant to include an informally adopted child like X in the class even though
he does not qualify as S's issue. Alas, once again, the instrument is
totally unenlightening and the court must fashion a presumption
concerning what the average donor using the language T used must
have intended.
Although few reported cases deal with the equitably adopted
child in the class gift setting, more such cases may arise as the
adoption by estoppel doctrine expands. The highest courts of Alabama and West Virginia already have had occasion to grapple with
the

problem. The Alabama

case, Robinson v. Robinson 3 3

presented the following facts. The testator died in 1937 with a will
survivor's or disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. For cases allowing
benefits, see Blair ex rel. Brown v. Califano, 650 F.2d 840 (6th Cir. 1981); Williams v. Richardson, 523 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1975). For a case disallowing benefits, see King v. Schweiker,
647 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1981). Statutes providing aid to dependent children are concerned
more with the needs of the child than with the relationship between the child and his custodian. The relationship between the child and his custodian will, however, determine under
which section the child receives benefits, which may, in turn, affect the amount of benefits.
Needy children living with a statutorily designated blood relative qualify for benefits under
42 U.S.C. § 606 (1976 & Supp. 1981), which also covers formal adoptees. Youngsters living
with more distant relatives or strangers, however, qualify for benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 608
(1976 & Supp. 1981). One court seemed to indicate that § 608 would also apply when a legal
adoption is still incomplete yet an equitable adoption is evident. See Cannon v. Illinois,
Dep't Pub. Aid, 76 Ill. App. 3d 910, 395 N.E.2d 732 (1979). For a case in which the court
allowed a claimant qualified under § 606 to choose § 608 instead and thus receive a higher
award, see Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125 (1979). For legislative history on these provisions, see Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
3287, 3350.
363. 283 Ala. 257, 215 So. 2d 585 (1967).
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devising approximately 1500 acres of farm and pasture land known
as the "McCarty Place" to one son for life and directing conveyance of the remainder to the children of another son in the event
that the life tenant should die without children." Although the
life tenant never had any biological children, he and his wife did
develop a close relationship with a lad named George for whom
they provided an education and a bedroom in their home. The testator never knew George, who was born two years after he died.
When George was about twenty years old, his biological parents
agreed to let the life tenant and his wife adopt him.365 Formal
adoption proceedings were actually commenced, but the decree of
adoption did not become final until eleven months after the life
tenant died with a will purporting to devise the "McCarty Place"
to George. The Alabama Supreme Court held that, because the decree was not final, George was not a legally adopted child when the
life tenant died and that, for purposes of the contingency in the
testator's will, the equitable adoption of George did not prevent
the life tenant's death without children. The court held that
George was entitled to share in his foster father's estate as an equitable adoptee but, because the foster father's interest in the "McCarty Place" ended with his death, the foster father's estate had
no realty for George to take. Had his foster father only lived another eleven months George would have owned a chunk of the
"McCarty Place," but the fates and the Alabama Supreme Court
conspired to leave George empty handed. 66
At the other end of the spectrum in approach is the decision
of the West Virginia Supreme Court in Wheeling Dollar Savings &
Trust Co. v. Singer.3 67 Wheeling involved a testamentary trust
that directed payment of income to the testatrix' niece, Lyda, for
life and payment of corpus to Lyda's children or, if she died without children, to the testatrix' heirs at law. 6 8 When Lyda died, a
woman named Ada, whom Lyda had taken from an orphanage
when Ada was eight years old and whom Lyda had raised as her
own child, claimed the fund. Lyda never legally adopted Ada. The
364. The terms of the devise have been simplified for the sake of readability.
365. One surmises that a desire to keep the "McCarty Place" from passing entirely to
the children of the life tenant's brothers partly motivated the proposed adoption.
366. That the adoption did not become final in time spared the court the agony of
having to decide whether the testator's use of the term "children" contemplated a person
adopted as an adult by the life tenant. For a refresher on that construction problem, see
supra notes 193-221 and accompanying text.
367. 250 S.E.2d 369 (W. Va. 1978).
368. The terms of the trust have been simplified for the sake of readability.
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West Virginia Supreme Court held that if Ada could prove "by
clear, cogent and convincing evidence" that she "stood from an age
of tender years in a position exactly equivalent to a formally
adopted child," she would be entitled to the fund as Lyda's equitably adopted child.3

'9

Neither the testatrix, who died long before

the alleged equitable adoption, nor her heirs, who were named as
alternate takers, were claiming through the alleged adopting parent. Neither the testatrix nor her heirs had done anything to warrant the raising of an estoppel against them. The practical effect of
the court's decision, therefore, was to give the equitably adopted
child the same status as a biological or legally adopted child vis-avis parties who had nothing whatsoever to do with the alleged informal adoption. The court did draw one distinction between the
legal adoptee and the equitable adoptee, pointing out that "[t]he
formally adopted child need only produce his adoption papers to
guarantee his treatment as an adopted child" whereas the equitably adopted child must prove his position "by clear, cogent and
convincing evidence.

3 70

The court indicated, however, that once

the equitably adopted child overcame the high proof hurdle, the
court would treat her in all respects like a formally adopted child.
Indeed, as the court saw it, the question was "whether adherence
to formal adoption procedures ... is the exclusive method by

which a person may be accorded the protections of adoptive status
in West Virginia. "371 The court proceeded to answer that question
in the negative, commenting that:
Our family centered society presumes that bonds of love and loyalty will prevail in the distribution of family wealth along family lines, and only by affirmative action, i.e., writing a will, may this presumption be overcome. An
equitably adopted child in practical terms is as much a family member as a
formally adopted child and should not be the subject of discrimination. He
will be as loyal to his adoptive parents, take as faithful care of them in their
old age, and provide them with as much financial and emotional support in
their vicissitudes, as any natural or formally adopted child.371

One may certainly sympathize with the court's position. However,
it is disappointing that the court did not explore in depth the
question whether we should presume a stranger to the informal
adoption meant to include someone else's equitably adopted child
369. 250 S.E.2d at 373. In the same opinion the court jettisoned the requirement that
an adoption contract be proved to establish an equitable adoption. See supra notes 317-20
and accompanying text.
370. 250 S.E.2d at 373.
371. Id.
372. Id.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:711

or consider the policy implications of treating the equitable
adoptee in all respects like a formally adopted child.
Should we presume that a stranger to the informal adoption
meant to include someone else's equitably adopted child in his private gift? Should tax departments give an equitably adopted child
the more favorable inheritance tax status accorded biological and
legally adopted children? Should a court permit an equitably
adopted child to inherit through his foster parents from their lineal and collateral kindred? In short, should equitable adoptees be
given legal adoptee status and thus receive the benefits of formal
adoption from parties who have done nothing to warrant the raising of an estoppel against them? Were the equitable adoptee's natural expectations the only consideration, the answer to this question would be a resounding "yes." There are, however, other
considerations that must be weighed in the balance. The theoretical difficulty of bringing Wheeling and the inheritance tax cases
within the estoppel doctrine is obvious. What is less obvious but
ultimately more important is the erosive effect that such
equivalent treatment of formal and informal adoptees may have on
our formal adoption procedures. A look at our adoption procedures
is needed to appreciate the policy considerations at stake.
In early America child placement and adoption was an informal affair. 8 Even when legislatures enacted general adoption legislation on a wave of social reform in the mid-nineteenth century,
some of those first statutes permitted one person to adopt another
simply by filing a deed of adoption.3 7 Such laissez-faire informality is now a thing of the past. Today all states require a judicial
3 75
decree to establish the legal status of adoptive parent and child.
The stringency of the procedures necessary to consummate an
adoption vary from state to state and within each state depending
on the nature of the adoption and the relationship of the prospective adoptor to the prospective adoptee. Still, the generalization
may be made that adoption today is a formal, closely regulated
process designed to ensure suitable placement of the child.
373. See supra notes 8-21 and accompanying text.
374. For example, the first Missouri statute authorizing adoption, 1856 Mo. Laws 59,
permitted the adoption of children by deed. In 1917 the Missouri legislature prohibited the
adoption of children by deed or private agreement and gave the juvenile courts exclusive
jurisdiction over the adoption of children. 1917 Mo. Laws 193. For other examples of early
legislation permitting adoption by deed, see statutes cited supra note 21.
375. See Comment, Moppets on the Market: The Problem of UnregulatedAdoptions,
59 YALE L.J. 715, 725 (1950).
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Procedurally two types of adoptions exist-agency adoptions
and independent adoptions. 7 6
The state regulates and licenses agencies authorized to place
children for adoption. Typically trained social workers subject the
prospective adoptors to rigorous investigation regarding their ability to provide a good home before the agency will even place them
on the agency's waiting list for a child. The average waiting period
is approximately five years.877 Even after the agency places the
child, the adoption cannot become final until the expiration of a
trial period during which the court directs its own investigation to
ensure that the placement is working out satisfactorily.3 78 According to a July 1983 news story the cost of adopting a child through
an agency in Spokane, Washington, ranges from $2500 to $5000 or
more.37 9 One private agency broke the costs down as follows: "For
a newborn, fees are $25 for the initial application; $550 for the
home study; $4500 for the actual adoption-which includes the
mother's hospitalization, attorney fees, and miscellaneous
'' o
expenses. 13
Independent adoptions are those adoptions not orchestrated
by agencies. Such adoptions, also called private adoptions, are legal
in most states. When the adoptor is the child's stepparent or blood
relative, one of the biological parents or some other blood relative
usually arranges placement. Private adoptions by strangers are
generally orchestrated by intermediaries-typically doctors, lawyers, or well-meaning friends or relatives of an unwed mother.
Since these intermediaries generally lack any expertise in child
placement, the child gets very little official protection at this
preplacement stage. Once the placement occurs, however, the procedures are the same as the procedures for an agency adoption.8 '
Specifically, almost all state statutes mandate a trial period and
home investigation before the adoption can be granted.8 2 Some
376. See generally Black-Market Adoptions, 22 CATH. LAw. 48 (1976); Grove, Independent Adoptions: The Case for the Gray Market, 13 VmL.L. REv. 116 (1967).
377. J. McNbA,
THE ADOPTION ADvisOR 75 (1975). A recent news story reports that
in the state of Washington "the wait averages about six years" for the most sought after
adoptees. See Huessy, More Young Moms Consider Adoption Option, The Spokesman-Review, July 17, 1983, at B1, col 1.
378. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-12 (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1508 (SmithHurd 1980); PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 23, § 2535 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984).
379. Huesay, supra note 377, at B1, col. 1.

380. Id. at B1, cols. 4-5.
381. See generally Black-Market Adoptions, supra note 376, at 52-54; Grove, supra
note 376, at 121-25.
382. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 224n, 226.6 (West 1982 & Supp. 1983); N.Y. Dom.
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states require that a social worker or licensed agency conduct this
home investigation.3 83 Other jurisdictions permit the judge to appoint any person deemed competent by the court.3 81 Thus, the
main feature that distinguishes the independent adoption from the
agency adoption is the lack of preplacement investigation in the
former.
In nonrelative independent adoptions the adopting couple typically pays for the biological mother's prepartum maintenance and
medical costs through birth. When the middleman is a lawyer, a
fee will be charged for professional services connected with the
adoption. The states have enacted various regulations to promote
the child's welfare as the paramount consideration and to protect
the private adoption process from unscrupulous intermediaries
more interested in making a profit than in placing the child with
suitable parents.8 5 Some regulations prohibit private placement by
anyone other than the child's biological parent, relative, or guardian. 86 Others require that a report be filed with the appropriate
child welfare department before or shortly after the child is placed
so that the department may begin a prompt investigation.38 7 Some
statutes require disclosure of all expenses paid in connection with
the adoption,38 8 and others provide criminal sanctions for profiteering in child placement.8 9 A few states require approval by the
court or a child welfare agency before placement is allowed. 890
REL. LAW §§ 112, 116 (McKinney 1977); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.13 (Page Supp. 1982);
TEX. FMf. CODE ANN. §§ 16.031, .04 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1982-1983).
383. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 45-63 (West 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, §
1508 (Smith-Hurd 1980); R.L GEN. LAWS § 15-7-11 (Supp. 1982).
384. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 199.510 (1982); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 2535 (Purdon
Supp. 1983-1984); WASH, REv. CODE ANN. § 26.32.090 (Supp. 1983-1984).
385. See generally Black-Market Adoptions, supra note 376, at 56-61; Grove, supra
note 376, at 125-33. For a discussion of the ethical problems facing even the well-meaning
lawyer who is not in it for the money, but seeks to make a nice couple happy rather than to
find the best home for child, see Address by the Honorable Alfred L. Podolski, Abolishing
Baby Buying: Limiting IndependentAdoption Placement (Aug. 13, 1975) printed in 9 FAM.
L. Q. 547, 551-53 (1975).
386. See, e.g., MICH. Cown. LAWS ANN. § 722.124 (West. Supp. 1983-1984); NEB. Rev.
STAT. § 43-701 (1978); N.Y. Soc. SmV. LAW § 374(2) (McKinney 1983).
387. See, e.g., Axuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-108(A) (1974); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-110(1)
(1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.092(1) (West Supp. 1976); MmNN. STAT. ANN. § 257.03 (West
1982); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:14(II) (1978).
388. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-114(A) (1974); CAL. CIV. CODE § 224r (West
1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.097 (West Supp. 1976).
389. See, e.g., MASs. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 11A (Michie/Law Co-op. 1981); MXCH.
Cowi. LAWS ANN. § 710.13 (West 1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A. 96-7 (West 1976); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 866 (West 1983).
390. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.470 (Baldwin 1982); MICH. Cowi. LAWS ANN.
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These safeguards appear in varying combinations in most state
statutes. Finally, four states completely outlaw private placements
in all cases except those cases in which the adoptor is a stepparent
or blood relative of the child."'1
Although weaknesses exist in some of our adoption schemes,
the regulations just described make it clear that the whole process
for both agency and private adoptions is designed to ensure that
the child is placed in a suitable environment. By contrast the process of equitable adoption is completely unregulated. In most cases
the placement of the child does not come to the attention of any
official until after the child is grown and the foster parents have
died. What will happen to formal adoption procedures if courts
and legislatures give equitable adoptees all the rights and privileges accorded formal adoptees? If the adopting public becomes
aware that they can achieve the equivalent of legal adoption
through an informal agreement or representation of status, they
may avoid and eventually undermine state supervised formal adoption procedures. Why should prospective adoptors endure the investigations, trial periods, red-tape, reporting requirements, and
expenses involved in formal adoption when they can achieve all the
consequences of formal adoption by informal means? As one court
put it,
If taking a child into a home, rearing such child, giving it the family name,

calling such child a daughter, and holding such child out to the relatives and
friends as a daughter, is sufficient to establish a lawful adoption, then there
would be no need for any statutory authority or judicial proceeding.392

What is to stop the would-be adoptor from simply finding an unwed mother or other custodian who is willing to sell the baby for a
price that is competitive with the cost of most formal adoptions? It
is true that the lack of protection equitable adoption provides for
the foster parent in the event the biological parents decide to reclaim the child would deter many prospective adoptors from taking
this route. 9 3 The skeptical reader may also be asking whether prospective adoptors would really consider the legal effects of informal
§ 722.559 (West 1968); Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.110 (1977); Omo Rlv. CODE ANN. § 5103.16
(Page 1981). Of these statutes, only the Ohio statute mandates a preplacement investigation
before the court approves the placement.
391. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-63 (West 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 904
(1981); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 28A, § 11 (West 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.22(2)
(West 1982).

392. Belden v. Armstrong, 93 Ohio App. 307, 312-13, 113 N.E.2d 693, 696 (1951).
393. See, e.g., In re Perales, 52 Ohio St. 2d 89, 369 N.E.2d 1047 (1977); Trevino v.
Garcia 627 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. 1982).
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adoption in deciding what course to follow. Perhaps many would
not and it may be that formal adoption procedures would be better
protected by more direct sanctions against informal adoption.
Meanwhile, pending such solutions, courts should not encourage
completely unregulated equitable adoptions by putting informal
adoptees on the same footing as formal adoptees. The courts that
are teetering on the brink of treating equitable adoptees in all respects like legal adoptees seem unaware or only dimly aware of the
indirect effect such equivalent treatment might have on the formal
adoption process.
One might ask whether circumvention of adoption procedures
would always bring about bad results. In some cases, particularly
those cases in which the child is given to relatives, unregulated
placement may work out just fine. Nevertheless, even our regulated
formal adoption schemes have been vulnerable to abuse by unscrupulous persons who are in the business of placing children for
profit. Independent nonrelative adoptions orchestrated by middlemen, called the grey market in adoption lingo, are particularly subject to this kind of abuse. Whenever the middleman receives an
under-the-table payment over and above the reasonable fee for
professional services, the transaction crosses the line of legitimacy
to become a black market sale of baby flesh to the highest bidder.
The widespread availability of contraception and legal abortion
has brought about a shortage of infants available for adoption.39 4

The scarcest adoptees in greatest demand are healthy white infants dubbed "'Gerber babies' because they resemble the 3picture
'9 5
used in marketing Gerber brand infant food and clothing.

Couples unwilling to endure the scrutiny and long wait required for an agency placement have been willing to pay fees in the
range of $10,000, $20,000, or even $25,000 for a healthy, white newborn. 98 In these transactions the child's welfare receives no consideration. The only criterion for placement is whether the prospective adoptors can pay whatever fee the black market traffic will
394. See Hearings on Examination and Exploration of Existing and Proposed Federal Policies Affecting the Adoption of Children and Their Placement in the Foster Care
System Before the Subcomm. on Childrenand Youth of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Hearings].
395. Huessy, supra note 377, at B1, col 1. This news story, however, also reports that
the number of young mothers considering adoption-out as an alternative to abortion or
keeping the child is on the increase. Id. at B1, col. 3.
396. 1975 Hearings, supra note 394, at 175; see also Breasted, Baby Brokers Reaping
Huge Fees, N.Y. Times, June 28, 1977, at 1, col. 1; Klemesrud, Adoption Costs Soar as
Births Decline, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1973, at 1, col. 4.
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bear. Although the object of a black market transaction may be
lucky enough to find himself in a good home, such a happy result is
completely fortuitous. In 1975 the executive director of the Child
Welfare League of America estimated that four or five thousand
black market adoptions occur each year. 97 The black market in
babies has produced such tragedies as the placement of children
with alleged child molesters 9 8 or with people who turned out to be
psychotic.39 9 It is beyond the scope of this Article to enter the debate over whether states should ban all independent adoptions in
an effort to eliminate the black market. Suffice it to pose the query
that if such sordid abuses can occur in the regulated market of
formal adoptions, what atrocities might we expect in the completely unregulated market of equitable adoptions?
With the foregoing considerations in mind, this author believes that courts and legislatures should carefully limit the consequences of equitable adoption to granting the child relief against
his foster parents and their privies. Specifically, the equitably
adopted child should have a claim against an intestate foster parent's estate, should have standing to contest the will of a testate
foster parent, and should be able to claim child support from a
foster parent whose actions have made it impractical for the child
to get support from others. On the other hand, a court should deny
relief when the equitably adopted child seeks full adoptee status
vis-A-vis relatives of the foster parents, taxing authorities, or others
who did nothing to estop themselves. Claims made by the foster
parents or their relatives to full legal status as the equitably
adopted child's heir or wrongful death beneficiary should likewise
be dismissed.
In taking this position the author acknowledges that were the
child's normal expectations our only concern, he should be treated
as a legally adopted child for all purposes. Yet, sympathies for the
equitably adopted child cannot be indulged without risking erosion
of formal adoption procedures and thus sacrificing the larger good
of ensuring suitable placement for all children to the exigencies of
the individual case.
The effect of the limited status rule suggested is that the equitably adopted child will not be a member of his foster family for all
purposes and, thus, will continue to have reciprocal rights of inher397. 1975 Hearings, supra note 394, at 31.
398. See NEV. ATT'y GEN., ADOPTION PRACTICES IN NEVADA 19 (1961).
399. See Gallese, Black-Market Babies: Couples Pay Big Fees to Get Children Fast,
Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 1971, at 1, col. 4.
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itance within his biological family. The possibility thus afforded of
dual inheritance from the biological and foster parents is perhaps
unfortunate. Another unfortunate byproduct of this limited status
rule is that the foster family from whom the child received nurture
and, possibly, property will not be able to inherit from him. These
results are the price we must pay for the continuing efficacy of our
adoption procedures.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

In dealing with the impact of adoption on succession, legislatures and courts should provide rules of inheritance and canons of
construction that fully address the problems that arise while furthering the humanitarian goals of modern adoption. We have seen
that the primary goal of the typical nonrelative adoption is to
sever the child from his biological family and to assimilate him
into his adoptive family as if he had been born into it.
In regulating intestate succession by, from, and through
adopted persons, several consanguinity minded states have fallen
far short of furthering these goals of adoption. By denying mutual
rights of inheritance between the adoptee and the relatives of his
adoptors, these states have given the adoptee only grudging second
class recognition within his adoptive family. At the same time consanguinity oriented states have unwisely assumed that biological
filiation must survive adoption. Wherever this unwarranted assumption persists, the adoptee is treated in matters of inheritance
like a two-headed freak, differentiated from natural children by his
dual sources of inheritance. The failure of these states to treat an
adopted child like any other child is brought into sharp relief by
those cases that grant the adoptee the dubious privilege of being
permitted to inherit in two capacities from the very same
decedent.
Even the more progressive states could improve their statutes.
These statutes laudably achieve total substitution of the adoptive
family for the biological family in the typical case but fail to address the questions that arise to plague the courts in the atypical
in-family and adult adoption cases.
Most state legislatures have ignored the special problems that
in-family adoptions pose. The attempted solutions are neither
comprehensive nor well thought out. For example, legislatures that
have embraced the UPC have enacted provisos to preserve mutual
inheritance ties between the child and both biological parents
when the adoptor is a stepparent. Because it seems wrong to pre-
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serve the inheritance rights of a parent who has relinquished his
child to a stepparent, such exceptions should be refined along the
lines of section 14 of the Revised Uniform Adoption Act. The progressive states also fall short in failing to provide for the case of
the child adopted by a blood relative, typically a grandparent.
When the adoption does not remove the adoptee emotionally from
his original family, the state legislatures should provide an exception to preserve the inheritance rights between the adoptee and
the nonadopting side of his family. A well-considered intestacy
statute should also make it clear that in the event of successive
adoptions, the child shall be deemed the natural child of his most
recent adoptors and shall not be deemed a child of his prior
adoptors.
Our state intestacy statutes have not coherently addressed the
phenomenon of adult adoption. As we have seen, the adoption of
an adult is ordinarily quite simple. One adult can usually adopt
another willing adult without obtaining anyone's consent. Moreover, most intestate succession schemes treat the adult adoptee exactly like a child adoptee. This situation invites the use of adoption laws to qualify adults as the heirs of persons who may know
nothing of the adoption or the adoptee. The opportunities for
abuse could be lessened by legislation either requiring notice to all
relatives whose estates the adoption might affect or permitting a
court that grants an adult adoption decree to restrict inheritance
rights as the situation may warrant.
In the construction of class gifts, most courts and some legislatures have recently rejected the "stranger-to-the-adoption" rule in
favor of a presumption that, unless the instrument provides otherwise, the donor intended to include adoptees in class designations
like "children" or "issue." This trend represents a great step forward in ensuring that the canons of construction governing class
gifts are in harmony with present societal attitudes toward adoption. Nevertheless, while the present constructional preference represents a vast improvement over the obsessive concern with consanguinity embodied in the "stranger-to-the-adoption" rule,
serious construction problems still await resolution.
One perplexing problem still outstanding is the retroactivity
problem inherent in the construction of old instruments. A court
that has recently embraced the new inclusionary presumption may
conclude that it must, nevertheless, apply the "stranger-to-theadoption" rule in vogue when the donor executed the instrument.
The refusal to apply the new presumption retroactively permits in-
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consistent results on identical facts within the same jurisdiction
depending on the fortuity of when the instrument was executed. It
also perpetuates a rule the courts now believe to have been a bad
guide to donative intent. The retroactivity issue is one on which
the courts have sharply divided. Apart from the merits of the debate, in today's highly mobile society this division of authority is
unfortunate in and of itself. The donor might execute the instrument in one state and die domiciled in another, thus compounding
the choice of law possibilities with a concomitant increase in unpredictability as to titles. In view of the unlikelihood that anyone
actually relied on the "stranger-to-the-adoption" rule in drafting
instruments, the courts that have refused to apply the new presumption retroactively should consider changing their stand. This
change would promote much needed uniformity in the treatment
of adoptees under class gifts and would give a final and decent burial to what probably always was a bad presumption.
Even when retroactivity is not a problem the danger exists
that courts will apply the new presumption too rigidly. Some states
have ushered in the new inclusionary presumption by legislation.
These statutory presumptions typically provide that adoptees take
under class gifts the same as natural children unless the instrument expressly excludes them. The all-or-nothing terms in which
such statutes are cast preclude the courts from considering circumstances extrinsic to the document even though common sense may
cry out for such inquiry in some cases. States with rigidly worded
statutory presumptions should consider redrafting them to provide
that adoptees are included unless the language of the instrument
or surrounding circumstances clearly indicate otherwise. Because
the courts have inherent power to redefine and refine their own
precedents, promulgation of the pro-adoptee presumption by judicial rule has distinct advantages over legislative attempts. Yet, although authority is thus far scant, some courts have limited themselves by holding that they will presume inclusion unless language
in the instrument itself shows a contrary intent. The difficulties
the courts have had in dealing with adopted-out claimants and
adult adoptees illuminate the adverse consequences of such rigidity, whatever its source.
Adult adoptions are frequently misused to misdirect and pervert a donor's dispositive plan after his death. Common sense tells
us that a donor's natural expectation would be that the legal relationship created by adoption would correspond functionally with a
normal parent-child relationship. The prospect of a manipulative
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adult adoption would never occur to most donors. It is therefore
unreasonable to expect that instruments will contain language excluding adult adoptees. A court's refusal or inability to examine
circumstances beyond the instrument itself will defeat the donor's
natural expectations in most class gift cases concerning claimants
adopted as adults. Because most state statutes make no distinction
between adult and child adoptees, manipulative adult adoption
schemes have all too often succeeded simply because the court assumed that it had to apply the inclusionary presumption and, the
instrument being silent, could not find a way to exclude the
adoptee. The legislatures should not hamstring the judiciary and
the judiciary should not hamstring itself into a position in which
the courts are powerless to protect the donor's clear, albeit unexpressed, intent.
In the class gift setting, the courts should apply the "strangerto-the-adoption" presumption to all adult adoptees in the first instance. They should, however, give the adoptee the opportunity to
rebut the exclusionary presumption by reliable extrinsic evidence
showing that he and his adoptor enjoyed the functional equivalent
of a normal parent-child relationship. If the adoptee can convince
the trier of fact on this issue, he should prevail. This approach
should enable the courts to protect the donor from imposition
without barring the door irrevocably against adult adoptees who
were actually reared by their adoptors.
Flexibility is also needed in class gift cases involving adoptedout claimants. In keeping with the policy behind modern intestacy
laws making the adoptee a legal stranger to his biological bloodstream, the basic presumption should be that the donor meant to
exclude claimants who have been adopted out of the donor's biological family. When the adoption takes place within the family so
that the adoptee and his biological relatives remain acquainted,
the court should have the discretion to permit rebuttal of this exclusionary presumption by convincing extrinsic evidence. On the
other hand, when the adoption-out is to strangers, the jurisdictional uncertainties, instability of titles, and other mischief a potential class of unknown beneficiaries might inject into the settlement of estates is of sufficient nuisance value to warrant an
absolute prohibition of extrinsic evidence. If donors want to include adopted-out relatives with whom the family no longer has
contact, they should be required to say so in the instrument itself.
The claims arising out of an equitable adoption scenario pose
special problems. In developing criteria for determining whether
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an equitable adoption has occurred, the courts should scrap the
contract requirement and focus on what the child was reasonably
induced to believe rather than on what the foster parents agreed to
do or intended to do. Once the court finds an equitable adoption,
however, it should scrupulously limit the consequences of that
finding. When the child's claim is against the foster parents or
their privies, a court should ordinarily grant relief. But when the
child goes beyond the foster parents and their privies and seeks
legal adoptee status vis-A-vis parties who have done nothing to estop themselves, a court should deny relief. Equitable adoption
should not be made the de facto equivalent of statutory adoption.
In taking this position, the author recognizes that were the child's
normal expectations the only concern, society should treat him as a
legally adopted child for all purposes. However, sympathies for the
equitably adopted child cannot be indulged without threatening
the fabric of our adoption procedures and thus sacrificing the
larger good of ensuring suitable placement for all children to the
exigencies of the particular case.
This Article has examined the impact of adoption on succession from every angle and found the existing state of the law wanting in purpose and consistency. Although states have made significant progress in some areas, it is evident that courts and
legislatures must make a concerted effort along the lines suggested
in this Article to bring our adoption laws, intestacy laws, and canons of construction into a harmonious working relationship.

